A hardware-enabled certificate of authenticity system with intrinsically high entropy by Lakafosis, Vasileios
A HARDWARE-ENABLED CERTIFICATE OF








of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Electrical and Computer Engineering
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
May 2013
Copyright© 2013 by Vasileios Lakafosis
A HARDWARE-ENABLED CERTIFICATE OF
AUTHENTICITY SYSTEM WITH INTRINSICALLY
HIGH ENTROPY
Approved by:
Dr. Manos M. Tentzeris, Advisor
Professor, School of ECE
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Gregory D. Durgin
Associate Professor, School of ECE
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Mark Allen
Professor, School of ECE
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Edward Gebara
Adjunct Professor, School of ECE




Date Approved: March 13th, 2013
To my parents, Dimitris and Evgenia, my sister, Paraskevi, and Eleni
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Writing down these lines helps me realize how fortunate I am to have met and have been
supported in this academic journey of mine by so many people. They have given me so
many wonderful moments I will cherish forever. First and foremost, I will always be grate-
ful to Prof. Tentzeris, my advisor, for the many opportunities he so generously provided
to me to expand my knowledge and experiences. I deeply thank him for his guidance, his
proven trust in me in many aspects of the academic life and often making great challenges
look simple. He taught me how important working efficiently and with confidence is to
be successful. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Gregory Durgin, Dr. Ed-
ward Gebara, Dr. Mark Allen, and Dr. Darko Kirovski for serving as my Ph.D. committee
members and for their thoughtful feedback on my Thesis. I am indebted to Dr. Kirovski
and Dr. Gebara; their truly uninterrupted support, expert advise, enthusiasm and encour-
agement have been crucial in the completion of this dissertation. This Ph.D. would have
not started at all without the help and encouragement of my undergraduate advisor at the
National Technical University of Athens, Nikolaos Uzunoglu. His laconic look and con-
senting smile at me during our discussions has been a great thrust toward embarking on
this journey. I cannot also thank enough Dr. Mostafa Ammar and Dr. Ellen Zegura with
the Computer Science department for their valuable time to so kindly provide me with
perspectives, when I needed them.
Sangkil Kim, Taoran Le, Trang Thai, Amin Rida, Benjamin Cook, Hoseon Lee, Cong
Shi, Danilo de Donno, Daniela Staiculescu thank you all for being great colleagues, lab
mates and friends! I owe special thanks to my collaborator and friend, Rushi Vyas, for the
endless discussions, the generous help in research and sharing all moments, both the good
ones and the difficult ones.
I am also grateful to Microsoft Research, the Georgia Electronic Design Center, the
iv
Cisco Research Center, the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organi-
zation and the Gerondelis Foundation for providing the grants to support this research work
and myself during all these years. It has also been an honor for me to be a Lilian Voudouri
fellow. Daniel Alvarez and Suyash Sinha have been great internship mentors at Cisco and
Microsoft Research, respectively. I am also thankful to Dimitris Mitsainas, my manager at
Intracom Telecom, for his trust in me from the very first moment and his endorsement to
pursue graduate studies.
Life in Atlanta was enjoyable because of many friends. I couldn’t have hoped for a bet-
ter roommate the five years of this journey than Vangelis Farantatos. He has supported me
more than he thinks, especially with his great memory! I also need to thank Niko Vasiloglou
and Vicki Papanikolaou for so generously offering me my first and last ”home” in Atlanta;
as well as... their cars whenever I asked – no questions asked! Their house always offered a
family atmosphere in Atlanta. I have many great times to remember with Giorgos Stefopou-
los, George Georgoulas, Michael Balchanos, Yannis Doudalis, Yorgos Amanatidis, Yannis
Raptis, Spyros Pavlidis, Yorgos Drakopoulos, Andreas Katsiamis, Ioanna Dafermou, and
Stephane Ntwoku. I would have never expected to say that in my first year, as my then
roommates Ola Gustafson and Philipp Andersch can attest, but Atlanta has been a super
cool city! Jonathan Pan you contributed to this too man! The time outside Atlanta and all
over the world has been exciting because of Babis Papamanthou (at Seattle and at Moun-
tain View with his invaluable support during tough times), Luca Amati (at the Bay Area),
Dr. Yoshihiro Kawahara, Dr. Tohru Asami, Hiroshi Nishimoto, Yun Li, Tashi Phuntsho
and Lyubo Valnarov (at Tokyo) and my friends in Greece George Sobonis, Kostas Zachos,
Dimitris Kyriakopoulos, and Kostas Kremyzas. Since my early undergraduate times and
regardless of the distance, Giannis Giannakakis has always been a friend to talk to on the
other line of the phone and a continuous source of joy.
I owe too much to my parents, Dimitris and Evgenia, for their endless love and numer-
ous sacrifices. The education they were able to provide me with, the values they instilled
v
in me and the motivation they gave me have been the greatest gifts. My appreciation, of
course, goes to my sister Evi, with whom I wish I could be spending a lot more time.
This final paragraph is for my beloved Eleni. No words can express my deepest grati-
tude for everything that has kept me going; her love, patience, support, and encouragement.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Dissertation Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 Anti-counterfeiting Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 Two-dimensional Printed Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2 Software-only-based Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.3 Fiber-based Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.4 Physical Unclonable Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.5 Far-field-based Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.6 Near-field-based Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.7 Summary/Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Differentiation/Strength of the NF-CoA System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHAPTER 3 THE NF-COA SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 Near-field (NF) Electromagnetic Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 Electromagnetic Scattering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3 The Near-field CoA Fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.4 Definitions of the Major Components of the NF-CoA System . . . . . . . 24
3.5 Leveraging the Unique Near-field Scattering Properties for
Increased Entropy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.6 Potential Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
CHAPTER 4 NF-COA INSTANCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1 CoA Design and Fabrication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.1 Inkjet-printed Paper-based CoAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.2 Copper-based CoAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1.3 CoA Instances on Flat and Cylindrical Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2 NF-CoA Instance Life Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2.1 NF-CoA Issuing Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.2 NF-CoA Verification Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
vii
CHAPTER 5 NF-COA READER DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . 45
5.1 The NF-CoA Reader Generations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1.1 First-generation NF-CoA Reader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.1.2 Second-generation NF-CoA Reader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.1.3 Third-generation NF-CoA Reader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.2 Super High Frequency Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.2.1 Antenna Array Elements and Coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.2.2 SP4T Switch Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.2.3 SHF Signal Generation and Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3 Micro-controller-enabled Reader Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3.1 Pulse Width Modulation to Control the VCOs . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.3.2 Analog-to-Digital Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.3.3 Component Timing Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.3.4 Wireless Network Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
CHAPTER 6 NF-COA SYSTEM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION . . . . . . 82
6.1 Simulations for Entropy Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.2 Performance Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.2.1 NF Response Before and After Attaching an NF-CoA . . . . . . 92
6.2.2 NF Response as a Function of the Distance of the NF-CoA In-
stance From the Antenna Array . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.2.3 NF Response as a function of the NF-CoA 2D Projection Area . . 99
6.2.4 Effect of the Conductive Material Density of the NF-CoAs . . . . 101
6.2.5 Intra-CoA Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.2.6 Inter-CoA Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.2.7 Shielding Against Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
CHAPTER 7 NF-COA ENTROPY EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.1 Statistics-based Empirical Entropy Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7.2 Randomness Evaluation With the NIST Statistical Test Suite . . . . . . . 144
7.2.1 The Null Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.2.2 Testing Against the NIST Statistical Test Suite . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.2.3 The NF-CoA System as a Physical Random Number Generator . . 148
CHAPTER 8 WITHSTANDING ADVERSARIAL EFFORTS/ATTACKS . . . 149
8.1 3D CoA Physical Replication/Reproduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
8.2 Inverse Design Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8.2.1 Step 1: Forward Design Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
8.2.2 Step 2: Inverse Design Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
8.2.3 An Inverse Design Attack Example: 2D to 3D Projection . . . . . 156
8.3 Private Key Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
8.4 Original Signed CoA Instances Re-use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
viii
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
9.1 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
9.2 Directions for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
APPENDIX A ENABLING LOCALIZATION FOR THE NF-COA SYSTEM . 172
A.1 Wireless Sensor and Ad-Hoc Networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
A.1.1 NF-CoA Instance Wireless Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
A.2 NF-CoA Instance Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
A.2.1 Lateration as the Localization Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
A.2.2 The Overall System/Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
A.2.3 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
AUTHOR’S PUBLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Anti-counterfeiting techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 2 The boundaries of the reactive near-field, the radiating near-field (Fres-
nel), and the far-field (Fraunhofer) areas surrounding the antenna ele-
ment of the reader array are shown in this table. The largest dimension
of the element is equal to D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Table 3 PWM and OpAmp output voltage levels for different PWM duty cycles. . 78
Table 4 Numbering of the couplings between antenna elements of the NF-CoA reader. 89
Table 5 4th order polynomial regression of the power detector output. . . . . . . . 91
Table 6 Antenna couplings of full-sized copper-based 2gI that significantly ex-
ceed the same couplings of all 45 small-sized CoAs, except for X many,
in terms of maximum magnitude and maximum sample standard deviation.100
Table 7 Contingency table (or confusion matrix) of outcome probabilities of a
binary classification problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Table 8 NIST statistical test suite results for all 47 copper-based NF-CoAs. . . . 147
Table 9 Summary of the localization estimation error results. . . . . . . . . . . . 187
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 The schematic representation shows the near-field electromagnetic scat-
tering on a randomly-shaped wire that is placed within the near field of
a transmit (Tx) and a receive (Rx) antenna element. . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Figure 2 A graphical representation of an NF fingerprint, as extracted by the cus-
tom fabricated reader for all different antenna element couplings of the
reader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 3 Design of a single paper-based layer (2D) of an inkjet-printed CoA. . . . 31
Figure 4 (a) Design and (b) fabrication of 2D NF-CoAs consisting of conductive
rhombic loops inkjet-printed on a single photo paper substrate layer with
varying metal density in terms of number of loops (11, 15, and 19). . . . 33
Figure 5 (a) Design and (b) fabrication of 2D NF-CoAs consisting of conductive
lines inkjet-printed on a single photo paper substrate layer with varying
metal density in terms of line thickness (0.25 mm, 0.5 mm, and 0.75 mm). 33
Figure 6 Separate 2D photo-paper-based layers with inkjet-printed rhombic loops
that, when stacked, form a 3D NF-CoA instance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Figure 7 A preliminary graphical evaluation of the NF signature entropy achieved
by four separate single-layered inkjet-printed CoAs shows highly-varying
signatures yielded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Figure 8 The inner semi-transparent three-dimensional structure of a 56 mm ×
56 mm “full-sized” copper-based NF-CoA instance. . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Figure 9 Copper-based 27 mm × 27 mm NF-CoAs of different mass per meter (2
g/m, 3 g/m, and 4 g/m). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Figure 10 Top view of the NF-CoA reader with (a) a small-sized and (b) a full-
sized copper-based certificate instance fastened to the annotated antenna
array slot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Figure 11 Concept photos of copper-based CoAs attached on rigid cylindrical sur-
faces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Figure 12 The NF-CoA issuing process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Figure 13 The NF-CoA verification process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Figure 14 The four metallic (MX) and three substrate (DX) layers of the NF-CoA reader
board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Figure 15 The circuit design of the first-generation NF-CoA reader. . . . . . . . . . 49
xi
Figure 16 The board schematic design of the first-generation NF-CoA reader. . . . 50
Figure 17 The (a) top and (b) bottom view of the 12.85 cm × 16.50 cm fabricated
first-generation NF-CoA reader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Figure 18 The original test setup of the first-generation NF-CoA system. The
reader control and NF-CoA signature extraction is performed by the Na-
tional Instruments data acquisition board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Figure 19 The board schematic design of the second-generation NF-CoA reader. . . 52
Figure 20 The (a) top and (b) bottom view of the 10.8 cm × 17.2 cm fabricated
second-generation NF-CoA reader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Figure 21 The original test setup of the second-generation NF-CoA system. The
control of the reader operation and the NF-CoA signature extraction are
here conducted by the NI DAQ board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Figure 22 The final test setup of the second-generation NF-CoA system. The fab-
ricated super high frequency plane of the reader is shown on the left and
its digital control plane is shown on the right. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Figure 23 The board schematic design of the third-generation NF-CoA reader. . . . 57
Figure 24 The (a) top and (b) bottom view of the 10.8 cm × 20.9 cm fabricated
third-generation NF-CoA reader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Figure 25 The design of an individual folded shorted-patch antenna. . . . . . . . . 60
Figure 26 The pattern of the transmit-only and receive-only elements of the antenna
array of the reader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Figure 27 (a) Antenna element simulation setup, (b) Antenna element measure-
ment setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Figure 28 Antenna radiation pattern of an individual element of the antenna array
simulated with ADS [1]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Figure 29 The S 11 curve of an individual element of the antenna array. . . . . . . . 62
Figure 30 (a) Bottom and (b) top view of a three by three antenna array fabricated
in the exact same way as the five by five array of the NF-CoA reader, (c)
S 21 curves of all possible different antenna element spacing of a subset
three by three array in the absence of any CoA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Figure 31 The two-layer SP4T switch hierarchy for enabling any antenna transmit
and receive element pair, out of the 72 possible permutations of the NF-
CoA board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
xii
Figure 32 Measured and simulated S 21 curves of the calibration (CAL) line of the
reader board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Figure 33 VCO mapping of the 0 V to 9.1 V (0% to 100% PWM) input control
voltage range to the 4.8 GHz to 5.8 GHz frequency spectrum. . . . . . . 67
Figure 34 The spectrum content of the super high frequency signal generated by
the voltage-controlled oscillator, as captured with a spectrum analyzer . . 69
Figure 35 Mapping of the voltage output of the power detector to the input gener-
ated by a signal generator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Figure 36 An example of the clockwise direction of a signal path through the RF
components of the NF-CoA reader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Figure 37 Operational state diagram of the algorithm implemented by the NF-CoA reader. 73
Figure 38 Passive, analog first order, or one pole, low-pass filter. . . . . . . . . . . 74
Figure 39 The step response of the first order, or one pole, low-pass filter for dif-
ferent duty cycles, namely 15%, 50% and 99%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Figure 40 The schematic of the non-inverting operational amplifier that maps the 0
V to 3.2 V filtered PWM output signal to the 0 V to 10 V tune voltage
range of the VCO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Figure 41 (a) Simplified and (b) Detailed design of the structure of an element of
the antenna array of the NF-CoA reader in ADS [1]. . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Figure 42 The designed 2 mm thick “random” scatterer that is surrounded by just
plain air (shown with red color) is placed at just 1 mm against the antenna
array (shown with blue color) in ADS [1]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Figure 43 The simulated S 21 curves when a CoA is in the reactive near-field prox-
imity or not of the antenna array of the NF-CoA reader. . . . . . . . . . . 85
Figure 44 The non-symmetric topology of the plastic poles that form the prelimi-
nary certificate slot of the NF-CoA reader against the antenna array. . . . 86
Figure 45 Top view of the NF-CoA reader with (a) a small-sized and (b) a full-
sized copper-based certificate instance fastened to the annotated antenna
array slot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Figure 46 Annotated diagram of the antenna elements of the array of the NF-CoA reader. 89
Figure 47 The No COA fingerprint (a) over frequency and (b) over antenna couplings. 93
xiii
Figure 48 Euclidean distance between the No CoA NF signature and the signatures
of randomly chosen copper-based certificates (a) 2gF, (b) 2gC, (c) 2gJ
and (d) 3gJ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Figure 49 Euclidean distance between the No CoA NF signature and the signatures
of randomly chosen paper-based certificates (a) B, (b) C, (c) D and (d) I. . 95
Figure 50 NF signature curves of NF-CoA 3gE corresponding to antenna couplings
(a) B1-D1, (b) B2-B4, (c) D4-B4 and (d) C3-B4 of NF-CoA 3gE at
distances ranging from almost zero (“just CoA”) up to approximately 6
mm (“bolt + 12ε”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Figure 51 NF signature curves of NF-CoA 3gE corresponding to frequency points
(a) 5.3419, (b) 5.3871, (c) 5.4083 and (d) 5.4285 GHz at distances rang-
ing from almost zero (“just CoA”) up to approximately 6 mm (“bolt +
12ε”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Figure 52 Antenna couplings (yellow) of full-sized copper-based 2gI that signifi-
cantly exceed the same couplings of all 45 small-sized CoAs in terms of
maximum magnitude and maximum sample standard deviation. . . . . . 100
Figure 53 Euclidean distances between all possible pairs of NF-CoA signatures
of (a) 2 g/m over frequency, (b) 2 g/m over antenna couplings, (c) 3
g/m over frequency, (d) 3 g/m over antenna couplings, (e) 4 g/m over
frequency, and (f) 4 g/m over antenna couplings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Figure 54 Range of Euclidean distances of all possible pairs of NF-CoA signatures
of (a) 2 g/m, (b) 3 g/m, and (c) 4 g/m over antenna couplings. . . . . . . 104
Figure 55 Interquartile range of Euclidean distances of all possible pairs of NF-
CoA signatures of (a) 2 g/m, (b) 3 g/m, and (c) 4 g/m over frequency. . . 105
Figure 56 Euclidean distance between all 10 possible pairs of the five times (re-
peatedly) extracted signatures of certificate instances (a) 2gE, (b) 3gE,
(c) 4gC and (d) full-sized 2gI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Figure 57 Mean of Euclidean distance between all 10 possible pairs of the five
times (repeatedly) extracted signatures of copper-based certificate in-
stances (a) 2gE, (b) 3gE, (c) 4gC and (d) full-sized 2gI. . . . . . . . . . . 108
Figure 58 Standard deviation of Euclidean distance between all 10 possible pairs
of the five times (repeatedly) extracted signatures of copper-based cer-
tificate instances (a) 2gE, (b) 3gE, (c) 4gC and (d) full-sized 2gI. . . . . . 109
xiv
Figure 59 Visual examples of the worst case scenarios (highest magnitude and
highest standard deviation of difference) of extraction of individual curves:
(a) B1-E1 of 2gE over frequency, (b) A1-D1 of 3gE over frequency, (c)
D4-D2 of 2gE over antenna couplings, and, (d) D4-E2 of 2gI over an-
tenna couplings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Figure 60 Euclidean distance between all 45 possible pairs of the 10 times (repeat-
edly) extracted signatures of paper-based certificate instances (a) C, (b)
H. Mean of Euclidean distance between all 45 possible pairs of the five
repeatedly extracted signatures of paper-based certificate instances (c) C,
(d) H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Figure 61 Visual examples of the worst case scenarios (highest magnitude and
highest standard deviation of difference) of extraction of individual curves:
(a) D5-B5 of H over frequency, (b) C3-B4 of H over frequency, (c) A2-
E2 of C over antenna couplings, and (d) A1-E2 of H over antenna cou-
plings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Figure 62 Euclidean distance between all 1081 possible pairs of extracted signa-
tures of copper-based certificate instances (a) over frequency and (b)
over antenna couplings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Figure 63 Range of Euclidean distances between all 1081 possible pairs of ex-
tracted signatures of copper-based certificate instances (a) over frequency
and (b) over antenna couplings. Interquartile range of Euclidean dis-
tances of all 1081 possible pairs of extracted signatures of copper-based
certificate instances (c) over frequency and (d) over antenna couplings. . 117
Figure 64 Euclidean distance between all 1081 possible pairs of extracted signa-
tures of paper-based certificate instances (a) over frequency and (b) over
antenna couplings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Figure 65 Range of Euclidean distances between all 45 possible pairs of extracted
signatures of paper-based certificate instances (a) over frequency and (b)
over antenna couplings. Interquartile range of Euclidean distances of
all 45 possible pairs of extracted signatures of copper-based certificate
instances (c) over frequency and (d) over antenna couplings. . . . . . . . 120
Figure 66 (a) Top side view and (b) cross-sectional view of a laminated copper
sheets with a size similar to that of NF-CoAs when stacked (at different
distances) on top of a certificate instance attached to the NF-CoA reader. 122
Figure 67 NF signature curves of full-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gI correspond-
ing to: (a) antenna coupling B1-D1, (b) antenna coupling B2-E2, (c)
frequency point 5.305 GHz, and (d) frequency point 5.349 GHz with-
out (“just CoA”) and with laminated copper sheets stacked on top of the
NF-CoA at distances up to 3.5 mm (“12ε”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
xv
Figure 68 NF signature curves of small-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gB corre-
sponding to: (a) antenna coupling B1-E1, (b) antenna coupling E4-D2,
(c) frequency point 5.256 GHz, and (d) frequency point 5.269 GHz with-
out (“just CoA”) and with laminated copper sheets stacked on top of the
NF-CoA at distances up to 3.5 mm (“12ε”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Figure 69 Test setup to verify the interference blocking capability of the NF-CoA sys-
tem against the proximity of third conductive material, such as, in this
example, a metallic key. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Figure 70 Euclidean distance of NF signatures of the same certificate instance (a)
over antenna couplings and (b) over frequency before and after placing
an interfering metallic object, i.e., “key1,” on top of the shielding copper
surface, as shown in Figure 69. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Figure 71 Euclidean distance of NF signatures of the same certificate instance (a)
over antenna couplings and (b) over frequency before and after placing
an interfering metallic object, i.e., “key2,” on top of the shielding copper
surface, as shown in Figure 69. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Figure 72 (a) Top view and (b) cross-sectional view of a large aluminum surface
when stacked (at different distances) on top of a certificate instance at-
tached to the NF-CoA reader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Figure 73 NF signature curves of full-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gI correspond-
ing to: (a) antenna coupling B1-E1, (b) antenna coupling C3-D2, (c)
frequency point 5.338 GHz, and (d) frequency point 5.370 GHz without
(“just CoA”) and with a large aluminum surface stacked on top of the
NF-CoA at distances up to 3.5 mm (“12ε”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Figure 74 NF signature curves of small-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gB corre-
sponding to: (a) antenna coupling B1-D1, (b) antenna coupling C3-E2,
(c) frequency point 5.244 GHz, and (d) frequency point 5.281 GHz with-
out (“just CoA”) and with a large aluminum surface stacked on top of the
NF-CoA at distances up to 3.5 mm (“12ε”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Figure 75 (a) Top view and (c) cross-sectional view of a large complementary cop-
per surface (shown in (b)) when stacked (at different distances) on top of
a certificate instance attached to the NF-CoA reader. . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Figure 76 NF signature curves of full-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gI correspond-
ing to: (a) antenna coupling B1-E1, (b) antenna coupling B2-E2, (c) fre-
quency point 5.359 GHz, and (d) frequency point 5.389 GHz without
(“just CoA”) and with a large complementary copper surface stacked on
top of the NF-CoA at distances up to 3.5 mm (“12ε”). . . . . . . . . . . 131
xvi
Figure 77 NF signature curves of small-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gB corre-
sponding to: (a) antenna coupling B1-E1, (b) antenna coupling E4-B4,
(c) frequency point 5.269 GHz, and (d) frequency point 5.204 GHz with-
out (“just CoA”) and with a large complementary copper surface stacked
on top of the NF-CoA at distances up to 4.5 mm (“12ε”). . . . . . . . . . 132
Figure 78 Example probability density curves depicting the four possible outcomes
of a binary classification given a detection threshold represented by the
black vertical line. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Figure 79 The receiver operating characteristic space. The red dashed line repre-
sents a random guess, whereas point (0,1) indicates perfect classification. 139
Figure 80 Histogram of the negative (red) and positive (green) scores (aggregate
maximum log likelihood values) of each binomial-coefficient possible
distance measurement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Figure 81 Three-dimensional bars of the maximum log likelihood of the (a) nega-
tive and (b) positive signature distance measurements. To strengthen the
iid property assumption, every other fourth frequency point is considered
in the negative (inter-CoA) scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Figure 82 The positive and negative probability densities over the aggregate maxi-
mum log likelihood values of the signature difference measurements. . . 142
Figure 83 The receiver operating characteristic curve of the NF-CoA binary classi-
fication problem. The green points represent different (TPR, FPR) points
for different similarity detection threshold δT values. A δT option that
corresponds to almost perfection classification, i.e., (0, 1), exists. . . . . . 143
Figure 84 Separate 2D photo-paper-based layers with inkjet-printed rhombic loops
that, when stacked, form a 3D NF-CoA instance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Figure 85 3D “random” metallic structure designed and used for the simulated in-
verse design attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Figure 86 Comparison between the near-field responses extracted by the 3D metal-
lic object of Figure 85 to that extracted by the object’s 2D projection
over antenna couplings A1-D1 and C3-D1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Figure 87 (a) Set D1 and (b) Set D2 of four fabricated two-dimensional photo-
paper-based NF-CoA designs. Each design consists of random constel-
lations of silver inkjet-printed 1 mm by 1 mm pixels. The resulting 2D
projections are shown on the right. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
xvii
Figure 88 (a) Euclidean distances, (b) range of Euclidean distances, and (c) in-
terquartile range of Euclidean distances between NF signatures extracted
from all 24 possible different stacked orderings of the four 2D paper-
based NF-CoAs yielding projection D1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Figure 89 (a) Euclidean distances, (b) range of Euclidean distances, and (c) in-
terquartile range of Euclidean distances between NF signatures extracted
from all 24 possible different stacked orderings of the four 2D paper-
based NF-CoAs yielding projection D2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Figure 90 An example of a wireless sensor network (WSN) topology, where the
WSN motes are not anymore the lowest-level network devices in the
infrastructure hierarchy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Figure 91 The NF-CoA wireless connectivity module. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Figure 92 The Crossbow Mica2 serving as the wireless sensor network anchor node
for the NF-CoA localization system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Figure 93 The wireless data sequence of a whole 9 ms packet broadcasted by the
NF-CoA wireless module as captured with a real-time spectrum analyzer
over time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Figure 94 (a) A wireless sensor network anchor node mounted on a lamp post,
(b) Sketch of the ellipsoidal surface of the first Fresnel area between
the transmitting NF-CoA wireless connectivity module and the wireless
sensor network anchor node. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Figure 95 The multilateration localization technique as conducted in a real-world
large parking lot environment that is RF covered by a wireless sensor
network. Identical unique identification packets are broadcasted by the
NF-CoA wireless connectivity module and captured by multiple fixed
anchor nodes for multilateration purposes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Figure 96 The WSN topology and measurement positions on Georgia Tech hotel’s
parking deck rooftop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Figure 97 The WSN topology and measurement positions within a large parking lot. 187
Figure 98 Two examples of localization estimation errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
xviii
SUMMARY
Counterfeiting affects many different sectors of the world trade, including the phar-
maceutical and the aerospace industries, and, therefore, its impact is not only of financial
nature but can also have fatal consequences. The objective of the proposed research is
the design and fabrication of a novel stand-alone wireless robust system with enhanced
hardware-enabled authentication and anti-counterfeiting capabilities. The system consists
of two major components: (a) the near-field certificates of authenticity, which serve as au-
thenticity vouchers of the products they are attached to, and (b) a microcontroller-enabled,
low-power and low-cost reader.
Out of the plethora of objects in nature that are of random, but unique, shape and
composition, and hard-to-copy at some degree, passive physical structures that behave
as extremely reliable certificates of authenticity (CoA) or instances of proof of value are
identified. Specifically, the two different types of small-sized physical three-dimensional
structures identified are composed of extremely cheap conductive and dielectric material.
These structures are shown to yield a unique and repeatable RF signature in a small portion
of the spectrum, when brought in the reactive and radiating near-field regions of an array
of miniature antennas. The multidimensional features of these CoAs, or in other words
their signature or fingerprint, are cryptographically signed and stored into any type of tiny
embedded storage chip preferred to ensure reliable and convenient offline validation. Even-
tually, the certificate instances of fixed dimensions may be integrated as an inseparable part
of the surface of a physical object or may simply be attached as a tag, a label or a seal to
objects, the value of which is to vouched for.
The contactless signature validation procedure, in which an attempt to associate the
near-field signature response of the physical CoA with the digitized signature that is signed
by the issuer and stored into the aforementioned tiny embedded storage chip, is carried
out by a reader. Toward the goal of a widest application adoption possible, the third and
xix
latest generation reader designed and fabricated operates autonomously and in an offline
(no Internet connectivity) fashion, exhibits enormous performance robustness, in terms of
accuracy, consistency and speed of capturing of the signatures, has dimensions comparable
to that of a human palm and also meets the requirement of low cost.
The system comprising the above two major components is fully characterized and its
feasibility and performance robustness is rigorously assessed with a wide array of tests.
Based on these results, the similarity detection threshold used during the validation pro-
cedure is evaluated and determined to be in the vicinity of the boundaries of the physical
limitations of the reader hardware. Moreover, the entropy, or uncertainty, of the signatures
generated by the NF-CoA system are empirically quantified and verified with the existence
of a point on the receiver operating characteristic curve that almost corresponds to the (0, 1)
“perfect classification” point within the context of the binary classification problem of the
verification procedure. Furthermore, the feasibility of the “null hypothesis,” according to
which the NF signatures are potentially generated by a true random number generator, is
supported by conducting and passing the majority of the tests of one of the most stringent
and highly regarded, by industry and research community alike, test suites, the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology Statistical Test Suite (NIST STS). Finally, an example
of a real super-positioning attack launched that the NF-CoA system successfully withstands
is presented.
On top of the main functionality of the NF-CoA instances and given that the integration
of localization into tiny sensors is rapidly becoming a necessity, the addition of location
tracking capabilities to the NF-CoA instances is sought after. Within the context of this ef-
fort, the first two real-world WSN-enabled multi-lateration localization testbeds to evaluate





In contrast to piracy, where the customer knows that the object he is buying is not gen-
uine usually because of its very low price, in counterfeiting the adversary fools the buyer
into believing that the merchandise is authentic and, as a result, the counterfeiter collects
significant profit margins.
Counterfeiting exists since the very first days of trading and exchanging. For exam-
ple, historians possess evidence of counterfeit coins of the world’s first coin, the Lydian
electrum trite [2], made of a gold and silver alloy and minted by King Alyattes in Sardis,
Lydia, Asia Minor back in circa 610−600 BC. Greek drachma and Roman denarius fourrée
coins, i.e., coins made from a base metal core that has been plated with a precious metal
to look authentic [3], have also been found. Revealing the interior metal with test cuts,
that is, slashing of the surface of a coin with a hammer, was the first counterfeit detection
procedure [4]. To try to prevent detection, early counterfeiters made coins that already had
engraved fake test cuts.
There is no doubt that counterfeiting has a huge economic impact. The World Customs
Organization estimated counterfeiting as a $512 billion market in 2004 [5]. The Counter-
feiting Intelligence Bureau estimated that nearly 8% of world trade every year concerns
counterfeit goods [5]. Undoubtedly, counterfeiting amounts to a huge economic impact
on industries, such as the entertainment, fashion, and software. The organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has dissected the effects of counterfeiting,
among others, on innovation and growth, employment, trade, and on governmental oper-
ations, such as tax collection and corruption [6]. The volume of counterfeits is estimated
nowadays to be in the range of half a trillion U.S. dollars annually, or roughly about one
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quarter of the gross domestic product of the entire African continent. A 2010 study esti-
mated that the volume of counterfeit U.S. currency in the form of banknotes, i.e., paper
currency, in circulation worldwide is in the neighborhood of $60 to $80 million [7]. In
Europe, almost one million counterfeit euro banknotes were removed from circulation just
in 2011 by the European Central Bank [8]. Approximately 8.1 million Americans, or 3.5%
of the total U.S. population, experienced fraud in 2010 [9]. At a global level, the “Global
Card Fraud” Nilson Report estimated card fraud losses at $6.89 billion on $14.6 trillion in
purchases of goods and services and cash advances in 2009 and projected the amount of
fraud losses to rise to $10 billion by 2015 [9].
Unfortunately, however, the impact of counterfeiting is not only one of a financial na-
ture. The numbers get scary when counterfeiters attack industries, such as the pharmaceuti-
cal and aerospace industries. In a study of Glaxo-Smith-Kline with the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration it was estimated that counterfeit drugs make up 10% of the global pharma-
ceuticals market [10]. The U.S. Federal Aviation Authority estimated that each year, 2%
(520, 000 parts) of the 26 million parts installed on airplanes are counterfeit [11]. From
1973 to 1993, fake parts were responsible for at least 166 U.S.-based aircraft accidents.
Four of these accidents involved commercial carriers that resulted in six deaths [11].
The aforementioned tremendous impact of counterfeiting is also reflected in the emer-
gence of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) [12], a multinational treaty that
creates a new governing body. As expected, large intellectual property based organizations
have been active in the development of ACTA. Despite the criticism the treaty is still re-
ceiving, ACTA supporters have described the agreement as a response to “the increase in
global trade of counterfeit goods and pirated copyright-protected works.”
Consequently, solutions that can address these problems are needed. In the battle
against counterfeiting, traditional two-dimensional solutions, such as black-and-white and
color barcodes, watermarks or holograms, or radio frequency identification (RFID) tags
with encoded digital information cannot be relied upon since they can easily be replicated,
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altered or distorted. Instead, extremely reliable and robust certificates of authenticity, or,
in other words, instances of proof of value, that can be used conveniently may prove valu-
able. Motivated by the recent patent of DeJean and Kirovski [13], this dissertation attempts
to further study, substantiate, realize, prove and, eventually, advance the exploitation of
the intrinsically highly complex to predict near-field electromagnetic scattering effects to-
ward creating inexpensive physical objects that are both digitally and physically unique and
behave as certificates of authenticity (NF-CoAs). The full implementation of a novel near-
field (NF) anti-counterfeiting system that aims to address counterfeiting in a hardware-
based way is presented in this document. As demonstrated, this system enables the offline
verification of the authenticity of a product within its near field with extremely low proba-
bility of a false alarm.
1.2 Research Objectives
The objectives of this research work can be summarized into the design and fabrication of
a novel and robust stand-alone wireless system with enhanced hardware-enabled authenti-
cation and anti-counterfeiting capabilities. The novelty of this system is the exploitation of
the intrinsically highly-complex near-field (reactive and radiating) electromagnetic scatter-
ing effects that enable the creation and verification of hard-to-forge objects.
The majority of the objects in nature are of random, but unique, shape and composition,
and hard-to-copy at some degree. Therefore, investigating passive physical structures that
behave as extremely reliable and robust certificates of authenticity (CoA) or instances of
proof of value constitutes a major effort of the proposed research. Essentially, the unique,
conductive and dielectric, physical three-dimensional structure of the certificate instances
is to yield a unique and repeatable RF signature in a small portion of the spectrum when the
certificate is brought in the reactive and radiating near-field areas of an array of miniature
antennas. The multidimensional features of these CoAs, or in other words their signature
or fingerprint, are to be cryptographically signed and stored into any type of tiny embedded
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storage chip to ensure reliable and convenient offline validation. The certificate instances of
fixed dimensions may be integrated as an inseparable part of the surface of physical objects
or may simply be attached as a tag, a label or a seal to objects that are to be protected.
Despite the very low cost of the instances on the order of a few cents of U.S. dollars, it is
highly desired that it is infeasible or prohibitively expensive for an adversary to reproduce
the electromagnetic fingerprint of an NF-CoA with enough accuracy.
The contactless validation procedure, in which an attempt to associate the near-field
signature response of the physical CoA with the digitized signature that is signed by the
issuer and stored into a complementary tiny embedded storage chip, is to be carried out by
a reader. As in the case of the certificate instances and for a wide adoption to be possible,
the reader may also meet the requirement of low cost (on the order of less than 75 U.S.
dollars). Meanwhile, it is also required that the reader can operate autonomously and in
an offline (no Internet connectivity) fashion, exhibits enormous performance robustness, in
terms of accuracy, consistency and speed of capturing the signatures, and has dimensions
comparable to that of a human palm.
The system comprising the two major components of CoAs and the reader is to be
characterized and its performance is to be thoroughly tested. The system assessment is
required to involve rigorous empirical analysis, with regard to uniqueness among different
instances and repeatability robustness for same instance, entropy estimation making use
of the most reliable statistical methodologies and universally respectable third-party test
suites and a study on how the system can withstand potential malicious attacks.
On top of the main functionality of the NF-CoA instances and given that, according to
the vision of the Internet of Things, the integration of localization into tiny sensors is rapidly
becoming a necessity, the addition of location tracking capabilities to the NF-CoA instances
is to be sought after.
4
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The outline of the remaining parts of the dissertation is as follows.
A thorough literature survey that summarizes the related state-of-the-art research work
efforts in the areas of anti-counterfeiting and highlights the differentiation and novelty of
the NF-CoA system is presented in Chapter 2.
The many-fold rationale behind focusing on the near-field observation of the electro-
magnetic phenomena is presented in Chapter 3. In the same chapter, NF-CoA-related defi-
nitions that are necessary for the remainder of the document are provided.
The design and fabrication of two different types of NF-CoA instances that yield unique
and highly-divergent NF fingerprints are presented in Chapter 4. Regardless of the type, the
entire life cycle of a certificate instance, spanning from the fabrication process (issuing) to
the point where it is used for identity validation or genuineness authentication (verification
process), is also outlined in the same chapter.
The NF-CoA reader is introduced in Chapter 5. In particular, the evolution over three
different generations of mixed-signal boards is presented, emphasizing on the advance-
ments brought by each generation. The full characterization of the analog and digital parts
is described and the operational state diagram of the firmware algorithm developed is illus-
trated.
A wide array of measurements and tests to assess the feasibility and performance of
the proposed authenticity certification system is presented in Chapter 6. Among these tests
are the uniqueness of each NF signature among different signatures and the repeatability
robustness, according to which the same certificate instance always yields nearly exact
replicate signatures.
Two major independent attempts to empirically quantify the entropy, or uncertainty, of
the signatures generated by the NF-CoA system are elaborated in Chapter 7.
Potential key attacks are set forth in Chapter 8. In the same chapter, an example of a
real attack launched against the NF-CoA system is presented.
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Finally, the main outcomes and contributions of this research work are summarized in
Chapter 9, where future research directions are also indicated.
In the Appendix, a localization service for the location estimation of the NF-CoA in-





2.1.1 Two-dimensional Printed Solutions
The majority of the anti-counterfeit methods that have been implemented in the market to
this point are of a two-dimensional (2D) style. Black-and-white or color barcodes, mag-
netic strips, watermarks and holograms constitute such examples that have been success-
fully attacked, i.e. copied, altered or distorted.
2.1.2 Software-only-based Solutions
Moreover, researchers soon realized that software-only-based solutions could also not be
relied upon in the fight against counterfeiting. The use of RFID tags against counterfeiting
has been proposed in the past. Traditional RFID tags with encoded digital information can
easily be replicated, which means that a complete image of the memory of the RFID tag
chip in bit level can be extracted and copied onto other blank RFID tag chips, regardless
of if its content is encrypted, signed and/or hashed. On top of that, security groups have
demonstrated successful attacks against even enhanced “symmetric-key” RFID tags that
are capable of computing cryptographic symmetric-key functions [14]. The same survey,
however, cites research proposals to close these security gaps.
2.1.3 Fiber-based Solutions
It was soon concluded that hardware-based CoAs comprise a more effective solution to
the problem. Bauder [15] and Simmons [16] proposed CoAs that consist of fibers, the
positioning of which is fixed. The principle of operation is based on illuminating one end
of a fiber and detecting the resulting glow on the other end using photo detectors. Among
only few other efforts, Church et al. [17] proposed the extraction of the random optical-fiber
patterns as a currency anti-counterfeiting application and Chen et al. [18] combined for the
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first time the fiber-infused paper solution with public key cryptography. While efficient
and inexpensive, this category of fiber-based CoAs does not provide a “physical one-way
function.” In other words, given the fingerprint of a particular fiber-based CoA, it is not
computationally difficult to construct an object of the same fixed dimensions that yields an
almost identical fingerprint. This is primarily due to the linearity of the CoA as a system
and the lack of interdependence among the responses of distinct fibers; since the glowing
of a single fiber does not dependent on the response of the remaining fibers of a fiber-based
CoA, an adversary can launch a super-positioning attack, i.e., a simple search process that
orients these fibers one by one.
Loading magnetic nanoparticles in cellulose fibers with the purpose to produce paper
with super-paramagnetic properties that can serve as a signature for authentication purposes
has also been proposed [19, 20]. The solutions incur not only a high cost for fabricating
the certificate instances, involving processes, such as in situ synthesis and lumen loading
methods [20], but also the authentication methods under this category are limited to the
detection of just the presence of the magnetic loading.
2.1.4 Physical Unclonable Functions
The so-called physical unclonable functions (PUF) constitute essentially a mapping be-
tween a set of specific challenges applied to a physical, complex structure and their corre-
sponding responses and are used to produce unclonable tokens for identification purposes.
Pappu [21] proposed speckle scattering as one example of physical unclonable functions.
Pappu focused on the natural randomness collected from a speckle pattern; a random in-
tensity pattern produced by the mutual interference of coherent wavefronts that are subject
to phase differences or intensity fluctuations. Skoric [22] was able to show experimental
and theoretical results on the randomness yielded by speckle-formed keys that are in good
agreement. Since speckle scattering is sensitive to small spatial differences in the placement
of the source of scattering and requires an expensive micro-fabrication technology, building
such CoAs that satisfy robustness seems to be a difficult task; in addition, speckle filtering
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is not clearly shown to guarantee repetitiveness robustness of the extracted fingerprint.
Under the same PUF category falls also the proposal of Tuyls and Batina [23] to fab-
ricate RFID-tags, the microchips of which are equipped with an additional PUF physical
structure that inherently incorporates unpredictable, manufacturing process inaccuracies.
Although not supporting off-line scenarios as in [23], an actual fabrication of a PUF-
enabled RFID chip in 0.18 µ technology is presented in [24]. The operation of this type
of CoAs is not passive as it consumes small, yet perhaps not negligible, power from the
tag chip, hence potentially decreasing its read range. Their fabrication is also coupled
with the RFID tag chip fabrication process. Furthermore, all the above PUF-based CoAs
require access to non-reusable, one-time challenge-response pairs through online Internet
connections with the potential added overhead of recharging the online challenge-response
database. As a result, the PUF solutions also rely on some kind of cryptographical encryp-
tion to ensure the security of the Internet online query transactions.
2.1.5 Far-field-based Solutions
In the far-field communication domain, researchers proposed identifying an individual
UHF RFID tag and a tag’s manufacturer based on timing, power, and voltage features
extracted from the tags’ transmitted signals [25]. Researchers have also proposed applica-
tions that detect the response of the random structure of the certificate over the expensive
millimeter wave frequency range [26].
Under the same far-field category also fall the chip-less RFID tags proposed for au-
thentication applications. However, their common main shortcoming is that the entropy
they provide is only limited to a two-digit bit-sequence. For instance, Preradovic et al.
[27] demonstrate a printable chip-less RFID tag for secure banknote applications in the 5
GHz to 7 GHz frequency band, the anti-counterfeiting robustness of which relies on a bit
sequence formed by a multi-resonating circuit and CrossID, Inc [28] has tested a chip-less,
chemical-material-based RFID tag using 3 GHz to 10 GHz readers with each of the 70
different chemicals being assigned its own position in a 70-digit binary number.
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The major limitations of the above far-field authentication schemes are the requirement
of a constant distance with the same reference between the reader and the certificates for
signature repetitiveness and potential interference, eavesdropping and/or malicious jam-
ming of the far-field channel. Moreover, the entropy results of the work in this area typi-
cally exhibits relatively low true positive rates (TPRs – see Chapter 7).
2.1.6 Near-field-based Solutions
Finally, regarding the near-field domain under which the NF-CoA system also falls, re-
searchers have attempted to quantify the electromagnetic characteristics of the near-field
coupling nature of ISO 14443 RFID transactions [29] or chip-less RFID tags for coun-
terfeit detection applications. The researchers actually make use of expensive real-time
oscilloscopes with a sampling rate of 20 GHz to measure a fine electromagnetic signature
that consists of the fundamental and harmonics up to the ninth harmonic of a 13.56 MHz
RF carrier. This method not only incurs a very high cost for the “reader” but also requires
a closed-loop, synchronized control system between the RFID reader and an oscilloscope
in addition to potential RFID reader software modifications.
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2.1.7 Summary/Comparison
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2.2 Differentiation/Strength of the NF-CoA System
The realized NF-CoA system, the operation of which relies on the near-field observation
of the electromagnetic scattering effects on the physical three-dimensional objects that
serve as certificate instances, possesses some important qualitative features not exhibited
by other types of CoAs. The superiority of the designed, proposed, developed, and tested
NF-CoA technology over other proposed hardware-based CoAs or PUFs is summarized in
the following points:
• The detection of the random structure and signature of a CoA does not occur in the
far field, which
– represents averaged-out characteristics of random discrete scatterers [30],
– can be eavesdropped,
– can be subject to interference or can be maliciously jammed,
– is very expensive if conducted over the millimeter-wave (typically 60 GHz)
frequency range.
• The NF-CoA solution relies on the near-field observation of the electromagnetic scat-
tering effects on the CoAs, where the relationship between the electric field compo-
nent E and the magnetic field component H becomes often too complex to predict,
as described in detail in Section 3.5.
• The NF-CoA system can withstand a wide range of considered attacks that can be
launched by malicious counterparts, including data replication of the stored digitized
NF signature or replacement of the latter with another signature, numerical com-
putation of a captured (with an NF-CoA reader) valid NF signature and the super-
positioning attack in an effort to obtain a desired near-field response. For a detailed
analysis see Chapter 8.
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• The overall cost of a complete NF-CoA system is extremely low. In particular, even
before considering the economies of scale for massive fabrication of the readers, the
sum of the cost of all the components of the designed and fabricated NF-CoA reader
does not exceed 75 U.S. dollars. Regarding the cost of a single certificate, that is
lower than the price of a typical passive RFID tag on the order of a few cents of U.S.
dollars.
• No expensive micro-fabrication technology is required for the certificates. In addi-
tion, the fabrication of the CoAs is decoupled from the potential accompanying RFID
chip fabrication process.
• The operation of the NF-CoA reader can be low power.
• The NF-CoA physical identifiers are completely passive, i.e., not consuming any
power from the potential accompanying embedded storage chip or RFID tag chip
and, as a result, not decreasing the latter’s back-scattered power and, effectively its
“read” range.
• The NF-CoA solution is compatible with any RFID technology or other physically
small and low-cost embedded storage devices with “read” capabilities. In the RFID
case, any RFID tag of any frequency can be used with a reasonable amount of RFID
tag chip storage, as discussed in Section 4.2.
• No physical certificate “wear and tear” is expected since the NF-CoA signature read-
out does not involve physical contact with the reader.
• In the case of relying on the RFID technology, no reader software modifications are
required.
• No oscilloscope or other expensive high-frequency reader is required to capture any
frequency harmonics.
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• The NF-CoA authentication and issuance processes are meant to take place entirely
locally and off-line, without looking up an online database.
• The NF-CoA technology does not rely on non-reusable, one-time, PUF-style challenge-
response pairs. On top of that, the overhead of charging and recharging the challenge-
response database, as is the case with the PUF solutions, does not exist.
• The NF-CoA technology requires no closed-loop, synchronized control system be-
tween the technology, wired or wireless, that is used to extracted the bit sequence of
the stored signed signature, such as an RFID reader, and an oscilloscope or any other
expensive measurement instrument.
• Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) issues (both potentially caused by the NF-
CoA system and received by third-party sources) are not expected both because of
the low signal power levels transmitted and because the antenna array slot and the




3.1 Near-field (NF) Electromagnetic Characteristics
The space around an antenna is subdivided into the reactive near field, the radiating near
field, and the far field. No rigid boundaries between these regions exist. The fields do
not change abruptly from one region to the other, but undergo a very gradual transition
[31]. Nevertheless, distinguishing these regions simplifies the formulation to yield closed-
form solutions of Maxwell’s equations. Several boundary distinction criteria have been
established [32]. Two of the most popular are described below.
According to the most popular approach, the boundary between the near and the far field
is the distance from the antenna at which the wave impedance, i.e., the ratio of the electric
field magnitude E to the magnetic field magnitude H, changes [31, 33]. In the far field,
E and H are related by the characteristic impedance of the medium, which is η = 120π Ω
for a vacuum. Conversely, in the near field, the wave impedance is not constant; the wave
impedance is high (high E and low H) when the radiator is a dipolar source and low (low
E and high H) for a loop-like structure [34]. This approach is valid for most practical
antennas with a maximum dimension D greater than a wavelength λ (D > λ). In this
scenario, a maximum total-phase error of π/8 rad (22.5◦) is not very detrimental in the
analytical formulations [31].
For electrically small antennas (D < λ), an alternative approach based on the power
density dissipation behavior of the fields is more appropriate for defining the electromag-
netic region boundaries [33]. In the near field, the small fractional values of the distance
of the observation point from the source r cause the near-field magnetic and electric fields
to exhibit 1/r3 and 1/r2 behavior, respectively. As the distance from the antenna increases,
the 1/r term dominates in the far field for both E and H and the 1/r3 and 1/r2 terms atten-
uate rapidly. The distance where the 1/r and 1/r2 terms are equal is the most commonly
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used boundary between near and far field. For an electric dipole, this distance is referred
to as the radian distance, and this distance is equal to λ/2π. The sphere with radius equal
to λ/2π, i.e., referred to as the radian sphere, defines the region within which the reactive
power density is greater than the radiated power density [35].
More specifically, the three regions that surround an antenna are:
• Reactive near field: The area that immediately surrounds the antenna. The outer




λ from the antenna surface
[36, 37, 38, 39], where λ is the wavelength and D is the largest dimension of the
antenna. For electrically small antennas, the more appropriate boundary is r < λ/2π
(kr < 1). The energy in this region is basically imaginary; the energy is stored, but
not radiated. The reactive near field can be defined in terms of planar, cylindrical, or
spherical modes [40].
• Radiating near field (Fresnel): The inner boundary of this intermediate area is the
same as the outer boundary of the reactive near field. The outer boundary of the same
intermediate area is at the radial distance of 2D2
/
λ from the antenna [36, 37, 38, 39].
Although for electrically small antennas this region may not exist at all [36], the
more appropriate boundary is r > λ/2π (kr > 1). This region is also called Fresnel,
because the field expressions in this region reduce to Fresnel integrals. Here, the
radiating power density is greater than the reactive power density, and the angular
field distribution, i.e., the shape of the antenna field pattern, is dependent upon the
distance from the antenna. Additionally, there is no reactive power any more, and
the wave impedance is equal to η. The electric and magnetic fields tend to propagate
predominantly in phase, but do not exhibit eikr/r dependence until the far field is
reached. The r variations of the E and H field components are not separable from
those of θ and φ. Finally, no transverse electromagnetic (TEM) wave exists in this
region, and the radial field component may be substantial [31].
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• Far field (Fraunhofer): The area that extends from 2D2
/
λ to infinity. For electrically
small antennas, the more appropriate boundary is r  λ/2π (kr  1). Eθ and Hφ
are the components of the spherical wave, and Er is negligible. In other words, the
electric and magnetic fields are transverse, and the wave front is plane. The radiation
pattern is independent of the distance from the antenna, and the radial dependence of
electric and magnetic fields varies approximately as eikr/r.
The antenna radiation pattern changes in shape, as the observation moves from the near
field to the far field. The pattern is nearly uniform in the reactive near-field region and only
begins to form lobes in the radiating near-field region [31, 41].
The boundary values of the three electromagnetic regions following both popular afore-
mentioned approaches for an antenna element with its maximum dimension equal to λ/8
are provided in Table 2. This antenna dimension and, consequently, the frequency oper-
ation have not been chosen randomly. The folded shorted-patch antenna element of the
antenna array of the NF-CoA reader has a frequency of operation that ranges from 5 GHz
to 6 GHz.
Table 2: The boundaries of the reactive near-field, the radiating near-field (Fresnel), and the
far-field (Fraunhofer) areas surrounding the antenna element of the reader array are shown
in this table. The largest dimension of the element is equal to D.
D = λ/8 = 6.81 mm
Frequency (GHz)
5.00 5.25 5.50 5.75 6.00
Wavelength λ (mm) 59.96 57.10 54.51 52.14 49.97
Reactive near field up to (mm) 1.42 1.46 1.49 1.53 1.56
Radiating near field up to (mm) 1.55 1.63 1.70 1.78 1.86
Radian distance λ/2π (mm) 9.54 9.10 8.68 8.30 7.95
As noted previously, the boundaries of the different radiation regions are in no case
abrupt or even totally agreed upon by different researchers. Actually, there is a large set
of definitions of the near-field/far-field boundaries in the literature [33]. In addition to the
two most popular approaches described above, Yaghjian [40] and Huang and Boyle [42]
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introduce corrections, 2D2/λ + λ and max{3λ, 2D2/λ} respectively, to cover the possibility
of the maximum dimension of the antenna being smaller than a wavelength. The boundary
between near and far field is 3λ in [38, 43] when D is not a lot larger than λ. According
to section C of a U.S. military standard [43], the near-field/far-field boundary is 2D2/λ if
the maximum dimension of the transmitting antenna, d, is less than 40% of the maximum
dimension of the receiving antenna D, otherwise the boundary is (d + D)2/λ. The same
boundary should also be considered according to section D of the same standard [43],
but only if d > 10 · D. Kaiser [44] suggests 4D2/λ for high-accuracy antennas. Three
different sets of boundaries of the electromagnetic regions (with the corresponding factors
of the wavelength ranging from 1.6 to 12) are provided for short, λ/2, and λ dipoles in [45].
Finally, Kraus [37] and White [38] conclude that for different boundaries chosen (λ/16, λ/8
and λ/4) yield different measurement error (≤ 0.1 dB, ≤ 0.3 dB and ≤ 1 dB respectively).
The performance test of Section 6.2.2 sheds light on the dependence of the entropy
of the signature response of the proposed certificate instances on the distance between the
antenna array and the instance itself. Based on the results of this test, the optimum distance,
in terms of a highest randomness in the signature response as possible, is chosen.
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3.2 Electromagnetic Scattering
Whenever electromagnetic radiation encounters an obstacle, the radiation may be deflected
or absorbed. For large objects, the deflection is considered to arise from reflection and
refraction. These phenomena can be described with the aid of ray tracing or geometrical
optics only if the far field is considered. Still, ray tracing and geometrical optics do not
completely describe the interaction [46]. Diffraction, that is, the spreading out of radiation
past a narrow aperture or across an edge as a result of the interference between the wave
forms produced, also occurs. When the object is less than or of the order of the wavelength
(λ), the interpretation is not simple, because wave optics analysis is required. The deflection
process here is referred to as scattering. Scattering by obstacles depends upon their size,
shape, and refractive index.
The exact solution to the problem of electromagnetic wave scattering relies on Maxwell’s
equations together with the associated boundary conditions. First, the example of a wave
impinging upon the surface of a conducting wire scatterer is considered (Figure 1). Part
of the incident electric field Ei (r) impinges on the wire and induces a current density JS
(A/m) on the surface of the wire. For non-perfect conducting wires, as is the case in the real
world, some part of the impinging field is absorbed. The induced current density reradiates
and produces an electric field that is referred to as the scattered electric field Es (r). At any
point in space, the total electric field Et (r) is the sum of the incident and scattered fields,
or Et (r) = Ei (r) + Es (r).
The incident and scattered electric and magnetic fields are represented by the following
radiation integrals:
















where the vector potential A for the electric current source J is a solution of the inhomoge-
neous vector wave equation of
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Figure 1: The schematic representation shows the near-field electromagnetic scattering on
a randomly-shaped wire that is placed within the near field of a transmit (Tx) and a receive
(Rx) antenna element.
∇2Ā + k2Ā = −µJ̄ (3)
and the vector potential F for the magnetic current source M is a solution of the inhomo-
geneous vector wave equation of
∇2F + k2F = −εM (4)
Especially for the scattered field, the electric vector potential stems from the aforemen-
tioned induced current JS . Approximations regarding this current density are not possible
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as this is not linear across any single Cartesian axis, the wire cannot necessarily be consid-
ered very thin so that an independence from the azimuthal angle φ can be assumed; not to
mention that in some cases the wires are bent in such a degree that they assume a spheroidal
or ellipsoidal form.
For an introduction to basic scattering theory regarding a more generic case, the Green’s
function needs to be introduced first. Although this function is primarily the solution of the
field equation for a point source, the principle of linear superposition to find the solution
of the field due to a general source can be used [47]. If the source is placed at a position
represented by the primed vector r′, as shown in Figure 1, the free space dyadic Green’s















∣∣∣r − r′∣∣∣ (5)
The Huygen’s principle, which is an exact relation that expresses the field in a region of
space as the fields on the surface that encloses this region, is derived from the vector Green’s
theorem. This means that the fields at any point in space can be determined if the surface


















· n̂ × Ei (r)
]
(6)
It should be repeated that with this rigorous approach one needs to first specify n̂ × E on
the surface S and then solve n̂ × H based on the boundary value problem before using the
Huygens principle to calculate the fields everywhere.
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In the above analysis, only single scattering has been considered, where the radiation
is only obstructed by a single scatterer. In other words, the fact that the radiation may
scatter many times as a result of spatially grouped-together, multiple scatterers (multiple
scattering) has not been considered. For instance, in the example of the conducting wire
described above, the presence of another wire in close proximity to the first one could also
be assumed. In this scenario, the reradiated wave would also impinge on the second wire
and would induce a current density JS 2 on the surface of the latter.
Of course, since a near-field approach has been opted for, no far-field approximations
can be applied to the above equations. On the contrary, the difficulties in obtaining closed-
form solutions that are valid everywhere, and even more anywhere between the boundaries
of the reactive and radiating near-field regions, stem from the inability to perform the inte-
gration of the vector potentials A (3) and F (4).
3.3 The Near-field CoA Fingerprint
When the NF-CoA instance is brought in the near field of an array of miniature antennas,
the near-field (NF) electromagnetic scattering effects are extracted in the form of unique
and repeatable (reproducible) patterns of scattering parameters (S 11 or S 21) (or even phase
information) that constitute an electromagnetic signature response from the NF-CoA . Es-
sentially, a set of these scattering parameters comprises the NF fingerprint or NF signature
of the NF-CoA technology. In a more rigorous definition, the NF fingerprint of an NF-
CoA x f ∈ RN f req·(
M
2 ) is a set of S 21 parameters over a frequency range and corresponding to











is the binomial coefficient that is equal to M!/[2! · (M − 2)!].
A graphical representation of this fingerprint is shown in Figure 2 as extracted from the
custom fabricated reader for all different antenna element permutations of the reader (here
72) using a signal-processing method described in detail in Chapter 5. The signature can be
plotted over frequency (as in Figure 2) or alternatively over antenna couplings (as shown
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in Chapter 6).
Figure 2: A graphical representation of an NF fingerprint, as extracted by the custom fab-
ricated reader for all different antenna element couplings of the reader.
3.4 Definitions of the Major Components of the NF-CoA System
Certificate of Authenticity (CoA): A physical object that either vouches for its own
genuineness and, as a consequence, also proves the genuineness and value of the prod-
uct it accompanies or can serve as a seal proof.
NF-CoA : A physical CoA instance that consists of an extremely difficult to replicate,
random arrangement of scatterers that produces a unique and repeatable response in
the near field for anti- counterfeiting purposes. Because of its slim profile, the NF-
CoA may be attached as a tag, a label or a seal to a physical object or may be integrated
as an inseparable part of the surface of an object.
Near-field Electromagnetic Scattering: The deflection of an electromagnetic wave as
it impinges upon an object (scatterer), when the latter has a size of less than or of the
order of the wavelength and is located in the (reactive or radiating) near field of the
transmitting antenna element.
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NF Fingerprint / Signature / Response: A set of S 21 parameters over a frequency
range that corresponds to a subgroup of or all available antenna couplings of an array
of a reader, when the NF-CoA is placed in the near field of the array.
NF-CoA Reader: A low-cost reader that can extract the signature of an NF-CoA in-
stance, can verify the issuer of the content of the potentially accompanying storage
chip or RFID tag and validate or not the authenticity of the instance.
3.5 Leveraging the Unique Near-field Scattering Properties for
Increased Entropy
As will be described in detail in Chapter 4, the physical CoA instance consists of an ex-
tremely difficult to replicate, random arrangement of a conductive material, such as copper
wire, mixed with a firm dielectric material, such as plastic PET mold, that produces a
unique and repeatable response. For purposes of both mechanical practicality and higher
complexity in theoretical analysis of the signature extraction that yields the security of the
NF-CoA system, the CoAs have been deliberately brought in the near field of the antenna
array of the reader; including both the reactive and the radiating areas presented in de-
tail in Section 3.1 [48]. More specifically, the rationale behind opting for the near-field
observation of the incurred electromagnetic effects is many-fold:
• Electric and magnetic fields require separate path link equations for like (electric-
electric or magnetic-magnetic) and unlike (electric-magnetic or magnetic-electric)
antenna links [49] that are different from the Friis Law [50]. Reception and transmis-
sion of an electric-field signal requires an electric antenna (e.g. a dipole), whereas
reception and transmission of a magnetic-field signal requires a magnetic antenna
(e.g. a loop).
• Within the near-field region, the relationship between the electric field component
E and the magnetic field component H often becomes complex to predict, because
either field component can dominate at any particular point [51]. Very close to the
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antenna, the energy level can rise dramatically with only a small additional movement
toward the antenna.
• The near-field observation enables relatively high variance of the EM field, causing
better discriminating characteristics compared to the far-field responses.
• Measurement of both E and H is required to determine the power density, because
the wave impedance in the near field is not constant (e.g. , η = 120π Ω in free space
for vacuum) [51].
• The near-field antenna element coupling is complex. The coupling between the an-
tennas affects the impedance of both antennas and the field distribution around them
and the several near-field tangential and radial electric and magnetic field compo-
nents can all contribute to coupling [52].
• The different definitions of the EM field boundaries render the prediction/simulation
of near-field scattering effect very difficult. This complexity is more pronounced if
the region, where the scatterer, is brought is very close to the boundary.
• In the near field the waves are spherical and not yet converted to plane waves, so
there is no polarization.
• It is hard to eavesdrop or maliciously jam near-field communication, compared to
far-field communication, which is prone to both potentially devastating attacks.
• The theory, measurements, and computer programming required to accurately char-
acterize antennas by near-field scanning is considerably more extensive than for con-
ventional far-field measurement [40].
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3.6 Potential Applications
The NF-CoA instances, as vouchers for authenticity, are an essential security tool in a
huge number of transactions and validations occurring on a daily basis. What enhances
the applicability of the NF-CoA system and makes it particularly attractive for several
applications [53] is the following set of features:
• The short physical profile, on top of the small 2D projection dimensions and neg-
ligible weight of the instances enables different ways of attaching the instances to
products or documents, such as fastening them as labels, affixing them onto surfaces,
or even embedding them inside the outer shell of various products.
• The NF-CoA instances can withstand wear-and-tear, mainly as a result of the con-
tactless signature readout mechanism, as well as the firmness of their 3D structure.
• The cost of a single NF-CoA instance is expected to be on the order of a few U.S.
dollar cents, and the prototyping cost of a single reader is lower than 75 U.S. dollars.
Moreover, the implementation potential of the NF-CoA system is great considering
that a) the low cost of the NF-CoA system can be pushed even further down with
economies of scale and b) a significant part of trade losses can be eliminated as a
consequence of counterfeiting.
• The issuing and verification procedures are inexpensive and very fast.
• The NF-CoA issuing can be realized either by storing the NF fingerprint into a large
remote Internet database – the database could be queried to vouch for the authenticity
of this tag, or by digitally signing the fingerprint using a public-key cryptosystem,
such as RSA [54], and storing the signature into the storage associated with the tag,
such as a barcode, an RFID chip, etc. While the first approach requires connectivity
of the verification device, the latter can validate the authenticity of a given tag off-
line, without any other additional communication device.
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Depending on the additional information associated with an NF-CoA certificate in-
stance, a vast array of applications can be supported. To provide a rough categorization of
these applications, the objective of such a CoA is either to present value on its own (e.g.,
identity card, credit card, currency bill, ticket, warranty, etc.) or to be associated with a
product whose genuineness it is aiming to certify. In the latter case, the tag can be attached
(i.e., clothing, jewelry) or jointly molded with the product (i.e., packaging of an electronic




The Certificate of Authenticity (CoA) is defined as a physical object that may be integrated
as an inseparable part of the surface of a physical object or can simply be attached to the
object as a tag, a label, or a seal. The certificate can prove its own authenticity and, as a
consequence, can also prove the authenticity and value of the product to which it is attached.
In this chapter, the passive physical structures that behave as CoAs in an electromagnetic
field, i.e., yield a unique signature in a portion of the electromagnetic radiation spectrum,
are investigated.
The unique physical structure of the certificate instance is an arbitrary constellation of
small, thin pieces of metallic conductors and/or one or more dielectric materials that are
randomly dispersed and spatially fixed into a three-dimensional (3D) RF-wave-permeable
dielectric fixative. The conductors may be copper, aluminum or other metal filings, and
particle scatterers. The list of candidate materials for fabrication of these unique identifiers
may also include non-linear materials, such as ferrites (ceramic compounds with ferro-
magnetic properties that show various kinds of anomalies in their power absorption at high
microwave signal levels [55]) and metamaterials (artificial materials, the permittivity and
permeability of which are both negative, resulting in a negative index of refraction, and,
thus, in a phase velocity that is anti-parallel to the direction of the Poynting vector [56]).
The proposed NF-CoA is the first extremely low-cost physical object that enables
unique identification and anti-counterfeiting capabilities based completely on the hard-
ware implementation of the object. Not only do these completely passive, random unique
physical NF-CoA structures cost a few cents of U.S. dollars, but also, because each NF-
CoA instance is different, it is almost always infeasible or prohibitively expensive for an
adversary to reproduce an NF-CoA with enough accuracy to successfully mimic the elec-
tromagnetic fingerprint that certifies authenticity. It is these benefits of physical near-field
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authentication and the resiliency to potential attacks, as discussed in Chapter 8, that render
the NF-CoAs ideal counterfeit deterrent candidates.
4.1 CoA Design and Fabrication
The design of the unique identification and anti-counterfeiting hardware certificates is chal-
lenging and has to be optimized as it determines the discrimination capability of the system,
i.e., the entropy. At the same time, as described above and in Section 4.2, the cost of the
CoA has to be on the order of a few cents of U.S. dollars.
A sine-qua-non design requirement is the “three-dimensionality” of the CoAs. This
requirement is translated to a required thickness of at least 0.75 mm, in order to prevent
the possibility of the use of inexpensive two-dimensional (2D) scanning technologies. This
three-dimensionality requirement and the random three-dimensional (3D) topology of the
mixture of the conductive and dielectric material give rise to the immense uncertainty of the
near-field electromagnetic response of the NF-CoAs. The second important design require-
ment is rigidness. This requirements implies that, although an instance can be curved as
discussed in Section 4.1.3, the certificate instance should not be flexible and, thus, should
not be forced out of initial shape.
Although there are numerous ways of creating these certificate instances, the first-of-
their-kind objects that have been tested and successfully used as NF-CoAs can be divided
into two main categories: those that are inkjet-printed and those that are copper-based.
4.1.1 Inkjet-printed Paper-based CoAs
For the realization of the first generation of certificate objects, a silver nano-particle inkjet-
printing technique [57, 58] on organic substrates was chosen as a direct-write technique.
According to this technique, the design pattern is transferred directly onto regular off-the-
shelf photo paper by means of multiple conductive inkjet-printed layers, eliminating many
of the more expensive and multistep fabrication processes currently utilized by cleanroom-
based photolithography methods for depositing multiple materials on a substrate. This
30
technique results in a very fast, low-cost, and in-house process that helps investigate the
establishment of simple inkjet-printed conductive structures as CoAs and assess the robust-
ness achieved when deploying the 2D-to-3D transition by simply stacking 2D paper-based
CoAs.
The design of an inkjet-printed paper-based single layer (2D) of a CoA [59] is shown in
Figure 3. The conductive inkjet-printed nano-particle material of the, single or eventually
multiple-stacked, 2D CoAs occupies the whole area of L2 ×W2 = 31.65 mm × 31.6 mm of
the five by five antenna array of the NF-CoA reader (see Section 5.2.1). The dimensions
of the whole surface of the CoA that also includes the through holes for fastening onto
the NF-CoA reader are L1 ×W1 = 55 mm × 53.5 mm. The number of silver nano-particle
inkjet-printed layers on the photo paper substrate is seven. The curing time for optimal
sintering of the conductive material is seven hours at 120◦C. The dielectric constant εr of




Figure 3: Design of a single paper-based layer (2D) of an inkjet-printed CoA.
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Under this category of inkjet-printed paper-based CoAs, three distinct types of geome-
tries for the NF-CoA design have been designed and fabricated. The resonance and inter-
ference of the individual scatterers was the design factor that was given the most attention.
An example of such an inkjet-printed NF-CoA instance with a single substrate layer that
consists of overlapping rhombic loop conductors is shown in Figure 4. Each loop is as-
signed a random aspect ratio and different overall circumference, so that the average loop
circumference is 18.6 mm (approximately between a half and a quarter of wavelength in
electrical length given that λ ranges from 59.96 mm to 49.97 mm in the 5 GHz to 6 GHz
frequency range as shown in Table 2). Other factors considered included the dimensions
of the spaces between conductors as a fraction of the wavelength of the reader and how
the non-periodicity of the scatterers of the NF-CoAs affects the NF response for varying
densities. As shown in the examples of Figure 4, the inclusion and disruption of periodicity
was achieved by randomizing the position of the loops and varying the number of loops (1,
6, 11, 15, 19, 24, and 29). Similarly, the second type of inkjet-printed NF-CoAs consists of
folded lines of different length and thickness (0.1 mm, 0.2 mm, 0.25 mm, 0.5 mm, and 0.75
mm); three such examples are shown in Figure 5. The folded shape was chosen for dimen-
sional miniaturization and density maximization purposes. Finally, random constellations
of 1 mm by 1 mm pixels that trace the form of the final geometry were also printed.
As mentioned previously, the final 3D structure of a physical identifier can be created




Figure 4: (a) Design and (b) fabrication of 2D NF-CoAs consisting of conductive rhombic
loops inkjet-printed on a single photo paper substrate layer with varying metal density in
terms of number of loops (11, 15, and 19).
(a)
(b)
Figure 5: (a) Design and (b) fabrication of 2D NF-CoAs consisting of conductive lines
inkjet-printed on a single photo paper substrate layer with varying metal density in terms
of line thickness (0.25 mm, 0.5 mm, and 0.75 mm).
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Figure 6: Separate 2D photo-paper-based layers with inkjet-printed rhombic loops that,
when stacked, form a 3D NF-CoA instance.
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A preliminary graphical evaluation of the NF signature entropy yielded by only a sin-
gle layer of this category of inkjet-printed CoAs is demonstrated with the highly-varying
signatures yielded that are shown in Figure 7. For a thorough performance evaluation and





Figure 7: A preliminary graphical evaluation of the NF signature entropy achieved by four
separate single-layered inkjet-printed CoAs shows highly-varying signatures yielded.
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4.1.2 Copper-based CoAs
The copper-based NF-CoA instances are constructed by immersing randomly entangled
and squished metallic hair into a dielectric substrate. The mixture of arbitrary 3D shape is
then molded into a fixed dielectric material with a single constraint; the thinnest dimension
of an NF-CoA should be substantial, e.g., at least 0.75 mm [60]. This constraint is imposed
to prevent from counterfeiting NF-CoA instances via printing them using inexpensive 2D
replication technologies, that is, it ensures that the adversary needs to master manufactur-
ing of NF-CoA-like objects in three dimensions. The key outcome obtained is that these
physical NF-CoA objects consist of an extremely difficult to replicate, random arrangement
of scatterers that produces a unique and repeatable response in the near field.
Examples of these copper-based CoAs are shown in Figures 8 and 9. These particular
instances have been fabricated in collaboration with an injection-molding company [61].
Essentially, the process involves the encapsulation of thin “hair” of copper wire of variable
mass in grams per meter (2 g/m, 3 g/m, and 4 g/m) into a heated plastic mold that is hard-
ened to maintain the position of the wires. This process helps the CoA instances withstand
humidity and temperature. Randomness in the shape of the submerged metallic hair is in-
troduced by applying techniques that are absolutely non-deterministic, including the use of
large air fans and blending with different speeds and for different amounts of time.
Contrary to the inkjet-printed CoAs, the copper-based NF-CoAs are designed to occupy
a smaller area (approximately 27 mm × 27 mm) with the aim to increase their practicality
and ease of attachment to physical objects. These are shown in Figure 9. Any potential
effect of the size reduction on the entropy of the signatures yielded is examined in Sec-
tion 6.2.3. The lateral surface of these smaller-sized square-shaped CoAs is rotated around
the central axis of the antenna array of the NF-CoA reader (see Figure 10), so that the
radiation of as many antenna elements as possible that are closer to the periphery of the
array is “disturbed” by the NF-CoA. Certificates I (of Figure 8) and J, however, comprise
the exceptions, since their cross-section areas intentionally exceeded those of the antenna
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Figure 8: The inner semi-transparent three-dimensional structure of a 56 mm × 56 mm
“full-sized” copper-based NF-CoA instance.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 9: Copper-based 27 mm × 27 mm NF-CoAs of different mass per meter (2 g/m, 3
g/m, and 4 g/m).
array for testing purposes. In particular, the dimensions of these two certificates are ap-
proximately 56 mm × 56 mm and holes for the plastic poles of the reader had to be drilled
through them (see Figure 8).
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Figure 10: Top view of the NF-CoA reader with (a) a small-sized and (b) a full-sized
copper-based certificate instance fastened to the annotated antenna array slot.
After an NF-CoA has been fabricated, regardless of if it is a copper-based or an inkjet-
printed one, its NF response has to be captured, digitized and stored. If the capability
of offline verification is desired, one of the tools that can be used is traditional asymmetric
key cryptography. The digitized NF-CoA signature is digitally signed by the original issuer.
This issuing process takes place in the controlled environment of a fabrication facility and
is discussed in detail in Section 4.2.1.
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4.1.3 CoA Instances on Flat and Cylindrical Surfaces
The design of the NF-CoA instances does not constrain them to necessarily be part of only
flat surfaces. As long as curved arrays of antennas are developed, the CoAs can also be
mounted on rigid curved surfaces.
To better illustrate this, concept photos are provided in Figure 11.
(a) (b)
Figure 11: Concept photos of copper-based CoAs attached on rigid cylindrical surfaces.
39
4.2 NF-CoA Instance Life Cycle
In an effort to provide all aspects of the proposed complete authentication and anti-counterfeiting
solution, this section presents the entire life cycle of an NF-CoA instance spanning from
the fabrication process to the point where a citizen has his identity card or passport authen-
ticated or a client checks out a product. Examples of the fabrication processes followed to
realize the first two generations of prototype CoAs have been provided in the previous sec-
tion. Regardless, however, of the exact fabrication process used, the two succeeding stages
that a certificate goes are the issuing and the verification processes if offline authentication
is desired.
The verification of a certificate instance in the framework of the NF-CoA system can
happen either in an online or an offline fashion. Essentially, the difference between these
two types of verification is that the online one is conducted by contacting and accessing a
remote Internet-based central database that keeps a record of all the queries in the past and
is able to tell if one particular serial number has been queried about its authenticity more
than once in the past. On the contrary, the offline process makes use of no intranet, i.e.,
corporate, or Internet connection whatsoever and is entirely carried out locally and almost
instantly by the standalone reader itself. Although one can naively argue that the physical
CoA is not required in the online verification process, this argument is, of course, not true.
Relying on just monitoring if one bit sequence, e.g. a serial number, has been queried more
than once (N times) in the past would only allow the original issuer to know there exist
N − 1 counterfeits; in fact, the issuer would not be able to track down which exact is the
genuine, and who N − 1 counterfeiters to legally pursue.
In this chapter, the focus is given on the more attractive offline scenario, as this is
applicable to a significantly broader range of applications. The traditional asymmetric
key cryptography shown below is only one of the large array of possible cryptosystem
candidates.
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4.2.1 NF-CoA Issuing Process
The first main process, which takes place in the controlled environment of a fabrication
facility right after the fabrication is complete, is the NF-CoA issuing process [62, 48]. This
process consists of a number of steps that are listed below and shown in Figure 12. The
certificate issuer follows these steps to digitally sign the NF fingerprint of the instance using
traditional and long-trusted cryptography.
1 First, the NF-CoA reader is used to digitize the unique NF fingerprint of the newly
fabricated NF-CoA instance. This digitized bit sequence, which consists of 12-bit ac-
curacy readings at fMAX frequency steps in the spectrum neighborhood of 5.5 GHz for
all Ncoupl antenna permutations has, initially, an overall raw size of (12×65×72)/8 =
7020 bytes. This bit sequence may be compressed, using any of the numerous avail-
able lossless compressing algorithms, into a reduced and fixed-length bit string (f ).
In case, for example, the UHF EPC Class 1 Gen 2 RFID standard [63] is used, this
protocol can handle multiple fragmented packets and, additionally, the RFID chip
manufacturers do provide 4 Kbytes or more of non-volatile high capacity memories
in their chips.
2 The information (data) associated with the owner of the protected document, such
as personal details and bio-metric data, or the product itself, including product ID,
color, and expiration date, is afterward appended to the bit string f.
3 A copy of the resulting composite bit string payload is directly stored to onto the
accompanying tiny embedded storage chip or an RFID tag chip, as shown in the
diagram of Figure 12.
4 A copy of bit string payload is hashed using a cryptographically strong algorithm,
with SHA256 [64] being a very good such candidate.
5 This hash is subsequently signed (s) by applying a public-key cryptosystem (PKCS),
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such as RSA [54], digital signature algorithm (DSA) proposed by the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [65] or other cryptographic routines based
on elliptic curves, such as EC-DSA [66], and using the issuer’s private key. The use
of asymmetric key algorithms that involve the use of a public key known to everyone,
and a secret private key is the distinguishing characteristic of public key cryptogra-
phy. The keys are related mathematically, but it is virtually impossible to deduce the
private key from the public key [54]. As a consequence, in the NF-CoA application
only the issuer can digitally sign the NF-CoA with the secret private key.
6 As was the case with the plain initial bit string w, the hashed and signed version s is
also directly encoded onto the same embedded storage chip or RFID chip.
Figure 12: The NF-CoA issuing process
4.2.2 NF-CoA Verification Process
The NF-CoA verification process [62, 48] is almost the inverse process of the certificate-
issuing process, discussed previously, and it is conceptually shown in Figure 13. Here
the similarity level between the signed and stored signature is checked. This process can
take place, for example, at passport checkpoints and customs offices, during the check-
out process of a product or drug with a cashier or during the arrival of merchandise at a
distribution center or a warehouse.
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The digitally-encoded information mentioned in the previous subsection, which essen-
tially results from the concatenation of a plain and a signed version of the identity or product
information and the NF signature of the CoA, i.e., s||w, is used to validate whether or not a
document is valid or a product is authentic or not. The steps of the verification process are
1 A regular wired or wireless storage chip reader or RFID reader is used to extract the
bit string payload, which contains data and its signed and hashed version s.
2 The integrity of the plain bit string payload is verified with respect to its encrypted
and signed version (s) using the corresponding well-known issuer’s public key. If the
integrity test is successful, then the verifier can be confident that no one else, except
for the possessor of the matching private key, has encrypted the information and, as
a result, the original compressed NF fingerprint f, and the object data are extracted.
3 The extracted fingerprint f is afterward compared with a new read-out of the NF-
CoA that the verifier extracts himself with his own NF-CoA reader. The compar-
ison/matching is done based on the same distance metric at each antenna coupling
(out of Ncoupl) and frequency point individually (out of fMAX). Only if the values of
the distance between these two, read and extracted, fingerprint curves is smaller than
a threshold value all across the frequency range, i.e., the similarity exceeds a certain
level, does the verifier declare that the certificate and, thus, the product is authentic.
For more details about the determination of this threshold δT see Sections 6.2.5.1 and
7.1.
As shown in the entropy quantification analysis of Chapter 7, this level of similarity
corresponds to a worst-case maximum probability for a false alarm of 10−200, which
is virtually impossible.
One last note that relates to the ease of use and portability of the NF-CoA reader within
store premises or industrial facilities is that the microcontroller unit chip of the last two gen-
erations of the reader can provide wireless connectivity and relay of the extracted CoA data
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Figure 13: The NF-CoA verification process
on top of the standardized and highly-reliable Zigbee Pro and Bluetooth wireless network-
ing standards to a central location and a mobile device, respectively, over AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard)-128 bit encrypted wireless links. Further details about how the pro-




NF-COA READER DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
The NF-CoA reader is an important component of the NF-CoA system. The reader is
used to reveal the fine near-field electromagnetic effects resulting from the impingement
of electromagnetic energy on a certificate instance and, thus, derive the fingerprint of a
certificate instance. In particular, during the contactless validation procedure, carried out
by the reader, an attempt is made to associate the near-field signature response, extracted
with the help of K × K matrix of antennae that latches onto an NF-CoA instance, with
the digitized signature that is signed by the issuer and stored into a complementary tiny
embedded storage chip.
The extraction of the unique signature of an NF-CoA object is performed as follows:
electromagnetic power in the neighborhood of 5.5 GHz is emitted from a particular element
of the antenna array of the reader, this radiation impinges upon an NF-CoA instance placed
at a distance of 2 mm up to approximately 6 mm away from the array, as long as this
distance is kept the same across different CoAs and different reader measurements and
allowing for ±0.3 mm vertical displacement, and eventually the near-field effects, discussed
in Chapter 3, are captured by another antenna element.
As in the case of the certificate instances and for a wide adoption to be possible, the
reader is required to meet the requirement of low cost (with the sum of its analog and dig-
ital components being on the order of less than 75 U.S. dollars). Meanwhile, it is also
required that the reader can operate autonomously and in an offline (no Internet connectiv-
ity) fashion, exhibits enormous performance robustness, in terms of accuracy, consistency
and speed of capturing of the signatures, and has dimensions comparable to that of a human
palm.
Despite the low accuracy provided by the out-of-the-shelf analog and digital circuitry
used and the noise due to external factors, the major objectives of the reader design are to
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→ maximize the entropy, i.e., randomness, of the near-field response of the CoA
→ guarantee the extraction robustness of the NF signature of the same CoA by different
readers. In other words, the reader has to exhibit consistency of the extracted NF
fingerprint across multiple readings of the same NF-CoA , as well as across readings
of the same NF-CoA tag by different readers despite the low accuracy provided by the
out-of-the-shelf analog and digital circuitry used and the noise because of external
factors.
The hardware aspects of the fabricated reader, including its design and fabrication, as
well as its operating details are presented in this chapter.
5.1 The NF-CoA Reader Generations
The design and fabrication of the NF-CoA reader has evolved over three different gener-
ations of mixed-signal boards. All board generations consist of four metallic and three
substrate layers of variable thickness, as depicted in Figure 14. Of the two inner conduc-
tive layers, M2 houses all DC lines that power the active components of the reader and M3
serves as the ground plane. As opposed to the case of the first-generation NF-CoA reader
(see Section 5.1.1), the ground layer of the second and third generations (see Sections 5.1.2
and 5.1.3) is not contiguous. Instead, on layer M3 reside two separate and unconnected
ground planes; one for the upper half of the board that houses the antenna array and one for
the lower half of the digital control plane of the board. The antenna array resides on layers
M1 and M2.
The thickness of the dielectric layers is TD1 = TD3 = 0.254 mm = 0.010 inch and
TD2 = 0.889 mm = 0.035 inch and the thickness of the conductor layers is TM1 = TM4 =
0.046 mm = 0.0018 inch and TM2 = TM3 = 0.018 mm = 0.0007 inch. As a result, the total
thickness of the board does not exceed 1.6 mm. The substrate of the board is FR-408 with
relative dielectric constant εr = 3.715 in the near-field super high frequency (SHF) band of
interest, namely 5 GHz to 6 GHz, relative permeability µr = 1 and loss tangent tanδ = 0.01.
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Figure 14: The four metallic (MX) and three substrate (DX) layers of the NF-CoA reader
board.
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5.1.1 First-generation NF-CoA Reader
During the design of the first generation of the NF-CoA board reader [59], the attention
was almost exclusively concentrated on the SHF plane. A significant effort was made to
optimally place the SHF components in order to maintain the signal integrity of the NF
fingerprint.
The circuit design of the first generation NF-CoA reader is shown in Figure 15. Figure
16 shows the board schematic design. In both figures, the major analog and digital compo-
nents are annotated. The circuit part that is colored with pink lines in the diagram of Figure
16 corresponds to the digital part. The SHF circuit part is shown with turquoise lines. The
dimensions of the board are 12.85 cm × 16.50 cm.
The SMA female connectors attached on each side of the fabricated first generation
board, as shown in Figure 17, only serve for characterization and verification purposes.
Of course, special provisioning was required in terms of both additional SHF lines and
low-capacitor structures to assist in re-routing of the SHF signal path for testing. The
characterization results are provided in the next section. Under this approach, the SMA
connectors should be considered removed during normal operation of the board.
For this first prototype implementation, an external data acquisition board [67] is used
to generate the 16-bit sequence that dictates the path of the SHF signal through the two-
layer SP4T switch hierarchy, controls the frequency output of the voltage-controlled oscil-
lator (VCO) through the corresponding input voltage and measures the power detected by
monitoring the output voltage of the power detector (PD). This data acquisition board is
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Figure 16: The board schematic design of the first-generation NF-CoA reader.
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(a) (b)
Figure 17: The (a) top and (b) bottom view of the 12.85 cm × 16.50 cm fabricated first-
generation NF-CoA reader.
Figure 18: The original test setup of the first-generation NF-CoA system. The reader
control and NF-CoA signature extraction is performed by the National Instruments data
acquisition board.
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5.1.2 Second-generation NF-CoA Reader
The board schematic design of the second-generation NF-CoA reader [60, 53] is shown
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Figure 19: The board schematic design of the second-generation NF-CoA reader.
The most important advancement in regards with the first-generation board is that this
design does not rely on a single VCO but two of them, namely the HMC430LP4 [68] and
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HMC431LP4 [69], which both together optimally cover the 5.0 GHz to 6.1 GHz frequency
band. Additionally, this board is narrower, occupying 16% less space; the dimensions of
the second–generation board are 10.8 cm × 17.2 cm. Moreover, the operation of this board
is, for the first time, controlled by an external micro-controller unit (MCU) board [70] that
provides not only a very fast means of capturing the NF fingerprint, but also the accuracy
required toward an effort to maximize the fingerprint’s entropy. The state diagram of the
MCU, which reflects the sequence of all the steps of the NF-CoA signature validation
procedure, is discussed in detail in the next section. As a result, the overall reader design
consists of a double-stacked layer solution; the SHF plane and the digital control plane. As
implied by their names, the first layer includes the CoA reading slot, the antenna matrix,
as well as all required digital and analog circuitry and the second houses the MCU and the
data acquisition interface. The circuit part colored with pink lines in the diagram of Figure




Figure 20: The (a) top and (b) bottom view of the 10.8 cm × 17.2 cm fabricated second-
generation NF-CoA reader.
(a) (b)
Figure 21: The original test setup of the second-generation NF-CoA system. The control
of the reader operation and the NF-CoA signature extraction are here conducted by the NI
DAQ board.
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Figure 22: The final test setup of the second-generation NF-CoA system. The fabricated
super high frequency plane of the reader is shown on the left and its digital control plane is
shown on the right.
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5.1.3 Third-generation NF-CoA Reader
The latest generation of the NF-CoA reader [48] represents the first standalone, autonomous
reader that does not make use of an external data acquisition board. Instead, a big leap to-
ward unifying the SHF plane and the digital control plane and integrating them on a single
board is done. It should be noted that, for this single board solution to be realized and
maintain its high efficiency, special care was taken for the optimal placement of the MCU
chip, its supporting IC components and the inter-connecting wiring that involved two main
goals, namely the isolation, that is, elimination of the electromagnetic interference, between
digital and analog circuitry and the signal integrity preservation of the NF fingerprint. A
direct result of this single-board approach has been the increase of the length of the board.
The board’s dimensions are 10.8 cm × 20.9 cm. The top and bottom views of one of the
fabricated third generation NF-CoA readers are provided in Figure 24.
The major analog and digital components of the third-generation NF-CoA reader are
annotated on the board schematic design of Figure 23. The SHF lines are on the top layer
(turquoise–colored lines in the diagram of Figure 23). The ground plane is placed on the
third metal layer and the digital control lines on the bottom layer (gold–colored lines in the
diagram of Figure 23).
At the heart of the control plane is the TI MSP-EXP430F5438 MCU [70] that features
an up to 18-MHz system clock, high-frequency crystals up to 32 MHz and multiple high-
resolution analog-to-digital converters (ADC). The MCU is accompanied by push buttons
and a USB interface for data transfer.
For its powering, the control plane does not rely on batteries, although a two-AA battery
option is available. Instead, the current is supplied by the USB cable, which is anyways
used for the NF-CoA fingerprint acquisition by a desktop or a laptop computer. When
alternatively powered by an AC-to-DC converter, the nominal voltage is 9 V while the
measured is 9.19 V with a significant peak-to-peak Voltage variance of 400 mV. When the
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Figure 23: The board schematic design of the third-generation NF-CoA reader.
power mode 4 (LPM4) sleep mode (see next section for more details).
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(a) (b)
Figure 24: The (a) top and (b) bottom view of the 10.8 cm × 20.9 cm fabricated third-
generation NF-CoA reader.
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5.2 Super High Frequency Plane
5.2.1 Antenna Array Elements and Coupling
The antenna elements that comprise the array are individual folded shorted-patch antennas,
the 3D design of which is shown in Figure 25. The planar shape of this type of antennas
makes them easy to integrate into the “skin” of the NF-CoA reader board, while a relatively
high gain with good side-lobe suppression can be achieved.
A trade-off between two contradictory desired features had to be made during the an-
tenna array design. On one hand, since it was desired that the planar dimensions of the
first generation of CoAs are approximately 1 inch × 1 inch for practical reasons, such as
mounting them on small sized products, and given that the certificate read-out involves the
near-field response of its scatterers, the antenna array should also occupy the same area. On
the other hand, it was desired that a single NF fingerprint consist of as a large set of scatter-
ing parameter (S 21) curves of antenna element couplings as possible. These contradictory
design requirements necessitated the use of folding and meandering minimization antenna
design techniques that enormously help in packing as many individual antennas as possible
in the aforementioned area. The technical characteristics and the antenna design strategy
has relied on previous research efforts [71, 72]. As a result of the exploitation of the mini-
mization techniques and by choosing an operating frequency range in the neighborhood of
5.5 GHz that yields a half wavelength (λ/2) of around 2.75 cm, the final planar size of each
element is 2.95 mm × 2.988 mm (or 116.142 mil × 117.638 mil corresponding to x × y of
Figure 26) and it is finally possible to fit 25 (with a 5 × 5 configuration) within an area of
31.70 mm × 31.51 mm (corresponding to L ×W of Figure 26) [59, 60]. The antenna array
elements are placed on the top two metal layers of the reader board at planar horizontal and
vertical distances of ∆x = ∆y = 4.19 mm between each other, as shown in Figure 26.
During an NF signature read-out, it is ensured that the placement of the NF-CoA in-




































Figure 26: The pattern of the transmit-only and receive-only elements of the antenna array
of the reader.
with short plastic bars (poles), shown in Figure 21b, the relative position of which is non-
symmetrical on the array’s plane.
The 3D antenna element design is shown in Figure 25 and 27a. A single such element
has been measured by itself, i.e., not in the presence of neighboring elements as shown
in Figure 27b, and exhibits a return loss of 27.4 dB at a resonant frequency of 5.26 GHz
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(measured with a Rohde & Schwarz ZVA 8 Vector Network Analyzer (VNA)), as shown
with the solid curve of Figure 29 [59]. The agreement of this measurement with the sim-
ulated resonant frequency of 5.33 GHz with a return loss of 13.75 dB, shown with the
dotted curve of Figure 29, is relatively satisfying if one considers the inevitable complex
3D manufacturing inaccuracies. Applying, however, the aforementioned miniaturization
techniques does not come without cost. The major negative effect is the limited −10 dB
bandwidth of this antenna element, which does not exceed 90 MHz (5.21 GHz to 5.30 GHz
at −10 dB). Despite this limited bandwidth, the strength of the electric field extracted by
these elements, even 500 MHz away from the resonant frequency, is very high (≥ 10 dB),
as shown in the performance tests of Section 6.2. This high electric-field strength is, of
course, attributed to the very good antenna radiation pattern, simulated with ADS [1] and
shown in Figure 28.
(a) (b)
Figure 27: (a) Antenna element simulation setup, (b) Antenna element measurement setup
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Figure 28: Antenna radiation pattern of an individual element of the antenna array simu-
lated with ADS [1].
Figure 29: The S 11 curve of an individual element of the antenna array.
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Out of all the 25 elements of the five by five antenna matrix, nine of them operate
as transmit-only and eight of them as receive-only, as shown in the pattern of Figure 26.
The transmit- and receive-only elements have been split into four sets of fours, placed as
farthest away as possible in the four corners of the array, and the rest eight elements on
the virtual cross of the structure are unconnected (not used), with the exception of the
central one. This design helps eliminate the need for single-pole double-throw (SPDT)
switches for dual operation of the elements and reduces the number of the required digital
input/output control lines. Moreover, the rationale behind this splitting is to minimize the
coupling that is due to proximity and, thus, attribute most of the coupling measured to the
presence of the conductive material of the CoA. To quantify this, the couplings (S 21 curves)
of all possible different antenna element spacing of a subset three by three antenna array,
shown in Figure 30a, have been captured over the 4.7 GHz to 6 GHz band at steps of 3
MHz in the absence of any CoA and are presented in Figure 30c [60]. This subset array
has been manufactured in the exact same way as the finally used five by five array, so that
SMA SHF connectors are available and more intuitive conclusions can be drawn by fewer
elements. These six different curves are labeled with a “x→ y” format; the x corresponds
to the transmitting numbered element, as shown in Figure 30a, and the y corresponds to the
receiving numbered element. As expected, all curves have their maxima at the range around
the resonant frequency of the antenna elements and the shorter the distance between the
transmitting and receiving elements the higher this maxima is ([Tx1−Rx4] > [Tx2−Rx4] >
[Tx2 − Rx3] > [Tx1 − Rx2] > [Tx3 − Rx4] > [Tx1 − Rx3]). It should be noted that, given
the functionality assigned to the active elements, the worst case scenario for the actual five
by five board corresponds to the cases of Tx1 − Rx2 (C3-B4) and Tx2 − Rx3 (C3-D2), for
which the magnitude of the maximum points does not exceed −20 dB. In other words, the
maximum coupling between any pair of elements of the 5×5 array in the absence of a CoA




Figure 30: (a) Bottom and (b) top view of a three by three antenna array fabricated in
the exact same way as the five by five array of the NF-CoA reader, (c) S 21 curves of all
possible different antenna element spacing of a subset three by three array in the absence
of any CoA.
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5.2.2 SP4T Switch Hierarchy
Any particular antenna transmit and receive coupling, out of the 72 possible permutations of
the NF-CoA board is chosen by digitally controlling eight identical single-pole four-throw
(SP4T) switches [73], arranged in two hierarchical levels, shown in the block diagram of
Figure 31 [60]. Based on this arrangement, there are always two switches preceding the
transmit-only antenna element and two switches following the receive-only element. The
physical location and order of the switches on the board has been optimized so that the
coupling between the SHF lines is minimal. All connections are 50 Ω and it has been
ensured that the length of the lines connecting the appropriate switches for any antenna
permutation is the same and fixed. The average insertion loss introduced by a single SP4T
switch across the 4.5 GHz to 6.5 GHz band has been measured to be 1.07 dB (using the
aforementioned VNA). The S 21 and S 11 parameters of the two-port system that include
the transmit and receive power amplifiers and the intermediate SP4T switch hierarchy are
shown in the next section for the case of enabled CAL line.
Figure 31: The two-layer SP4T switch hierarchy for enabling any antenna transmit and
receive element pair, out of the 72 possible permutations of the NF-CoA board.
The losses introduced by the components of the reader are expected to vary from lot of
circuit components to lot and, as a result, from reader to reader. Given that it is very im-
portant to achieve consistency and elimination of false negatives among different readers,
a calibration technique is deployed. This calibration technique involves measuring all cou-
pling channels (S 21) for all possible antenna permutations of each NF-CoA reader over the
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entire supported frequency band in the absence of any CoA, namely the “No CoA” curves,
and storing these curves into the non-volatile memory of the board. Additionally, a copper
line (CAL line) that is connecting two unused ports of two SP4T switches, out of the overall
four lower-level switches, is also used for calibration purposes. With the help of this CAL
line, the insertion loss introduced by four consecutive SP4T switches is measured [59]. As
shown in Figure 32, the average S 21 value of −16.57 dB as well as the curve across the 5
GHz to 6 GHz spectrum agree well with the simulated overall loss, which is the sum of the
attenuation because of the total line length itself as calculated by ADS [1] and the 4.3 dB
attenuation incurred by the four switches.
Figure 32: Measured and simulated S 21 curves of the calibration (CAL) line of the reader
board.
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5.2.3 SHF Signal Generation and Propagation
The SHF signal radiated toward the NF-CoA instance is generated by selecting any of the
two voltage-controlled oscillators (VCOs) [68, 69], which together optimally cover the 5.0
GHz to 6.1 GHz frequency band. The exact mapping of the 0 V to 9.1 V VCO input
control voltage range to the VCO output frequency spectrum has been characterized (using
the Tektronix RSA 3408A real-time spectrum analyzer (RSA)) and shown in Figure 33.
Figure 33: VCO mapping of the 0 V to 9.1 V (0% to 100% PWM) input control voltage
range to the 4.8 GHz to 5.8 GHz frequency spectrum.
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The peak power of the +2 dBm generated, nearly monochromatic signal, after it is
amplified by +11.25 dB by a power amplifier (PA) [74], is measured 3.94 dBm (using the
above RSA) with 50 dB insertion loss. The spectrum content of this SHF signal is shown
in Figure 34. The scattered, reflected and refracted signal received is amplified by the same
PA and the SHF power is monitored by an RMS PD [75] that yields a ±1 dB accuracy.
According to the data sheet of the PD used [75] for fRF = 5800 MHz, the RF in-
put power range is from −25 dBm to 6 dBm when externally matched to a 50 Ω source
and the linear dynamic range for a continuous wave is 31 dB with a ±1 dB linearity er-
ror. These values agree very well with a new self-conducted characterization of the PD.
Specifically, the voltage output of the PD (approximately 180 mV to 1400 mV) has been
accurately mapped to the input generated by a signal generator [76] before the PA rang-
ing from −50 dBm up to 5 dBm for frequency points in the 5 GHz to 6 GHz spectrum
and is shown with the graph of Figure 35. Especially for the evaluation of the results of
Chapter 6, it is important to estimate the linear dynamic range in mV. Given that the output
DC voltage, when no signal is applied to the RF input, is 180 mV and since the output
slope is 31 mV/dB, the linear dynamic range in mV is approximately 250 mV to 1211 mV
(= 250 mV + (31 dB ∗ 31 mV/dB)). In dB, the linear dynamic range ranges approximately
from −35 dBm up to −4 dBm.
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Figure 34: The spectrum content of the super high frequency signal generated by the
voltage-controlled oscillator, as captured with a spectrum analyzer
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Figure 35: Mapping of the voltage output of the power detector to the input generated by a
signal generator.
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An example of the clockwise direction of a signal path through the aforementioned and
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Figure 36: An example of the clockwise direction of a signal path through the RF compo-
nents of the NF-CoA reader.
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5.3 Micro-controller-enabled Reader Operation
The functionality of the NF-CoA reader is summarized in the following four main tasks:
1. generating the appropriate SHF power and controlling the frequency output of the
VCO,
2. dictating the path that the SHF signal follows through the two-layer SP4T switch
hierarchy and the coupling, eventually, between the Tx and Rx antenna elements,
3. measuring the power captured by monitoring the PD output voltage, and
4. uploading the set of measured data that comprise the fingerprint of the NF-CoA to a
computer host or other networked device.
For the last two reader generations, the control of all the digital and analog components
of the reader is performed by a 16-bit RISC architecture ultra-low-power TI MCU [77].
The MCU provides multiple digital output pins for controlling the SP4T switches, a con-
nection to a physical push button, a USB interface for data transfer and powering (if battery
operation is not desired) and two different RF networking interfaces, briefly described in
Section 5.3.4. Of course, a JTAG interface is also provided for re-programming the MCU
with the MSP-FET430UIF programmer and the code composer studio (CCS/CCE) Eclipse
software development environment.
The algorithm implemented by the developed firmware code in C programming lan-
guage is depicted with the state diagram of Figure 37 [60]. When the power switch of the
board is turned on, the MCU finds itself in the low-power mode 4 (LPM4) sleep mode.
This is the deepest sleep mode with a current consumption of 1.69µA at 3.0 V, in which the
CPU and all clocks are disabled, the crystal oscillator is stopped but the supply supervisor
is operational and full RAM memory retention is provided.
In short time intervals the 32 KHz auxiliary clock of the micro-controller is enabled
and used to check if the button on the control plane is pressed. Given that a human would
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Figure 37: Operational state diagram of the algorithm implemented by the NF-CoA reader.
be pressing the button for at least half a second, the time duration of this button monitoring
lasts for only a few milliseconds, leading eventually to a very low duty-cycle monitoring.
As soon as a press on the button is detected, the MCU exits the deep sleep mode and tran-
sits to the antenna permutation selection state. In this state a particular antenna element
pair (one antenna element to illuminate the NF-CoA and the other to receive the scattered
energy) is selected by appropriately configuring the two digital logic control pins of all the
SP4T switches with a 16-bit sequence generated by the digital output pins of the MCU. For
instance, coupling A1 − E1 is selected with bit sequence 0100000010000001 and D4 − B5
with 0011110001001000 . “Logical 0” corresponds to 0 to +0.8 Vdc at a current consump-
tion of 5 µA and “logical 1” corresponds to +2.0 to +3.2 Vdc, at a current consumption of
up to 60 µA (a small fraction of the 2 mA that a single pin of this MCU can drive). This
selection remains active until a new bit sequence is generated. The next time the control
plane returns to the antenna element pair selection state a check is performed as to whether
or not the maximum number of antenna permutations (NUM_ELEM), namely 72, has already
been selected; in which case the MCU reverts to the sleep mode.
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If not all possible antenna element permutations have been enabled, the next step is to
generate a sinusoidal power signal at a particular frequency, nearly monochromatic, by con-
trolling the appropriate VCO. The S 21 NF-CoA fingerprint is captured over the frequency
band of 5.1 GHz to 5.9 GHz at 65 steps of 12.3 MHz each. The selection of these steps is
achieved by altering the tune voltage of the VCO.
5.3.1 Pulse Width Modulation to Control the VCOs
Since the MCU provides no digital-to-analog (DAC) functionality, the latter is emulated
by a high-frequency pulse width modulation (PWM) signal. In pulse width modulation,
the carrier wave is simply a succession of pulses, or a pulse train, and the information
modulated onto the carrier is a DC level. Specifically, the output, or average, voltage is
configured by a variable duty cycle (D) that can vary from 0 to 1 and is derived from the
ratio of the duration of one PWM pulse width (at the level of the USB rail’s VCC = 3.2
V) and the time duration of one PWM cycle (PWM period), as shown in the following
equation




The averaging out of the PWM waveform cannot only rely upon some property of the
load to act as an integrator. Instead, a passive, analog first order, or one pole, low-pass
filter that consists simply of one resistor (R) and one capacitor (C) (see Figure 38) is used
[78]. The low-pass filtering, ideally, eliminates the inherent high-frequency harmonic noise
components and leaves just the DC content of the waveform.
Figure 38: Passive, analog first order, or one pole, low-pass filter.
The 3-dB cut off frequency, where the output has dropped by a half compared to the
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input, is fcut = 12πRC . The product RC is also called the time constant (τ) of the filter.
The cut off frequency has to be kept as far away as possible from the PWM carrier wave,
or in other words the bandwidth has to be a small fraction of fPWM. The above discussion
results in a trade-off between how often it is desired for the NF-CoA reader to perform
frequency hopping in the 5 GHz to 6 GHz range and eliminating the ripple effect, as well
as making sure the guard delay slot times between consecutive read-outs are maintained,
as discussed later with the timing characteristics of the components along the SHF signal
path.
Using the sub-main clock (SMCLK) of the MCU, fPWM  1048 kHz and the timer
period is approximately 488 µs. By picking R = 53.6 kΩ (not high so as to keep the system
less sensitive to load resistance) and C = 100 pF, the cut-off frequency is satisfyingly small
fcut = 29.7 kHz compared to fPWM and equally significantly the peak-to-peak ripple voltage
is Vpk−pk = 0.142 V for the worst case scenario of D = 50% [79]. The step response of
the used first order filter, i.e., the time description of how it responds to a step input, for
different duty cycles, namely 15%, 50% and 99%, is shown in Figure 39. For all three
different cases of duty cycles shown, the settling time is tr = 12.342 µsec to reach the final
Vout levels of g(∞) = 0.48 V (D = 15%), g(∞) = 1.60 V (D = 50%) or g(∞) = 3.168 V (D
= 99%).
Returning back to the control of the VCOs, the mapping of the 0 V to 3.2 V filtered
PWM output signal to the 0 V to 10 V tune voltage range of the VCO is done by an
intermediate non-inverting operational amplifier (OpAmp) [80], the schematic of which is
shown in Figure 40. With appropriate biasing (VP = 9.19 V and VN = 0 V), input voltage
levels (V1 = 0 V and V2 = VPWM up to 3.2 V) and resistor values (R1 = 15 kΩ, R2 = 2.2 kΩ,
R f = 33 kΩ and Rg = 19.1 kΩ), the non-inverting gain (Vout/V2) of the operational amplifier
is 2.87 and for the maximum input voltage of V2 = 3.2 V the non-clipped output voltage
is 9.18 V. Table 3 provides the PWM and OpAmp output voltage levels for different duty





Figure 39: The step response of the first order, or one pole, low-pass filter for different duty
cycles, namely 15%, 50% and 99%.
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representation of the actual generated VCO frequency as a function of the PWM duty cycle
is provided in Figure 33.
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Figure 40: The schematic of the non-inverting operational amplifier that maps the 0 V to
3.2 V filtered PWM output signal to the 0 V to 10 V tune voltage range of the VCO.
Table 3: PWM and OpAmp output voltage levels for different PWM duty cycles.











10 0.307 1.018 3.315960912 5.043
20 0.607 1.977 3.257001647 5.195
30 0.907 2.935 3.235942668 5.304
40 1.207 3.895 3.227009114 5.406
50 1.508 4.854 3.218832891 5.496
60 1.808 5.813 3.215154867 5.577
70 2.108 6.77 3.211574953 5.652
80 2.408 7.73 3.21013289 5.724
90 2.708 8.69 3.20901034 5.785
99 2.979 9.1 3.054716348 5.811
The next time the control plane returns to the control VCO state a check is performed
as to whether or not the maximum number of frequency steps (maxFreq), namely 65, has




With the Tx antenna element radiating power toward the NF-CoA that is placed just 2 mm
against the antenna matrix, the next step is to amplify the captured reflected and refracted
signal and feed it to the power detector of the board. The PD output voltage, which es-
sentially represents the received signal strength, is read by the ADC of the MCU with its
highest 12-bit precision mode.
Based on measurements carried out under a controlled environment of pre-configured
signal power amplitude and before applying the PWM filtering of the previous section,
it has been found that a single analog-to-digital conversion is not enough. In particular,
although the voltage reference used (3.2 V) for the ADC and supplied by the USB input
has been measured to remain steady over time, AD conversions have been recorded to be as
far as 20% off from the same actual input signal for more than 100 duplicate measurements.
In addition, of course, to the inaccuracy introduced by the output of the PD, pointed
out above, the two major sources of inaccuracy in the ADC testing of mixed-signal circuits
have been identified to be the approximations of IEEE standard for digitizing waveform
recorders and IEEE standard for terminology and test methods for analog-to-digital con-
verters [81] and the fact that the DC offset and the amplitude of the input analog signal
evaluated on the base of the digital output differ from their true values [82]. However, this
deviation easily drops to less than 8% by performing 20 consecutive conversions (measure-
ments) of an NF response at a particular antenna configuration and frequency, storing them
in the successive approximation register of the MCU and afterward simply averaging them.
The latency incurred, as a result of the additional 19 conversions, is totally negligible given
that each 12-bit resolution conversion requires only 13 MCU clock cycles, the total time
duration of which is 0.65 µsec for a MCU clock speed of 20 MHz. The NUM_AVG variable
shown in the state diagram of Figure 37 corresponds to the maximum number, that is, 20,
of consecutive analog-to-digital conversions before the averaging is performed.
Each payload triplet entry consisting of the antenna permutation, the frequency and the
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received power in dB is uploaded to the computer at 57.6 Kbps with the use of the USCI
module of the MCU that supports the UART protocol used to communicate with the TI
TUSB chip [83].
After the above steps are completed, the MCU algorithm performs a check of whether
or not the maximum number of frequency steps has already been reached; in which case
the full frequency spectrum for a single antenna permutation has been swept and the MCU
jumps to the next antenna permutation. At this point, a check is also done about whether
or not the maximum number of antenna permutations has already been selected; in which
case the MCU reverts to its LPM4 sleep mode. An LED that remains on until all the
aforementioned steps for the NF fingerprint extraction are completed is indicative of the
activity of the control plane before it returns back to its sleep mode state.
5.3.3 Component Timing Characteristics
The timing characteristics of all the components across the SHF signal path have to be
carefully considered, since the maximum component delay will define the minimum guard
time that the NF signature extraction process has to adhere to to guarantee reliability of the
measurements.
The power detector [75] requires 8 µs of fall time to drop from 90% to 10% of its full
dynamic range, 1 µs of turn-on time and 1 µs of settling time. An SP4T switch [73] re-
quires 50 ns of rise or fall time (10% to 90% and vice versa of its full dynamic range) and
120 ns of turn-on and turn-off time. The first order, low-pass filter requires a settling time
of 12.342 µsec, as calculated above. So, it is concluded that the source of lag, which over-
laps the delay times of all other components, is the PWM filter. The latter’s settling time
eventually determines the guard, i.e., “wait,” time of the MCU. For the currently developed
and programmed running firmware version, the overall time required to capture a full NF
signature of Ncoupl = 72 S 21 curves is around 30 seconds. This time currently includes
additional, significantly conservative long guard times that are maintained between the
aforementioned consecutive operations and can be removed from future software versions.
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5.3.4 Wireless Network Connectivity
Small 802.15.4/Zigbee and Bluetooth modules can be readily attached to the provisioned
18-pin connector of the second and third generation of the MCU-enabled NF-CoA reader
of Chapter 5 to provide the corresponding desired network functionality. Specifically, two
compatible wireless networking module options are the TI CC2530 [84] System-on-Chip
for 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee and the TI CC2540 [85] for Bluetooth, respectively.
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CHAPTER 6
NF-COA SYSTEM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Different types of tests, ranging from near-field (NF ) scattering simulations to real inter-
and intra-CoA measurements, have been conducted to assess the feasibility and perfor-
mance of the realized NF authenticity certification technology [60] and are presented in
this chapter.
For all tests presented in this chapter, physical objects that are conceptually very close
to the final envisioned certificate instance have been used as NF-CoAs. These types of
objects, both copper-based and inkjet-printed, are presented in Section 4.1.
6.1 Simulations for Entropy Evaluation
Simulations have been conducted not only for the estimation of the reflection coefficient
(S 11) of an element of the antenna array (as shown in Section 5.2.1) or the losses introduced
by the SP4T hierarchy as the SHF signal propagates through them, but also to obtain a first
evaluation of the entropy of the near-field scattering response of a 3D NF-CoA. Toward the
latter goal and given the complexity and the time required for the simulation to complete, a
simplified structure of an antenna element, shown in Figure 41a, was designed in ADS [1]
besides the initially used detailed full structure, shown in Figure 41b. For the same main
reason of long simulation required, the simulation results shown below are extracted from
a 4 by 4 (instead of 5 by 5) antenna array, depicted in Figure 42. The resolution used for
the simulation is 60 cells/wavelength.
The designed 2 mm thick “random” scatterer that is not encapsulated in any dielectric
material, but rather is surrounded by just plain air, is shown with red color in Figure 42.
In this same figure, the scatterer is placed at a distance of just 1 mm against the antenna
array, which is shown with blue color. The FR4 [86] dielectric material shown with golden
color in Figure 42b has been removed in 42a for an unobstructed view of the shorted-patch
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(a) (b)
Figure 41: (a) Simplified and (b) Detailed design of the structure of an element of the




Figure 42: The designed 2 mm thick “random” scatterer that is surrounded by just plain air
(shown with red color) is placed at just 1 mm against the antenna array (shown with blue
color) in ADS [1].
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antenna array consisting of the aforementioned simplified antenna elements.
The NF signature simulation results correspond to two different Tx − Rx couplings,
namely 2A − 3C and 1A − 4D (see Figure 43a). For faster convergence of the ADS sim-
ulation, all but the two antenna elements used were removed, as depicted in Figure 42c.
The simulated S 21 curves of Figure 43b in the reactive near-field proximity of the NF-
CoA reader (blue line for coupling 2A − 3C and green line for coupling 1A − 4D) exhibit
not only significant difference between them but also show a significant variance of almost
30 dB across the 5 GHz to 6 GHz frequency range.
The red curve in Figure 43b corresponds to the simulated coupling of the 2A − 3C
antenna permutation over the air medium and in the absence of the CoA. It is interesting to
note that the magnitude of this curve does not exceed −60 dB despite the short distance of
the involved antenna elements, as shown in the top of Figure 43a. In reality, however, and as
is shown with the measured results of subsection 6.2.1, the antenna coupling in the absence
of any CoA instance is higher and the reason this is not reflected here is due, mostly, to the
simplifications made for the simulation, including the absence of the neighboring antenna
elements.
The simulation results were encouraging enough and urged the conductance of real





Figure 43: The simulated S 21 curves when a CoA is in the reactive near-field proximity or
not of the antenna array of the NF-CoA reader.
6.2 Performance Measurements
For the measurements conducted in this section, both types of NF-CoA instances, namely
copper-based and inkjet-printed ones, are attached to the reader antenna slot against the
antenna matrix of the manufactured NF-CoA reader through the non-symmetric plastic
poles, shown in Figure 44, at a distance of 2 to 3 mm. This short spacing is actually
equal to the thickness of the plastic bolts that hold the plastic poles shown in Figure 44.
Alternatively, a sturdy dielectric foam material with characteristics close to that of air, i.e.,
relative dielectric constant εr close to 1, can be used.
The conductive inkjet-printed nano-particle material of the, stacked or single, paper-
based 2D CoAs occupied an area of 31.65 mm × 31.6 mm centered around the 5 by 5
antenna array, which occupies a lateral area of 31.70 mm × 31.51 mm.
As for the copper-based CoAs, these were designed to occupy a smaller area of 27 mm×
27 mm. The reason for the decreased 2D projection area is to increase their practicality
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and ease of attachment on physical objects but, in the same time, without sacrificing the
entropy yielded, as examined in the following subsections, as well as in Chapter 7. Instead
of keeping the sides of the orthogonal NF-CoA instances parallel to those of the antenna
array, the position of these certificates has been rotated around the central axis of the array
so that the radiation of as many antenna elements as possible closer to the periphery of the
array is “disturbed” by the NF-CoA. This is clearly shown in Figure 45a. Certificates I
and J, however, comprise the exceptions since their cross-section area of 56 mm × 56 mm
intentionally exceeded that of the antenna array for testing purposes. That is why six holes,
as many as the plastic poles of the antenna array of the reader, had to be drilled through
certificates I and J (see Figure 8 and 45b). For the reader’s reference, whenever a full-sized
CoA is mentioned, either certificate I or J is referred to.
Figure 44: The non-symmetric topology of the plastic poles that form the preliminary
certificate slot of the NF-CoA reader against the antenna array.
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Figure 45: Top view of the NF-CoA reader with (a) a small-sized and (b) a full-sized
copper-based certificate instance fastened to the annotated antenna array slot.
The extraction and processing of the certificate fingerprints is done as follows:
• A parser developed with C# programming language reads the raw information ex-
tracted by the USB-connected reader of Section 5 and converts it to a comma sepa-
rated value (CSV) sheet that can be imported into Matlab [87].
• Matlab code both helps visualize the entropy through plots, following the procedure
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described below, and quantifies the entropy, the results of which are presented in
Chapter 7.
In each of the graphs presented hereafter, the y axis corresponds to the output of the
power detector (PD) based on its received signal strength of the nearly monochromatic
signal. The x axis corresponds to the either different frequency points chosen through the
voltage-controlled oscillator (VCO) or all the available antenna couplings chosen through
the hierarchy of SPDT RF switches. Although one could say that, visually speaking, two
types of NF signatures exist, based on if
• scattering parameter curves of particular antenna couplings are plotted over a spec-
trum of chosen frequency points, or
• scattering parameter curves of particular frequencies are plotted over all available
antenna couplings,
these two types of graphs are essentially the same, since they correspond to the exact same
certificate instance measurement. In many tests described below, both types of graphs are
provided for a better understanding of the results.
In the first case, the color bar on the right of the graph corresponds to all the available
antenna couplings, with numbers ranging from 1 to 72. A mapping of these numbers to the
actual antenna couplings of the antenna array of Figure 46 is provided in Table 4. Respec-
tively, in the second type of NF signature graph, the color bar on the right corresponds to

















Figure 46: Annotated diagram of the antenna elements of the array of the NF-CoA reader.
Table 4: Numbering of the couplings between antenna elements of the NF-CoA reader.
A1-A4→ 1 B1-B4→ 19 D4-D1→ 37 E4-E1→ 55
A1-A5→ 2 B1-B5→ 20 D4-D2→ 38 E4-E2→ 56
A1-B4→ 3 B1-D1→ 21 D4-E1→ 39 E5-A4→ 57
A1-B5→ 4 B1-D2→ 22 D4-E2→ 40 E5-A5→ 58
A1-D1→ 5 B1-E1→ 23 D5-A4→ 41 E5-B4→ 59
A1-D2→ 6 B1-E2→ 24 D5-A5→ 42 E5-B5→ 60
A1-E1→ 7 B2-A4→ 25 D5-B4→ 43 E5-D1→ 61
A1-E2→ 8 B2-A5→ 26 D5-B5→ 44 E5-D2→ 62
A2-A4→ 9 B2-B4→ 27 D5-D1→ 45 E5-E1→ 63
A2-A5→ 10 B2-B5→ 28 D5-D2→ 46 E5-E2→ 64
A2-B4→ 11 B2-D1→ 29 D5-E1→ 47 C3-A4→ 65
A2-B5→ 12 B2-D2→ 30 D5-E2→ 48 C3-A5→ 66
A2-D1→ 13 B2-E1→ 31 E4-A4→ 49 C3-B4→ 67
A2-D2→ 14 B2-E2→ 32 E4-A5→ 50 C3-B5→ 68
A2-E1→ 15 D4-A4→ 33 E4-B4→ 51 C3-D1→ 69
A2-E2→ 16 D4-A5→ 34 E4-B5→ 52 C3-D2→ 70
B1-A4→ 17 D4-B4→ 35 E4-D1→ 53 C3-E1→ 71
B1-A5→ 18 D4-B5→ 36 E4-D2→ 54 C3-E2→ 72
The conversion of the PD output voltage to a SHF power signal reading (in dB) is based
on the PD characterization presented in Section 5.2.3. In particular, the equations that cor-
respond to the curve fitting of Figure 35 at different equidistant points of the frequency
range under examination are provided in Table 5. Whenever the Euclidean distance be-
tween different NF signatures is considered, the preferred unit on the y axis is mV instead
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of dBm. The reason for this is to help the reader gain a better understanding of the actual
signature differences with respect to the PD dynamic range, that is, what fraction of the
linear and the entire dynamic range of the PD does a particular signature difference cor-
respond to. Of course, wherever deemed necessary (as for example in Section 6.2.5) the
actual difference in dB is provided. As for the conversion of the voltage input of the VCO
to the frequency of the generated nearly monochromatic signal, that is based on the VCO
characterization of Section 5.3.1. The equation that corresponds to the curve fitting of Fig-
ure 33 at different equidistant points of the frequency range under examination is provided
in Equation (7).
Moreover, it should be noted that the above conversions, and, as a result, the compu-
tational burden of calculating the 4th order polynomials, not only are not part at all of the
CoA issuing and verification procedures, but also are not run locally on the NF-CoA reader.
Instead they are run on a desktop computer with Matlab and the only reason the curve fit-
ting equations are provided here is for clarification purposes in the context of this chapter
and so that the reader has a clear view of the real frequency points and the signal power
magnitudes involved.
Freqout(GHz) = 6 · 10−8 · [Vout(mV)]5 − 7 · 10−6 · [Vout(mV)]4 + 0.0003 · [Vout(mV)]3−
0.007 · [Vout(mV)]2 + 0.1048 · Vin(mV) + 5.0617
(7)
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5.0 GHz −10−4 · [Vout(mV)]4 + 0.0005 · [Vout(mV)]3 + 0.0144 · [Vout(mV)]2 + 0.033 ·
Vout(mV) + 0.1312
5.2 GHz −10−4 · [Vout(mV)]4 + 0.0005 · [Vout(mV)]3 + 0.0144 · [Vout(mV)]2 + 0.035 ·
Vout(mV) + 0.131
5.4 GHz −10−4 · [Vout(mV)]4 +0.0004 · [Vout(mV)]3 +0.0146 · [Vout(mV)]2 +0.0459 ·
Vout(mV) + 0.123
5.6 GHz −6 · 10−5 · [Vout(mV)]4 − 0.0005 · [Vout(mV)]3 + 0.0223 · [Vout(mV)]2 +
0.0176 · Vout(mV) + 0.1442
5.8 GHz −3 · 10−5 · [Vout(mV)]4 − 0.0014 · [Vout(mV)]3 + 0.0315 · [Vout(mV)]2 −
0.0326 · Vout(mV) + 0.1839
6.0 GHz −4 ·10−5 ·[Vout(mV)]4−0.001 ·[Vout(mV)]3 +0.0321 ·[Vout(mV)]2−0.0654 ·
Vout(mV) + 0.2162
Essential to the evaluation of the results of the following tests is the standard devia-
tion (std); the square root of an estimator of the variance of the received signal strength xi
for N different CoAs at the same frequency points and antenna couplings. The most com-
monly used estimator for σ is an adjusted version (based on estimation theory), the sample
standard deviation, defined as follows:
std ,







where x̄ = 1N
N∑
i=1
xi. The reason for adopting this estimator is that, when the mean of a
population, the variance of which is to be estimated based on samples, is unknown, the
sample variance underestimates the true value of the population variance (biased estima-
tor) [88, 89]. Removing this bias from the population variance estimator is done with a
correction, known as Bessel’s correction [90, 88], which multiplies the standard sample
variance by N/(N − 1).
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6.2.1 NF Response Before and After Attaching an NF-CoA
When no certificate instance is attached to the reader, the No CoA near-field electromag-
netic response comprises the antenna couplings shown in Figure 47. As explained in the
introduction of this section, the same No CoA signature is shown for both varying frequency
points and varying antenna couplings.
As a very first step toward evaluating the performance of the NF-CoA system, what
needs to be assessed and verified is that the close proximity of an NF-CoA to the antenna
array does significantly disrupt the NF response, compared to the case where no certificate
instance is attached to the reader. In this test, the difference between the NF signatures
of the No CoA case and the signatures of randomly chosen copper-based certificates 2gF,
2gC, 2gJ and 3gJ is measured and presented in Figure 48. The range of the disruption
caused by the presence of the certificate instance exceeds in some cases 650 mV. For a
better understanding of how large this disruption is, one should take into account that the
linear dynamic range of the used power detector [75], as measured in Section 5.2.3, is 250
mV to 1211 mV and the overall dynamic range is approximately 180 mV to 1400 mV. This
means that the differentiation due to the disruption caused by the presence of the copper-
based certificate instances is approximately up to 68% of PD linear dynamic range or 53%
of PD overall dynamic range.
The same behavior is also noticed when paper-based NF-CoAs, specifically B, C, D,
and I are used, as shown in Figure 49. The range of the disruption caused by the presence
of the certificate instance exceeds in some cases 850 mV. Consequently, the differentiation
due to the disruption caused by the presence of the paper-based certificate instances is
approximately up to 88% of PD linear dynamic range or 70% of PD overall dynamic range.
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Figure 47: The No COA fingerprint (a) over frequency and (b) over antenna couplings.
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Figure 48: Euclidean distance between the No CoA NF signature and the signatures of
randomly chosen copper-based certificates (a) 2gF, (b) 2gC, (c) 2gJ and (d) 3gJ.
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Figure 49: Euclidean distance between the No CoA NF signature and the signatures of
randomly chosen paper-based certificates (a) B, (b) C, (c) D and (d) I.
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6.2.2 NF Response as a Function of the Distance of the NF-CoA Instance From the
Antenna Array
As part of the initial performance characterization that can determine particular aspects of
the setup of the final application, it is essential to examine how the NF signature depends
on the distance between the antenna array of the reader and the certificate instance, when
the signature of the latter is being extracted.
A random NF-CoA , 3gE, is initially inserted into the slot of the NF-CoA reader almost
touching the antenna elements (as shown in Figure 44, but without the white plastic bolts).
This case of shortest distance is labeled in the following figures with “just CoA”. This
distance is gradually increased either introducing up to two plastic bolts vertically of 2.5
mm thickness each (labeled with “bolts” and “2bolts”) or by introducing on top of one bolt
up to 12 plain photo paper sheets of Kodak gloss premium photo paper of 0.22 mm (8.5
mil) thickness and 5.2 cm by 5.2 cm lateral area each. These cases of different distances
ranging from almost zero (“just CoA”) up to approximately 6 mm are labeled as “bolt +
Xε”, where X is the number of intermediate layers of photo paper used with dielectric
constant εr of around 3.2 [58] in the neighborhood of 5.5 GHz.
Since it would not be possible to discern the difference because of varying distance if the
whole signature was provided, scattering parameter curves corresponding to four different
couplings, namely B1-D1, B2-B4, D4-B4, and C3-B4, and four different frequency points,
namely 5.342, 5.387, 5.410, and 5.429 GHz, with relatively high magnitude and standard
deviation of NF response are shown in Figures 50 and 51, respectively.
The curves corresponding to zero distance (“just CoA”) and one plastic bolt (“bolt”)
exhibit the most distinctive (or differentiating) behavior compared to all the rest in all eight
different examples presented (either over frequency or over antenna couplings). This phe-
nomenical abnormality, as explained in Section 3.1, should actually be attributed to the
crossing of the boundary between the reactive and the radiating near-field region and. On
the contrary, the trend for the rest curves is similar between them.
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Figure 50: NF signature curves of NF-CoA 3gE corresponding to antenna couplings (a)
B1-D1, (b) B2-B4, (c) D4-B4 and (d) C3-B4 of NF-CoA 3gE at distances ranging from
almost zero (“just CoA”) up to approximately 6 mm (“bolt + 12ε”).
Moreover, it can be noted that as the frequency increases the dynamic range (difference
between maxima and minima) increases and, thus, the difference between the responses in-
creases and as the distance increases up to almost 4.5 mm, i.e., bolt thickness plus thickness
of 12 plain photo sheets, the magnitude of the maxima of the NF responses also increases.
From the point of view of highest entropy desired, the study in this subsection leads to
considering as optimum distance the one that corresponds to the thickness of one plastic
bolt. This is the distance chosen for all the subsequent measurements.
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Figure 51: NF signature curves of NF-CoA 3gE corresponding to frequency points (a)
5.3419, (b) 5.3871, (c) 5.4083 and (d) 5.4285 GHz at distances ranging from almost zero
(“just CoA”) up to approximately 6 mm (“bolt + 12ε”).
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6.2.3 NF Response as a function of the NF-CoA 2D Projection Area
As mentioned in the introduction of this section, two different sizes of copper-based NF-
CoAs have been fabricated. The objective of the test of this subsection is to evaluate the
difference between the NF responses of the full-sized certificates 2gI and 2gJ and all the
rest 45 smaller-sized copper-based certificates. Additionally, it is important to verify that
the entropy yielded by the smaller-sized certificates is adequate.
The fact that the small certificate instances do not cover the whole area of the antenna
area and, thus, there may be particular antenna couplings not significantly disrupted creates
the expectation of particular couplings to be significantly more disrupted by the full-sized
instances 2gI and 2gJ.
To show this, all 72 couplings of the 47 different copper-based NF-CoAs available are
sorted by both descending maximum magnitude and sample standard deviation. Using
these two tables, couplings of the full-sized certificate 2gI that are sorted to rank signifi-
cantly higher than the same couplings of the small-sized NF-CoAs are identified and pre-
sented in Table 6. Specifically, this table shows the (for most cases single-digit) number
of other copper-based small-sized CoAs, the couplings of which are not exceeded by the
same couplings of full-sized 2gI in terms of maximum magnitude and maximum sample
standard deviation.
The results not only make sense, but are actually absolutely expected when the cou-
plings of Table 6 are depicted in Figure 52 on an actual photo of the antenna array of the
NF-CoA reader with an aligned semi-transparent 2D projection of an attached small-sized
certificate instance; here 2gK.
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Table 6: Antenna couplings of full-sized copper-based 2gI that significantly exceed the
same couplings of all 45 small-sized CoAs, except for X many, in terms of maximum
magnitude and maximum sample standard deviation.
Full-sized 2gI exceeding significantly all 45 but X
many copper-based small-sized CoAs in terms of:































Figure 52: Antenna couplings (yellow) of full-sized copper-based 2gI that significantly
exceed the same couplings of all 45 small-sized CoAs in terms of maximum magnitude
and maximum sample standard deviation.
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6.2.4 Effect of the Conductive Material Density of the NF-CoAs
The next question that arises, concerning the optimal design of the NF-CoA certificates,
is what is the effect of the amount of metal density in the 3D structure of the NF-CoA to
the entropy of its NF frequency response. Although it would be possible to investigate this
aspect with paper-based CoAs by varying the number of conductive nano-particle inkjet-
printed, this option would not be very reliable as the final metal density would highly
depend on how well and uniformly the instances have been cured for the percolation to be
equally effective among all paper-based CoAs.
As a highly more reliable solution for this test, three different sets of copper-based
CoAs of different mass per meter, namely 2, 3 and 4 grams per meter, are used. Each one
of these sets includes 15 certificates of the same copper weight (excluding the two full-
sized ones). No well-determined and fixed structures of different mass are used. Instead, in
order to keep the test setup closer to reality and to the final application, random amount, but
not considerably different, of each type of wires has been randomly mixed with dielectric
fixative to create the copper-based certificate instances already presented in Section 4.1.2.
First, all Euclidean distances between all possible pairs of instances within the same
group, which yields the binomial coefficient of 15!/[2! · (15 − 2)!] = 105 differences of
NF fingerprints, are captured and presented in Figure 53 over frequency ((a), (c), and (e))
and over antenna couplings ((b), (d), and (f)). In particular, (a) and (b) correspond to the
group of 2 g/m NF-CoAs, (c) and (d) correspond to the group of 3 g/m NF-CoAs, and (e)
and (f) correspond to the group of 4 g/m NF-CoAs. It is noticed that the metal density
does indeed affect the entropy of the frequency response and that the lighter copper-based





Figure 53: Euclidean distances between all possible pairs of NF-CoA signatures of (a) 2
g/m over frequency, (b) 2 g/m over antenna couplings, (c) 3 g/m over frequency, (d) 3 g/m
over antenna couplings, (e) 4 g/m over frequency, and (f) 4 g/m over antenna couplings.
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For a clearer assessment, additionally the range, i.e., difference between the maximum
and the minimum of each sample, and the interquartile range (IQR) of statistical disper-
sion, i.e., difference between the 75th and the 25th percentiles of the sample are evaluated
based on the data of Figure 53 and are presented in Figures 54 and 55, respectively. In
both Figures, subfigure (a) corresponds to the group of 2 g/m NF-CoAs, subfigure (b) cor-
responds to the group of 3 g/m NF-CoAs, and subfigure (c) corresponds to the group of 4
g/m NF-CoAs. In a consistent manner across both the range and the interquartile range, it
is noticed that the lighter 2 g/m instances exhibit the highest entropy and the heavier 4 g/m





Figure 54: Range of Euclidean distances of all possible pairs of NF-CoA signatures of (a)





Figure 55: Interquartile range of Euclidean distances of all possible pairs of NF-CoA sig-
natures of (a) 2 g/m, (b) 3 g/m, and (c) 4 g/m over frequency.
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6.2.5 Intra-CoA Robustness
The most important and sine-qua-non property that the NF-CoA system has to possess is
the intra-CoA robustness. With this property it is ensured that always nearly exact replicate
signatures are extracted from the same certificate instance by the NF-CoA reader.
The test procedure here is very simple and conducted as follows: a single certificate
instance is placed on the reader, its NF signature is extracted, then the instance is taken
off and then placed back on the reader to extract again its signature. This is repeated a
number of times to indicate any changes in measurement results. Specifically, the full-sized
copper-based instance 2gI and three random small-sized instances, 2gE, 3gE and 4gC, are
chosen for this test and measured five times each. The Euclidean distance between all
5!/[2! · (5 − 2)!] = 10 possible pairs of the five repeatedly extracted signatures of each
certificate instance are shown in Figure 56 over frequency. The reason there is no apparent
difference in the trends between the graphs over frequency and over antenna couplings is
that in both cases the differences look like noise. Actually the differences almost are noise
since the maximum difference at any combination of frequency point and antenna coupling
does not exceed 30 mV.
For a more complete assessment of how small the intra-CoA differences/distances are,
the mean and the sample standard deviation of the differences of Figure 56 are presented
in Figures 57 and 58, respectively. Regardless of at which part of the logarithmic power
range of the power detector these Euclidean distances are measured, the distances for the
randomly chosen four different certificate instances never exceed 13 mV of PD magnitude
for any combination of frequency point and antenna coupling and the vast majority of the
measurements has a value below 8 mV. If one considers that the overall dynamic range of
the power detector is approximately 180 mV to 1400 mV (see Section 5.2.3 and [75]), it
can be safely concluded that the differences are located in the neighborhood of the noise





Figure 56: Euclidean distance between all 10 possible pairs of the five times (repeatedly)




Figure 57: Mean of Euclidean distance between all 10 possible pairs of the five times
(repeatedly) extracted signatures of copper-based certificate instances (a) 2gE, (b) 3gE, (c)




Figure 58: Standard deviation of Euclidean distance between all 10 possible pairs of the
five times (repeatedly) extracted signatures of copper-based certificate instances (a) 2gE,
(b) 3gE, (c) 4gC and (d) full-sized 2gI.
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Visual examples of the worst case scenarios, i.e., highest magnitude and highest stan-
dard deviation of difference, of extraction of individual curves of these signatures, over
frequency and over antenna couplings, are shown in Figure 59.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 59: Visual examples of the worst case scenarios (highest magnitude and highest
standard deviation of difference) of extraction of individual curves: (a) B1-E1 of 2gE over
frequency, (b) A1-D1 of 3gE over frequency, (c) D4-D2 of 2gE over antenna couplings,
and, (d) D4-E2 of 2gI over antenna couplings.
Similarly to the copper-based scenario, two random paper-based instances, C and H,
are tested for intra-CoA robustness by extracting their instances consecutively for 10 times.
The Euclidean distances between all 10!/[2! · (10 − 2)!] = 45 possible pairs of the five re-
peatedly extracted signatures of each certificate instance are shown in Figure 60. In partic-
ular, (a) and (b) correspond to the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of intra-CoA
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Euclidean distances of instance C and (c) and (d) correspond to the mean and standard de-
viation, respectively, of intra-CoA Euclidean distances of instance H. However, as opposed
to the above case of copper-based instances, in the paper-based based scenario the graphs
over the antenna couplings are presented, since only with this type of graphs the major rea-
son for the increased Euclidean distance among the paper-based instance compared to the
copper-based ones can be highlighted; mean values of differences larger than 14 mV are
only noticed for few particular frequencies that belong to the lower half of the spectrum.
Of course, additional reasons for the increased differences are the flexibility of paper and





Figure 60: Euclidean distance between all 45 possible pairs of the 10 times (repeatedly)
extracted signatures of paper-based certificate instances (a) C, (b) H. Mean of Euclidean
distance between all 45 possible pairs of the five repeatedly extracted signatures of paper-
based certificate instances (c) C, (d) H.
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Visual examples of the worst case scenarios, i.e., highest magnitude and highest stan-
dard deviation of difference, of extraction of individual curves of the paper-based signa-
tures, over frequency and over antenna couplings, are also shown in Figure 61.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 61: Visual examples of the worst case scenarios (highest magnitude and highest
standard deviation of difference) of extraction of individual curves: (a) D5-B5 of H over
frequency, (b) C3-B4 of H over frequency, (c) A2-E2 of C over antenna couplings, and (d)
A1-E2 of H over antenna couplings.
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6.2.5.1 Determining the Similarity Detection Threshold δT
Let an NF-CoA reader extract two NF signatures f and f ′, such that both signatures are
a cardinality-N real vector of numbers ∈ RN . The reader decides that both belong to the
same physical certificate instance, i.e, have been extracted by the same physical certificate
instance, if || fi j − f ′i j|| < δT , where the similarity detection threshold δT is a standardized
distance metric ||  ||, such as the Euclidean distance, between f and f ′
The results provided in the preceding intra-CoA robustness study can lead to the reck-
oning of δT . Essential toward this goal is the knowledge that the slope of the output voltage
over input RF power of the power detector [75] of the reader is 31 mV/dB, as analyzed
in Section 5.2.3 and shown in Figure 35. This information combined with the sub 30 mV
Euclidean difference across all antenna couplings of an NF signature for all frequencies
including both copper- and paper-based certificate instance, leads to the conclusion that the
maximum similarity detection threshold is bound by 1 dB or
|δT | 6 1 dB (8)
This level of accuracy takes on even higher importance if one considers that the linearity
error exhibited by the power detector [75] used is ±1 dB. In other words, the maximum




Inter-CoA robustness, i.e., the uniqueness among the signatures extracted from different
NF-CoA instances, is also a sine-qua-non property that the NF-CoA system is required to
have. Without this property, false-positive decisions, with which counterfeit instances are
accepted as authentic, can be made by the NF-CoA reader.
For this test, the signatures of all fabricated copper-based NF-CoAs are compared to
each other. As described in Section 4.1.2, this set of available fabricated copper-based in-
stance includes 45 small-sized ones belonging to all three types of different mass per meter,
namely 2 g/m, 3 g/m and 4 g/m, as well as the two full-sized, 2gI and 2gJ. Specifically, first
the Euclidean distance between all 47!/[2! · (47 − 2)!] = 1081 possible pairs of extracted
signatures of different certificate instance are measured and shown in Figure 62 both (a)
over frequency and (b) over antenna couplings.
Because of the density of the curves of the 1081 different sets of Euclidean distances
among different certificate instances, an estimation of the range of these differences is
needed for a clearer assessment of how large the intra-CoA differences/distances are. The
range, i.e., difference between the maximum and the minimum of each sample, and the
interquartile range, i.e., difference between the 75th and the 25th percentiles of each sample,
are evaluated based on the data of Figure 62 and are presented in Figure 63. The conclusion
that can be drawn by analyzing these plots is that the differences among all the available
signatures is significantly high. The range, especially around the the resonant frequency
of the antenna elements and also for many antenna couplings, almost reaches the dynamic
range of the power detector of the NF-CoA reader with values close to 1500 mV. As a
more reliable measure of statistical dispersion, the interquartile range or range of middle
fifty verifies the inter-CoA robustness for almost all combinations of antenna couplings and





Figure 62: Euclidean distance between all 1081 possible pairs of extracted signatures of




Figure 63: Range of Euclidean distances between all 1081 possible pairs of extracted sig-
natures of copper-based certificate instances (a) over frequency and (b) over antenna cou-
plings. Interquartile range of Euclidean distances of all 1081 possible pairs of extracted
signatures of copper-based certificate instances (c) over frequency and (d) over antenna
couplings.
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Similarly to the copper-based scenario, all 10 paper-based instances, A to J, are tested
for inter-CoA robustness by comparing their instances. The Euclidean distances between
all 10!/[2! · (10− 2)!] = 45 possible pairs of the extracted signatures of different certificate
instance are measured and shown in Figure 64 both (a) over frequency and (b) over antenna
couplings. The convergence that can be noted at the very far high end of the frequency
range is attributed entirely to the low resonant frequency of the antenna elements, presented
in Section 5.2.1.
An estimation of the range of these differences is also provided in the paper-based case
for a clearer assessment of how large the intra-CoA differences/distances are. The range,
i.e., difference between the maximum and the minimum of each sample, and the interquar-
tile range, i.e., difference between the 75th and the 25th percentiles of each sample, are
evaluated based on the data of Figure 64 and are presented in Figure 65. The conclusion
that can be drawn by analyzing these plots is that the differences among all the available
signatures is, equally with the previous case of copper-based certificate instances, remark-
ably high. The range, especially around the resonant frequency of the antenna elements and
also for many antenna couplings, almost comes close to the dynamic range of the power
detector of the NF-CoA reader with values close to 1400 mV. As a more reliable measure
of statistical dispersion, the interquartile range verifies the inter-CoA robustness for almost
all combinations of antenna couplings and frequency points.
Of course, it comes as no surprise that the results of Chapter 7 corroborate the strong be-





Figure 64: Euclidean distance between all 1081 possible pairs of extracted signatures of




Figure 65: Range of Euclidean distances between all 45 possible pairs of extracted signa-
tures of paper-based certificate instances (a) over frequency and (b) over antenna couplings.
Interquartile range of Euclidean distances of all 45 possible pairs of extracted signatures of
copper-based certificate instances (c) over frequency and (d) over antenna couplings.
120
6.2.7 Shielding Against Interference
As far as the applicability of the proposed anti-counterfeiting solution is concerned, it is
highly desired that the NF-CoA system can operate without any problems and still yield
high entropy of extracted signatures even when large conductive objects and surfaces exist
in close proximity to the actual certificate instances. Actually, these kinds of environments,
where shielding of the NF-CoA operation against interference from nearby conductive and
dielectric material is required, are expected; for instance, when NF-CoAs are attached on
computer laptops, aircraft spare parts, pharmaceutical liquids, etc.
Toward assessing the shielding capability of the NF-CoA system against interference,
three different tests are conducted that involve the proximity of three different types or sizes
of metallic surfaces brought close enough to the certificate instances. The test procedure is
the same for all three tests: the full-sized copper-based CoA 2gI and a random small-sized
one, 2gB, are initially inserted into the slot of the NF-CoA reader. This case is labeled in
the following figures with “just CoA.” Afterward, two 5.2 cm by 5.2 cm plain photo paper
sheets of Kodak gloss premium photo paper of 0.216 mm (8.5 mil) thickness each and the
metallic surface under test are stacked on top of the NF-CoA. The distance of the metallic
surface from the NF-CoA is finally being varied by introducing up to 12 photo paper sheets
in-between (labeled with numbers ranging from “2ε” to “12ε”).
The trend of the NF signatures extracted when the NF-CoA is in close proximity to
metallic objects does not necessarily have to be very similar to the “just CoA” case. Nev-
ertheless, the former signatures need to exhibit high enough entropy and consistency (i.e.
not being averaged out). The couplings presented in the following tests are not randomly
chosen; rather, they represent the cases of highest magnitude and standard deviation of
NF fingerprints.
6.2.7.1 NF-CoA-sized Copper Surface
Three 5.5 cm by 6 cm laminated sheets of copper, liquid crystal polymer (LCP) and copper
again, serve in this test as the copper surface that is stacked on top of a full- and small-sized
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NF-CoA at different distances. The laminated sheets are attached as shown in Figure 66.
As can be discerned in the cross-section view of Figure 66b, there is almost no distance
between the NF-CoA and the antenna array. The rationale behind this decision has been to
be able to compare this shielding behavior with the case of a distance equal to the thickness
of a plastic bolt (as in Section), which is examined in the next subsection.
(a) (b)
Figure 66: (a) Top side view and (b) cross-sectional view of a laminated copper sheets with
a size similar to that of NF-CoAs when stacked (at different distances) on top of a certificate
instance attached to the NF-CoA reader.
122









































































































































Figure 67: NF signature curves of full-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gI corresponding to:
(a) antenna coupling B1-D1, (b) antenna coupling B2-E2, (c) frequency point 5.305 GHz,
and (d) frequency point 5.349 GHz without (“just CoA”) and with laminated copper sheets
stacked on top of the NF-CoA at distances up to 3.5 mm (“12ε”).
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Figure 68: NF signature curves of small-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gB corresponding
to: (a) antenna coupling B1-E1, (b) antenna coupling E4-D2, (c) frequency point 5.256
GHz, and (d) frequency point 5.269 GHz without (“just CoA”) and with laminated copper
sheets stacked on top of the NF-CoA at distances up to 3.5 mm (“12ε”).
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Within the framework of the same test, a good opportunity arises to verify the interfer-
ence blocking capability of the NF-CoA system against the proximity of third conductive
material, such as in this example two different keys as shown in Figure 69. Very simply
the NF signatures extracted before and after placing the keys on the copper surface are
compared. Of course, the copper surface serves as a shield against any third object and
this is reflected in Figures 70 and 71 for the two different keys. The lack of differentiation
is effectively represented by the numerical difference between the signatures being even
slightly lower than the difference noticed in the intra-CoA tests of Section 6.2.5.
Figure 69: Test setup to verify the interference blocking capability of the NF-CoA system
against the proximity of third conductive material, such as, in this example, a metallic key.
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Figure 70: Euclidean distance of NF signatures of the same certificate instance (a) over
antenna couplings and (b) over frequency before and after placing an interfering metallic
object, i.e., “key1,” on top of the shielding copper surface, as shown in Figure 69.









































































Figure 71: Euclidean distance of NF signatures of the same certificate instance (a) over
antenna couplings and (b) over frequency before and after placing an interfering metallic
object, i.e., “key2,” on top of the shielding copper surface, as shown in Figure 69.
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6.2.7.2 Large Aluminum Surface
A 12.5 cm by 17.5 cm aluminum surface serves in this test as the conductive surface that
is stacked on top of a full- and small-sized NF-CoA at different distances. The aluminum
surface is attached as shown in Figure 72. The antenna array is aligned around the center
of the metallic surface. As can be discerned in the cross-section view of Figure 66b, the
distance between the NF-CoA and the antenna array is equal to the 1 mm thickness of a
plastic bolt.
(a) (b)
Figure 72: (a) Top view and (b) cross-sectional view of a large aluminum surface
when stacked (at different distances) on top of a certificate instance attached to the NF-
CoA reader.
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Figure 73: NF signature curves of full-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gI corresponding to:
(a) antenna coupling B1-E1, (b) antenna coupling C3-D2, (c) frequency point 5.338 GHz,
and (d) frequency point 5.370 GHz without (“just CoA”) and with a large aluminum surface
stacked on top of the NF-CoA at distances up to 3.5 mm (“12ε”).
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Figure 74: NF signature curves of small-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gB corresponding
to: (a) antenna coupling B1-D1, (b) antenna coupling C3-E2, (c) frequency point 5.244
GHz, and (d) frequency point 5.281 GHz without (“just CoA”) and with a large aluminum
surface stacked on top of the NF-CoA at distances up to 3.5 mm (“12ε”).
129
6.2.7.3 Large Complementary Copper Surface
A 12 cm by 15 cm complementary copper surface with an opening of 4 cm by 4.2 cm serves
in this test as the interfering surface that is stacked on top of a full- and small-sized NF-
CoAs at different distances. The aluminum surface is attached as shown in Figure 75. The
antenna array, and thus the NF-CoA as well, is aligned around the opening of the metallic
surface. As can be discerned in the cross-section view of Figure 66b, the distance between
the NF-CoA and the antenna array is equal to the 1 mm thickness of a plastic bolt.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 75: (a) Top view and (c) cross-sectional view of a large complementary copper
surface (shown in (b)) when stacked (at different distances) on top of a certificate instance
attached to the NF-CoA reader.
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Figure 76: NF signature curves of full-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gI corresponding to:
(a) antenna coupling B1-E1, (b) antenna coupling B2-E2, (c) frequency point 5.359 GHz,
and (d) frequency point 5.389 GHz without (“just CoA”) and with a large complementary
copper surface stacked on top of the NF-CoA at distances up to 3.5 mm (“12ε”).
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Figure 77: NF signature curves of small-sized copper-based NF-CoA 2gB corresponding
to: (a) antenna coupling B1-E1, (b) antenna coupling E4-B4, (c) frequency point 5.269
GHz, and (d) frequency point 5.204 GHz without (“just CoA”) and with a large comple-




Before any attempt is made to quantify the entropy, or uncertainty, of the NF-CoA system,
the metric of the similarity between any two fingerprints needs to be determined. An NF
fingerprint f, the definition of which has been provided in Chapters 1 and 4, is a cardinality-
N vector of numbers ∈ RN , where N = Ncoupl× fMAX with Ncoupl being the number of antenna
couplings, which is given by the possible permutations of the elements of the antenna
array of the reader based on their functionality (see Section 5.2.1), and fMAX the number
of equidistant frequency points at which the scattering parameters of the NF signature are
quantized and digitized (see Section 5.3.1).
In the context of this research effort, the similarity metric is the sum of the Euclidean
distances of the magnitudes of the SHF signal power (in dB or V) of the S 21 scattering
parameters curves of different fingerprints at the same antenna coupling and frequency
point over the whole aforementioned space N. Analytically, the distance ||  || of two NF
fingerprints, or of signatures f and f ′ is defined as:
d
(
f , f ′
)













∣∣∣ fi j − f ′i j∣∣∣ (9)
As described in Section 4.2.2, during the NF-CoA verification process the verifier first
reads the signed fingerprint f s and afterward compares the latter with a new read-out f e of
the NF-CoA that the verifier himself extracts with his own NF-CoA reader. The compar-
ison/matching is done based on the distance metric of Equation (9). Only if the value of
the distance between these two, signed and extracted, fingerprints at any (antenna coupling,
frequency point) point || f si j − f
e
i j|| is lower than a threshold δT , i.e., the difference does not
exceed a certain level, does the verifier declare that the certificate and, thus, the document
or product is authentic. This threshold δT is referred to as the similarity detection threshold.
The goal in this section is to use prior knowledge of the measured inter- and intra-CoA
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distances/differences (presented in Chapter 6) between all the NF signatures available, so
that:
• the entropy of the NF-CoA system can be reliably estimated, and
• the similarity detection threshold for any future NF-CoA system can be optimally
determined with a well recognized statistical methodology.
7.1 Statistics-based Empirical Entropy Analysis
Obviously, the certificate verification/validation procedure is a binary classification prob-
lem, in which each certificate instance is mapped to one of two predicted classes/groups.
The outcome of the comparison conducted by the NF-CoA reader between the signed and
the extracted signature is labeled as
• T+, that is, the certificate instance signature is believed to be valid or authentic (V+),
or
• T−, that is, the certificate instance is believed to be invalid or fake (V−).
From now, the terms valid, authentic and positive are used interchangeably. Accordingly,
the terms invalid, fake and negative are used also interchangeably.
The Euclidean distance ||  || between any two certificate fingerprints is represented by
the data vector δ of random samples from an unknown population. Vector δ is an instance
of the continuous random variable ∆.
As far as the measurement data are concerned, based on which the statistical analysis






of continuous independent and identically distributed (iid) random positive or valid (V+)






= k · (k − 1)/2 distances between any two of the k intra-CoA (of the same
CoA) signatures across all antenna permutations and frequency points. Accordingly, let
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be a vector of continuous inde-
pendent and identically distributed random negative or invalid (V−) samples drawn from the





= l · (l−1)/2 dis-
tances between any two of the l inter-CoA signatures (of different CoAs) across all antenna
permutations and frequency points. The assumption about independence of the responses
over neighboring transmitter-receiver couplings is not totally realistic, but the difficulty in-
volved with inverting Maxwell’s equations is overly high, as discussed in Section 8.2. Nev-
ertheless, to strengthen the iid assumption, later in the “score computation” step, frequency
points are skipped so that NF responses of only every other fourth frequency sample are
considered. It should also be noted that misalignment noise is present in the above mea-
surements as the placement of each certificate instance in the slot of the reader involved
rotational inaccuracies around an axis perpendicular to the board and passing through the
middle element (C3). This rotational displacement potentially was up to 3 degrees, which
corresponds to around 1 mm of displacement on the circumference of the rotation. The
reason for this was that the plastic poles were not firm enough as they were just fixed on
the board with plastic screws (see Figure 44). This misalignment, is significantly higher
than the mechanical alignment that can be achieved in an industrial environment and within
the practicality tolerance needed for high-volume fabrication.
Following the principles of basic detection theory [91, 92, 93], the analysis needs to rely
on the concepts of hypothesis testing, probability density functions (PDFs) and receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves [48]. The formulated hypothesis under test here is
that the extracted signature of a certificate instance is valid. The procedure of hypothesis
testing involves the collection of data, i.e. aforementioned δp and δn, and estimating how
likely the particular set of data is, assuming the hypothesis is true. If the data set is very
unlikely, defined as being part of a class of data sets that are only rarely observed, the
hypothesis is rejected concluding that the extracted signature is (probably) invalid. This
class of data sets is specified via a test statistic, which reflects the extent of departure from
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the hypothesis.
Toward that goal, let iid sample vectors δp and δn each be drawn from some distribu-
tion with an unknown density. The respective PDFs describe the relative likelihood for the
random variable δ to take on a certain value of distance/difference between the extracted
and signed signatures. Denote the positive PDF of a continuous signature test in variable δ
as f (δp) in the case of a valid certificate instance and the negative PDF as f (δn) in the case
of an invalid instance. To illustrate this approach, the graph of Figure 78 depicts examples
of these PDF curves that model the four possible outcomes from the binary classifier as a
function of the NF signature distance. Essentially, a continuous signature test is converted
to a binary test by determining the classifier boundary between classes with value δT and
interpreting results within those ranges as valid and results outside those ranges as invalid.
As will be seen from the results of this analysis, a low probability of an incorrect classi-
fication decision is achieved when the two density distributions are largely separated with
low variances.
FN FP 
Figure 78: Example probability density curves depicting the four possible outcomes of a
binary classification given a detection threshold represented by the black vertical line.
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Out of the four possible classification outcomes from a binary classifier, namely true
positive (TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP) and false negative (FN), that are
shown in Figure 78, the emphasis is placed on estimating the latter two ones:
• FP or false alarm (=
∫ δT
−∞
f (δn) dx), where the outcome from a prediction is P and
the actual value is N, i.e., the CoA is fake and predicted as authentic







dx), where, conversely, the prediction outcome is N while
the actual value is P, i.e., the CoA is authentic and predicted as fake.
By defining sensitivity or true positive rate as Se , T PR = P(T+|V+) = T P/(T P + FN)
(probability of a successful verification when the certificate is authentic), and specificity or
true negative rate as Sp , T NR = P(T−|V−) = T N/(FP + T N) (probability of a failed
verification when the certificate is fake), one can get the two-by-two contingency table or
confusion matrix of outcome probabilities, shown in Table 7. Here, P(D+) is the pre-test
probability of validity prevalence in the general population.




Predicted Class T+ P(D+) · Se [1 − P(D+)] · (1 − Sp)T− P(D+) · (1 − Se) [1 − P(D+)] · Sp
Total P(D+) 1 − P(D+)
For the intra-CoA measurements, a single NF-CoA instance is placed on the reader,
then taken off and then placed back on the reader to indicate any changes in measurement
results and the whole process is repeated nine times. As for the inter-CoA scenario, this
involves the measurement of all 47 different available certificate instances. Given that the
absolute value of the distances between NF-CoA signatures is considered, the positive PDF
curve that includes probabilities TP and FN is expected to have a large magnitude and be
137
located close to 0+ (the y axis) and the negative PDF bell is expected to be located on the
positive x semi-axis. The decision or discrimination threshold value or similarity level δT
is the distance value (on the x axis) shown with the dotted line in Figure 78 where the two
PDF curves intersect [91].
The corresponding classification ranges can be identified with the use of the likelihood-




describes the ratio of the likelihood of observing a sample distance vector δ in the popula-
tion of valid signatures over that of the population of invalid ones. Regions with λ < δT are
denoted as T− and those with λ ≥ δT as T+, where the threshold δT can vary between zero
and infinity. Additionally,








Adjusting the threshold δT will in turn change Se and (1-Sp), which together deter-
mine all four decision fractions (Table 7). Explicitly changing the decision threshold sev-
eral times, will yield several different pairs of Se and (1-Sp), which if plotted on a two-
dimensional graph will give the ROC curve (see Figure 79).
First, the distance/difference vectors δp and δn are calculated after extracting with the
NF-CoA reader all available positive fp ∈ RNp and negative fn ∈ RNn signatures with
Np = Ncoupl × fMAX × k and Nn = Ncoupl × fMAX × l, respectively. For each single antenna
permutation and frequency combination, the logarithm base 10 (log) of the PDF of the
intra-CoA random variable δp (for distance values that positive samples take) and in a small
frequency neighborhood (total of nine frequency points) is estimated. Since accurate PDFs
are difficult to acquire with relatively few measurements (binomial coefficients), the most
popular non-parametric way is applied, namely the kernel density estimation (KDE). KDE
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Figure 79: The receiver operating characteristic space. The red dashed line represents a
random guess, whereas point (0,1) indicates perfect classification.
takes a finite sample of data and make inferences about the underlying PDF everywhere
by smoothing out the contribution of each data point (with the weighting function of the
kernel) into a region of space surrounding it and aggregating (iid property already assumed)
the individually smoothed contributions (see [98, 99, 100]). The kernel density estimator


















In the framework of this analysis, the KDE implementation of Botev et al. [101] is used,
since it is considered a bona fide PDF; it is conservative enough (fits each point with a thick
Gaussian of automatically chosen bandwidth) and substantially reduces the asymptotic bias
and the mean square error, unlike other proposals.
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Since the PDF of positive distances/differences is now available, it is possible to de-
rive the maximum likelihood estimate, the so-called “probability of the data” rather than
the parameter, of a signature distance measurement (sample vector δ). In other words, the
maximum likelihood estimate that the certificate instance is positive or negative is derived.
Each binomial-coefficient possible distance measurement is “scored” with an aggregate
maximum log likelihood (averaged across the frequency spectrum and the antenna cou-
plings) corresponding to the aforementioned hypothesis that the extracted signature of a
certificate instance is valid. A histogram of these scores is shown in Figure 80. As ex-
pected, small log values (leftward on the x axis) correspond to the negative, that is, invalid,
samples. For the sake of completeness, Figure 81 illustrates the maximum log likelihood of
the negative and positive signature distances/differences averaged across all the binomial
coefficient available measurements for each pair of frequency point and antenna coupling.
Especially regarding the negative scenario, only every other fourth frequency point is con-
sidered to strengthen the aforementioned iid property assumption.





















Figure 80: Histogram of the negative (red) and positive (green) scores (aggregate maximum













































Figure 81: Three-dimensional bars of the maximum log likelihood of the (a) negative and
(b) positive signature distance measurements. To strengthen the iid property assumption,
every other fourth frequency point is considered in the negative (inter-CoA) scenario.
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The overall resulting positive and negative scores can be modeled as PDFs, using the
pure Gaussian-based KDE (ksdensity function of Matlab [87]), to get the two final densities
that model the FP and FN error probabilities. These negative and positive probability
densities over the scores defined above are shown in Figure 82. The result of this empirical
analysis is that the probability of intersection of the density curves is lower than 10−200. In
other words, the probability that the NF-CoA system predicts a fake CoA as authentic or
predicts an authentic CoA as fake is inconceivably small.
Figure 82: The positive and negative probability densities over the aggregate maximum log
likelihood values of the signature difference measurements.
The near-deterministic and highly entropical performance of the NF-CoA system is
also verified by the calculated ROC curve, shown in Figure 83. The sensitivity (Se) or
true positive rate (TPR), that is, the proportion of instances that tested authentic (TP) to
all the instances that actually are authentic (TP+FN), is by many decimal points almost 1
(0.99999...) and the 1-specificity (1-Sp) or false positive rate (FPR), that is, the proportion
of instances that tested authentic (FP) to all the instances that actually are fake (FP+TN), is
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by many decimal points almost 0 (extremely small number in the ROC space: 0.00000...).
This means that the chosen point on the ROC space, shown in Figure 83, for a certain detec-
tion threshold δT is almost identical to that of (0, 1), which is termed perfect classification.
Equivalent to this, is that the value of the area under the ROC curve, abbreviated AUC, is
close to 1.0.






















near perfect classification (0,1) 
Figure 83: The receiver operating characteristic curve of the NF-CoA binary classification
problem. The green points represent different (TPR, FPR) points for different similarity
detection threshold δT values. A δT option that corresponds to almost perfection classifica-
tion, i.e., (0, 1), exists.
By following a conservative statistical methodology at modeling each PDF, an upper
bound on performance is expected to exist. A parametric analysis on the two sole param-
eters, namely frequency neighborhood for the Botev KDE and density of non-neighboring
frequency points for the iid property, has been conducted, of course, yielding a similar
or even greater performance. In particular, for any of the two parameters being assigned a
value in the [2, 10] range, the probability of intersection of the negative and positive density
curves is always lower than 10−150 and in many cases close to 10−300.
143
7.2 Randomness Evaluation With the NIST Statistical Test Suite
Based on the analysis provided in the previous section, it is believed that the signatures
extracted by the NF-CoA system are indeed random and, thus, the entropy is high. Never-
theless, in order to strengthen the above claim, empirical evidence is also provided in this
section by conducting randomness testing based on one of the most stringent and highly
regarded test suites, the NIST Statistical Test Suite (NIST STS) [102]. This battery of
independent and computationally intensive statistical tests is the same test suite that was
used for the randomness testing of the five finalist encryption algorithms for the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), namely Mars, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent and Twofish [103].
7.2.1 The Null Hypothesis
The null hypothesis typically corresponds to a general or default position and can never
be proven. A statistical test, based on a set of data, can only reject a null hypothesis or
fail to reject it. The null hypothesis in the context of this research work is that a tested
bit sequence that represents an NF signature/fingerprint is random and could have been
generated by running a truly random number generator. A test applies particular mathe-
matical methods on the input data, i.e., the NF signature, to derive a relevant randomness
statistic, based on which the null hypothesis is accepted or rejected. This test statistic value,
the P-value, embodies the strength of the evidence against the null hypothesis. Basically,
it is the probability that the given sequence could have been generated by running a truly
random number generator once.
If P-value is larger than a critical value, the significance level α, then the sequence
appears to be random and the null hypothesis is accepted. Otherwise, if P-value is smaller
than α, then the null hypothesis is rejected. The level of significance, also called Type I
error or α error, is the probability that a test indicates that a sequence is non random when
it is in fact random.
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7.2.2 Testing Against the NIST Statistical Test Suite
The NIST Statistical Test Suite, developed by the Computer Security Division and Sta-
tistical Engineering Division of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, is a
highly regarded set of algorithmic tests, which attempt to identify binary digit sequences
that do not behave in a truly random manner. They are widely preferred for analyzing
cryptographic random number generators (RNGs) and pseudorandom number generators
(PRNGs).
As described in the previous subsection, a P-value is calculated for each binary se-
quence and each statistical test. A sequence is considered to pass a test if the correspond-
ing P-value exceeds the predetermined significance level α. A very common value of α in
cryptography is 0.01. A P-value ≥ 0.01 leads to the conclusion that the sequence is random
with a confidence of 99%. Conversely, a P-value < 0.01 leads to the conclusion that the
sequence is non random with a confidence of 99%. Closely associated with the P-value is
the proportion of success sequences; the number of sequences with a P-value greater than
the significance level α, divided by the total number of bit sequences tested. NIST [102]
specifies a range of acceptable proportions. This confidence interval is defined as
p̂ ± 3
√
p̂ (1 − p̂)
m
(11)
where p̂ = 1 − a and m is the number of bit sequences tested. For the NF-CoA empirical
randomness tests, 47 copper-based bit sequence signatures (m = 47) were available and
used. Based on the formula above, the lower boundary of the range of acceptable proportion
is 0.946 for copper-based NF-CoAs. If the proportion falls outside of this interval, then
there is evidence that the data is non random.
The NF signatures have been fed to the NIST STS as ASCII characters consisting of
zeroes and ones, which is the binary representation of the data extracted by the NF-CoA
reader. It was evident from the performance analysis of Chapter 6, that the highest entropy
exists around the resonant frequency of the antenna elements of the reader. So, the results
presented below are for a portion of the NF signatures over the 60 MHz range around the
145
center frequency of 5.45 GHz, in which case the size of each of the bit sequences is equal
to 17.408 Kbytes.
The NIST STS tests focus on different types of non randomness that can exist in a
sequence [102]. The ones the NF signature bit sequences were tested against are the fol-
lowing:
• Frequency Test determines whether the number of ones (“1”) and zeros (“0”) in a
tested bit sequence are approximately 1/2.
• Cumulative Sums Test determines whether the maximum absolute value of the cu-
mulative sum of the partial sequences occurring in the tested sequence is too large
or too small relative to the expected cumulative sum for truly random sequences. A
dual test is derived by applying the test backward through the input sequence instead
of forward.
• Discrete Fourier Transform Test detects periodic features in the tested sequence,
such as repetitive patterns that are near each other, by computing the peaks of the
discrete fast Fourier transform (DFFT) of the tested sequence.
• Rank Test checks for linear dependence among fixed-length substrings of the origi-
nal sequence.
• Non-overlapping Template Matching Tests determine whether there are too many
occurrences of predefined aperiodic patterns (148 such patterns and, thus, different
tests). If a pattern is not found, the match window slides one bit position. The default
block length parameter value of nine is used.
• Linear Complexity Test determines the length of a linear feedback shift register
[104] that would produce the tested bit sequence. A short feedback register implies
lack of randomness. The default block length parameter value of 500 is used.
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The NIST STS results are summarized in Table 8. Obviously, the proportion of sig-
natures that passed the tests for copper-based NF-CoAs is very high. Even in the case of
the discrete Fourier transform test tagged by the NIST STS as “Failed,” the proportion of
passed signatures (0.915) is very close to the aforementioned pass rate of 0.946. The pres-
ence of periodicity between the binary sequences of the signatures that causes the failure
of a few sequences is mostly attributed to the fact that the small-sized copper-based NF-
CoAs do not cover the whole area of the antenna array and, thus, allow certain antenna
couplings not to be disrupted. An increased success rate can be achieved with a smaller
antenna array, the projection area of which coincides with the 2D area of the small-sized
copper-based CoAs.
Table 8: NIST statistical test suite results for all 47 copper-based NF-CoAs.




Frequency (Monobit) 0.979 (= 46/47) Passed
Cumulative Sums (for-
ward)
0.957 (= 45/47) Passed
Cumulative Sums (back-
ward)
0.979 (= 46/47) Passed
Rank 1.000 (= 47/47) Passed




1.000 (= 47/47) for vast major-
ity of 148 tests
Passed
Linear Complexity 0.957 (= 45/47) Passed
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This deduced inherent unpredictability potentially allows the NF-CoA system to take
over the additional role of a reasonably good physical RNG. This statement takes on an
even larger importance if one considers that:
• No pre- or post-processing of the bit sequences is applied, compared to the related
work in the area. Instead, the raw data is directly fed to the suite.
• No consecutive multiple refeeds of the bit sequences is applied. The results are based
on the test outputs for a single feeding of each bit sequence of each NF signature.
• No Von Neumann [105, 106] or any other corrector is applied on the bit sequences
to remove any weakness in the entropy source, such as potential duplicate patterns.
• No optimization of the parameters of the NIST STS has been pursued.
7.2.3 The NF-CoA System as a Physical Random Number Generator
The ability to generate random and pseudorandom numbers is essential in many crypto-
graphic applications. As opposed to pseudo random number generators that produce bit
sequences from an initial value, a seed, using a known algorithm, physical/hardware RNGs
require no seed. Instead, RNGs attempt to extract randomness directly from complex
and unpredictable physical non-deterministic sources, such as temperature, atmospheric
or electromagnetic noise, etc., to produce random bits [107, 108, 109, 110].
For a physical RNG to use its produced bit strings directly, without the application of
further processing, the generated sequences need to meet strict randomness criteria to deter-
mine that the underlying physical sources appear random [102]. In this section, one candi-
date physical RNG, the underlying physical concept of which is based upon the near-field
electromagnetic effects of an SHF signal impinging on complex 3D physical conductive
and dielectric structures, has been tested against one of the most stringent and worldwide
recognized test suites revealing the potential of leveraging the NF-CoA system for applica-




The anti-counterfeiting nature of the NF-CoA system and the consequent benefits from
counterfeiting NF-CoA protected objects render a discussion about potential attacks im-
perative.
Regarding the NF fingerprint f as a cardinality-N real vector of numbers ∈ RN , the key
attack problems can be formulated as following:
Problem #1: Assuming the adversary has physical access to an original NF-
CoA reader, as well as any original certificate instance X he wishes to counterfeit,
is it possible to develop a manufacturing process that can massively and exactly or
nearly-exactly reproduce/replicate X at a low price?
Problem #2: Assuming the adversary has in his possession the electromagnetic finger-
print f of an authentic certificate instance, which he himself extracted using an original
or successfully replicated NF-CoA reader, is it possible to find a three-dimensional ob-
ject of the same dimensions as the original certificate, that produces an electromagnetic
near-field response f ′ such that || fi j − f ′i j|| < δT , where the detection threshold δT is a
standardized distance metric ||  ||, such as the Euclidean distance, between f and f ′
and, as such, is a proportionally small scalar?
Problem #3: Is it possible for an adversary to directly compute the issuer’s private key
and, as a result, be able to ultimately create his own physical NF-CoA object, extract
its near-field signature with an NF-CoA reader and sign and store the fixed-length bit
string of the signature (as in Figure 12)?
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Problem #4: Assuming that the certificate instance is not embedded into the surface
of the protected item, i.e., the certificate is in the form of a tag, and assuming that the
embedded storage chip is physically co-located with the 3D structure of the NF-CoA,
is it possible for an adversary to misappropriate original NF-CoA tags?
The NF-CoA instances are intended to protect a physical object in scenarios where any
of the above challenges may be applied. As a result, all the above problems are consid-
ered separately below. Considering them, nevertheless, first as a whole, these key problems
involve two layers of difficulty and complexity, namely manufacturing (the first two prob-
lems) and computational (the last three problems). As argued below, it is these two layers
that inherently enforce the security of the CoA instances.
For completeness sake, the practical aspects of all the above attacks, visited in recent
studies [111, 48, 53], are reported. Nevertheless, this chapter focuses on the most inter-
esting, from a complexity point of view, problem; Problem #2. Complementary to the
theoretical study is an example of inverse design attack that has been launched against the
NF-CoA system in Section 8.2.3.
8.1 3D CoA Physical Replication/Reproduction
Let us assume that an adversary has in his possession an original, physical NF-CoA in-
stance. By using a, somehow acquired, NF-CoA reader, the adversary extracts the exact
NF fingerprint f. An attack against the NF-CoA system is considered successful when the
adversary is able to construct a nearly-exact replica that can produce a near-field response
f ′ such that || f − f ′|| < δT , where δT is the detection threshold analyzed and quantified in
Chapters 6 and 7.
Formulating a manufacturing process that can exactly or nearly exactly replicate the 3D
structure of an already signed CoA instance consists of two major steps, namely (i) captur-
ing the physical 3D structure and (ii) realizing this structure into the physical world. There
150
is a number of potential state-of-the-art 3D scanning and imaging processes, such as stere-
oscopy [112], confocal microscopy [113], conoscopic holography [114], structured-light
method [115], and computed tomography, including magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
[116], X-ray microtomography [117], and optical coherence tomography [118, 119], that
can help accurately scan arbitrary complex 3D structures. Nevertheless, the major chal-
lenges arise during the attempt to fabricate this three-dimensional physical structure with
very high precision in terms of mechanical tolerances and, finally, to embed the structure
in an encapsulating sealant by making using of materials that have dielectric properties as
close as possible to those of the original certificate instance.
Although this type of attack is not unfeasible, it requires certain expenses by the mali-
cious party. The cost of a massive successful adversarial manufacturing process, including
not only the development but also the necessary research, has to be lower than the earnings
that can be fetched on the market by selling the counterfeit product. From this perspective,
it is obvious that a certificate instance can be used to protect an object, the value of which
does not exceed the cost of forging a single CoA instance. Finally, it should be highlighted
that a successful such attack results in the forging of only a single certificate instance, that
is, the same effort has to be invested for every single NF-CoA physical instance.
8.2 Inverse Design Attack
The objective of the malicious party under this type of attack is to be able to create any 3D
object of the same dimensions as an original NF-CoA that produces a near-field signature
f ′ that is nearly-exact same to that of the original one f . In addition to any final manufac-
turing process involved, here an adversary needs to be able to numerically compute the NF
signature of any own-designed physical certificate instance with very high precision and
almost no assumptions (forward design problem) and also be able to launch and complete
in reasonable amount of time a space search of all candidate designs, the superposition or
other combination of which yields the desired fingerprint f ′ (inverse design problem). As
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a result, solving the forward problem is only a step toward solving the associated inverse
problem. This dependence also reveals that the higher numerical accuracy and efficiency
of the forward solution is, the less arduous the search for the inverse solution/s is.
8.2.1 Step 1: Forward Design Complexity
The first challenge that an adversary is confronted with under this type of attack is the
forward design complexity, the fundamental problem of directly computing NF respons-
es/signatures.
The adversary will typically attempt to launch a super-positioning attack, that is, try
to obtain a desired final near-field response by combining a number of physical objects
with known fingerprints at different highly accurate 3D positions relative to the plane of
the antenna array. To acquire these “known fingerprints,” the adversary needs to be capable
of numerically computing with high precision any complex physical structure constrained
by the fixed dimensions of an original NF-CoA instance. A small change in the physical
position incurs a large set of different responses for each one of the individual physical
objects combined, as shown later in Section 8.2.3. This parameter, in addition to the number
of physical objects used, are only a couple of the many parameters that the malicious party
has to deal with in an optimal way so that the search space visited in the next step of inverse
design problem does not end up being tremendously large.
Moreover, it is argued that, for a dense population of scatterers in the CoA instance, the
system is non-linear in terms of near-field responses produced. One can understand this
by simply assuming only two scattering physical objects S 1 and S 2 that, when individually
placed in front of an antenna array, yield f (S 1) and f (S 2), respectively. Nevertheless, when
both are in each other’s proximity and in front of the antenna array, their joint response is
f (S 1 + S 2) , f (S 1) + f (S 2) because of their mutual interdependence, which is expressed,
for example, by coupling between S 1 and S 2 or by additional reflection or refraction on
S 1 by the reradiated energy from S 2 (which energy did not exist when S 2 was not in the
proximity of S 1, finally yielding f (S 1)).
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The precision and reliability of the electromagnetic field solvers has been thoroughly
studied and assessed in a large body of literature. The benchmark studies, referred to
below, employ the majority of the available state-of-the-art full Maxwell three-dimensional
electromagnetic field solvers. Categorized by their solution method, the integral equations
solvers are IE3D of Zeland Software, FEKO of EM Software & Systems, ADS Momentum
of Agilent and MAGMAS 3D of K.U. Leuven, the finite element method (FEM) solvers are
Ansoft HFSS and Comsol Multiphysics, the finite-difference time-domain (FDTD) solver is
CST Microwave Studio and the method of moments (MoM) solvers are AWR Microwave
Office Sonnet and Software EM. With the exception of a few studies, these popular EM
solvers are not only compared to each other, but their results are compared against real
measurements performed on prototype antennas and/or microwave devices manufactured
with high mechanical precision just for this purpose.
The structures benchmarked include a line-fed planar patch with local dielectric inho-
mogeneity, an ultra-wide-band (UWB) planar antenna (3.1 GHz to 10.6 GHz) and a planar
folded monopole antenna for GSM application (up to 2 GHz) in [120], a simple line-fed
patch antenna (45 mm by 15 mm) on an extended Rogers R04003 substrate in [121], a
cavity-backed aperture antenna (covering, among others, the 3 GHz to 6 GHz range) in
[122], a slot rhombic antenna (covering the 2 GHz to 3 GHz range) in [123], a very com-
pact planar antenna in [124], a conventional λ/2 microstrip resonator and a 2D Hilbert
resonator (covering the 5 GHz to 6 GHz range) in [125], dielectric objects in free space
and a cavity with a perfectly metallic boundary in [126], a resonant left-handed (LH) mi-
crostrip line, composed of complementary split ring resonators and capacitive gaps in the
microstrip in [127], and a complete industry-standard SOIC8 (single-outline integrated cir-
cuit with eight leads) circuit, packaging, and an interconnection topology combined with a
completely passive electrical circuit inside represented by a well-defined geometrical and
material model (covering the 1 GHz to 14 GHz range) in [128]. Specifically in the near-
field region domain, Karamehmedović et al. [129] investigated the problem of scattering
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by a spheroidal silver nano particle immersed in glass and illuminated in the wavelength
range 250 nm to 900 nm. After ruling out purely analytic methods such as the Mie theory
[130], which is restricted to simple shapes like spheres, the FDTD, which relies on the
staircase approximation and not on an unstructured mesh to accurately represent curved
surfaces, and time domain methods, which usually require an approximation of the permit-
tivity with analytic models, the authors compared the FEM-based Comsol Multiphysics,
a multiple multipole (MMP) implementation (MMP 3D), a discrete dipole approximation
(DDA) implementation (DDSCAT) and the null field method with discrete sources (NFM-
DS) implementation of T-Matrix type.
The authors of these benchmark testing articles notice considerable deviations in the
real and imaginary parts of the scattering parameters, the resonant frequency and its power
magnitude, the −10 dB bandwidth and quality factor Q or even the electric field magni-
tude in V/m in the time domain. Vasylchenko et al. [121] in their study conclude that
forcing HFSS to double the amount tetrahedra for antenna model discretization or number
of mesh cells per wavelength in Momentum and CST Microwave Studio does not affect
the solution significantly, if a convergence criterion of the method is met. Furthermore,
Karamehmedović et al. [129] drew the conclusion that the quality of the computed near
field can deteriorate significantly as the observation point approaches the scatterer surface.
To summarize, the conclusions of all the above studies prove that the analysis of even pla-
nar antennas is not always straightforward; simple antennas with regular geometries, may
involve intensive computational tasks of arguable accuracy [131].
The deviations in the results can be attributed to a plethora of reasons. Two of the
most crucial design goals are the correct feeding modeling and the proper mesh genera-
tion [120]. Since a slight difference between the simulated feed topology and the actual
setup may result in completely different performance, the model selected has to match as
closely as possible the real physical feed topology [132]. Very fine/dense meshing near the
ports and at critical regions is also a necessity. According to Massaro [133], the singular
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behavior of the electromagnetic field close to sharp dielectric edges is poorly represented
and the frequency domain characteristics of the structure will typically be shifted, unless
a very fine mesh is used. The researcher recommends, specifically for these points, the
analytical treatment of the EM field configuration in proximity of 3D corners. Impedance
mismatch of the feed lines, different excitation models and de-embedding schemes should
also be considered. Nevertheless, Vandenbosch et al. [120] indicate that the PCB manufac-
turing process, although it does not yield loss and substrate dielectric constant uniformity,
is not the cause of the discrepancy between the solvers; this may only explain some of the
variation between the solvers.
Important, though, the difference between the simulation results and the measurements
may be, what is even more critical is that the aforementioned investigations of the simu-
lation results reveal lack of mutual correspondence between the different software solvers
themselves. This discrepancy is further corroborated by the existence of a relatively new
IEEE standard [134], which attempts to validate computational EM simulation results, even
if the software code used is established.
Finally, the computational complexity exists even despite the fact that for the current
generation of NF-CoAs instances only isotropic materials have been considered. Finding
approximations that can accelerate an electromagnetic field solver can be a difficult task
if non-linear building materials are used for the fabrication of the certificate instances.
Candidate such materials are ferrites (ceramic compounds with ferromagnetic properties
that show various kinds of anomalies in their power absorption at high microwave signal
levels [55]) and metamaterials (artificial materials, the permittivity and permeability of
which are both negative resulting in a negative index of refraction and, thus, in a phase
velocity that is anti-parallel to the direction of the Poynting vector [135, 56]).
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8.2.2 Step 2: Inverse Design Complexity
The inverse design problem, that is, the problem of inverting time-domain electromagnetic
data to recover three-dimensional distributions of electrical conductivity, is of major inter-
est in the fields of geophysics and medical imaging.
There are many practical challenges that render the task of fully interpreting three-
dimensional datasets an arduous one [136]. A fast, accurate and reliable algorithm for 3D
forward modeling is required, but the reliability and accuracy of this solution are open to
question [137], as discussed in the previous section. On top of that, the accumulated errors
while performing the super-positioning of the discrete simulated physical structures to-be-
combined has a direct negative effect on the inverse design problem. Additionally, from
the real observation point of view, ambient signal noise, spatial-configuration errors, in-
strument malfunction, ill-determined and poorly understood recording parameters all con-
tribute to data inaccuracy [138]. This inaccuracy, when combined with the aforementioned
resolution issues of the EM solver methods, can lead to many models that can equally fit the
data within a given tolerance threshold, i.e., the problem is inherently ill-posed [139]. In
some occasions, the trial-and-error forward modeling may be the only available tool [137].
8.2.3 An Inverse Design Attack Example: 2D to 3D Projection
Experiments that aim to test the invincibility of the NF-CoA system against the super-
positioning attack have been carried out. This type of attack can be realized by using
three-dimensional structures, each created as a different-ordered stack of multiple inkjet-
printed 2D CoAs. The separate layers of a 3D stacked certificate are shown in Figure 84.
The key point here is that all the resulting 3D structures have the same 2D projection when
viewed from above, or, in other words, from the perspective of the antenna array.
The first experiment is essentially an ADS simulation, the goal of which is to compare
the near-field responses extracted by a 3D metallic object to that extracted by the object’s
2D projection when viewed from the top (from the perspective of the reader antenna array).
This “random” 3D object that possesses the properties of copper material is shown in Figure
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Figure 84: Separate 2D photo-paper-based layers with inkjet-printed rhombic loops that,
when stacked, form a 3D NF-CoA instance.
85. The subset of S 21 antenna couplings that are simulated are A1-D1 and C3-D1 and
the results are shown in Figure 86. In the same figure, the different colors correspond to
the two different couplings, the continuous lines correspond to the 3D structure and, last,
the dashed lines correspond to the “squeezed” 2D projection of the same copper-based
metallic object. Despite the relatively same trend, the differences in magnitude between
the scattering parameter curves reaches up to 7 dBs. Of course, since the A1-D1 coupling
is on the periphery of the antenna array and is “obstructed” in a significantly lesser degree
compared to the centrally-originating C3-D1, the differences between the responses of A1-
D1 are smaller.
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Figure 86: Comparison between the near-field responses extracted by the 3D metallic ob-
ject of Figure 85 to that extracted by the object’s 2D projection over antenna couplings
A1-D1 and C3-D1.
The second experiment involves the comparison between the measured NF signatures
of fabricated physical certificate instances [60]. Specifically, two different sets of four 2D
photo-paper-based NF-CoA designs each that consist of random constellations of silver
inkjet-printed 1 mm by 1 mm pixels are used. These two sets, D1 and D2, are shown in
Figure 87. The four 2D CoAs of each set can be stacked on top of each other in 24 (4!)
different orders, but they always produce the same visual 2D projection when viewed from
above, or equivalently from the antenna array. Given that the thickness of each photo paper
sheet is 0.22 mm (8.5 mil), the resulting 3D CoA has an approximate total thickness of
0.9 mm. This meets the “three-dimensionality” design requirement of Section 4.1 and is
comparable to the thickness of a regular credit card (0.762 mm or 30 mil).
First, for each set, the near-field responses of 24 different-ordered stacks of 2D CoAs






Figure 87: (a) Set D1 and (b) Set D2 of four fabricated two-dimensional photo-paper-based
NF-CoA designs. Each design consists of random constellations of silver inkjet-printed 1
mm by 1 mm pixels. The resulting 2D projections are shown on the right.
of signatures are measured and shown over frequency in Figures 88a and 89a for D1 and
D2, respectively. Because of the density of the curves of the 276 different sets of Euclidean
distances among different stacks of the 2D certificate instances, an estimation of the range
of their differentiation and their standard deviation is needed for a clearer assessment of
how large the differences/distances between the signatures are. The range, i.e., difference
between the maximum and the minimum of each sample, and the interquartile range are
evaluated and presented in Figures 88 and 89 for D1 and D2, respectively.
The conclusion that can be drawn by analyzing these plots is that the Euclidean dis-
tances among all the available signatures are significantly large. The range, especially
around the the resonant frequency of the antenna elements and also for many antenna cou-
plings, almost reaches the dynamic range of the power detector of the NF-CoA reader with
values close to 1200 mV. This result supports that even slight variations in manufacturing
across the z axis, that is, the thickness of the certificate objects, which in the above two




Figure 88: (a) Euclidean distances, (b) range of Euclidean distances, and (c) interquartile
range of Euclidean distances between NF signatures extracted from all 24 possible different




Figure 89: (a) Euclidean distances, (b) range of Euclidean distances, and (c) interquartile
range of Euclidean distances between NF signatures extracted from all 24 possible different
stacked orderings of the four 2D paper-based NF-CoAs yielding projection D2.
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8.3 Private Key Computation
As described in Section 4.2.1, the NF-CoA issuing process relies on the use of asymmetric
key algorithms that involve the use of a public key known to everyone and a secret private
key. The keys are related mathematically [54], but it is virtually impossible to deduce the
private key from the public key, as long as factorization of large numbers remains practi-
cally intractable [140]. This is the same kind of technology (Hypertext Transfer Protocol
Secure (HTTPS) with SSL or TLS encryption) used nowadays to secure communications
between a user’s Internet browser and a web server of a financial institution, e-shop or gov-
ernment agency during e-commerce, e-banking and other transactions when the two parties
need to authenticate one another [141, 142, 143].
So with public key cryptography, only the issuer can digitally sign the NF-CoA with
the secret private key. Nevertheless, one potential attack could be to directly compute the
issuer’s private key [144]. A successful such attack would allow an adversary to ultimately
create his own NF-CoA object, extract its near-field signature with a, possibly, original
reader, rather than exact replica, and store and sign the fixed-length bit string f into the
embedded storage chip accompanying the certificate instance (see Figure 12).
The solution to this potential attack is to make the private key computation arbitrarily
difficult and time consuming by adjusting the length of the key of the public key crypto-
system deployed [140, 145, 54] at the expense of a larger amount of information stored in
the embedded storage chip accompanying the certificate instance. As it is obvious from
the description of Section 4.2.1, adjusting the length of the private key is totally possible.
Moreover, each potential successful attack is constrained in the context of a single certi-
fier, or in other words, of a single manufacturer. This means that only the objects of that
particular manufacturer can be counterfeited. The reason for this is that the verifier’s NF-
CoA reader will make use of the public key of the scanned objects manufacturer. The time
and effort of breaking a new private key has to be reinvested for an attack against a different
certifier.
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8.4 Original Signed CoA Instances Re-use
This type of attack does not apply to the cases in which the certificate instance is embedded
in the protected object, such as for instance passports, cars, etc., which typically represent
the upper bound of value of protected objects. Instead, it only applies to the case where the
CoA is in the form of a detachable tag.
Under the later scenario, it is possible that one collects CoA instances from already
sold products, attaches or embeds them on counterfeit objects that, necessarily, have the
same properties, e.g. product model, color and, more importantly, serial number, with the
original products, and sells the fake products as authentic merchandise.
This type of attack is eliminated in the case of the on-line authentication process, where
the CoA of an already sold item has been invalidated in the central database. Regarding the
offline authentication case, one way to address this problem is by destroying/devaluing the




The research work presented in this dissertation has involved the design and realization of
a novel standalone wireless robust system that inherently exhibits enhanced authentication
and anti-counterfeiting capabilities. The system consists of two major components, namely
the near-field certificates of authenticity (NF-CoAs), which serve as authenticity vouchers
for the products to which they are attached, and a microcontroller-enabled, low-power, and
low-cost reader.
This work embarked on describing the many-fold rationale behind focusing on the near-
field observation of the electromagnetic phenomena of reflection, refraction, diffraction
and, most importantly, scattering. The boundary values of the electromagnetic regions
of the space surrounding the miniature antenna elements deployed have been determined
following the two most popular theoretical approaches. Leveraging the unique near-field
scattering properties and the complexity of the incurred electromagnetic effects, especially
when the latter are viewed under the prism of a thorough literature survey, highlights the
important qualitative features not exhibited by related anti-counterfeiting techniques.
Two different types of NF-CoA instances that yield unique and highly-divergent NF fin-
gerprints have been studied and realized following a design and fabrication strategy that
has allowed for control over their properties, as well as randomness. The first category
includes three different sets of two-dimensional geometries inkjet-printed with conductive
silver nano-particle-based ink on regular photo paper layers that are stacked one on top of
each other. The second type includes three different sets of copper-based CoAs of varying
mass per meter, namely 2, 3 and 4 grams per meter. Very simply, these copper-based in-
stances are created by immersing and fixating randomly entangled and squished metallic
hair into a dielectric substrate, the thinnest dimension of which should be substantial (e.g.
0.75 mm). Regardless of the type, the entire life cycle of a certificate instance, spanning
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from the fabrication process (issuing) to the point where it is used for identity validation or
genuineness authentication (verification process), has been outlined.
The design and fabrication of the NF-CoA reader that is used to expose the subtle vari-
ances of the near-field electromagnetic effects, which result from the impingement of elec-
tromagnetic energy on a certificate instance, has evolved over three different generations of
mixed-signal boards. The full characterization of all hardware components comprising the
reader, with an emphasis on accuracy and insertion loss introduced, as well as the operating
details of the three generations have been described. During the design of the first gener-
ation of the NF-CoA board reader, the attention was almost exclusively concentrated on
the super-high-frequency plane. The operation of this first prototype implementation was
assisted by an external data acquisition board. The most important advancements brought
by the second-generation board was the computationally more powerful MCU-controlled
operation of this board for the first time with an external board, the optimal coverage of
the contiguous 5.0 to 6.1 GHz frequency spectrum by using two distinct VCOs, and the
decrease by 16% in the overall dimensions. This has provided not only a very fast means
of capturing each fingerprint, but also the accuracy required toward an effort to maximize
the resulting entropy. The third and last generation did not make use of an external data
acquisition board. Instead, a big leap toward unifying the super-high-frequency plane and
the digital control plane and integrating them on a single board has been achieved. This is
the first standalone reader. This design has necessitated special care to maintain isolation of
EM interference between digital and analog circuitry, so as to preserve the signal integrity
of the NF fingerprint and to produce a firmware code that complies to the timing charac-
teristics of all the components across the signal path. The operational state diagram of the
algorithm implemented by the NF-CoA reader has also been discussed and illustrated.
A wide array of tests have been conducted to assess the feasibility and performance
of the proposed authenticity certification technology. Physical objects that belong to both
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aforementioned categories and that are conceptually very close to the final envisioned cer-
tificate instance have been tested. As a very first step, it was verified that the close proximity
of an NF-CoA to the antenna array of the reader does significantly disrupt the NF response
by almost 2/3 of the overall dynamic range of the power detector of the reader. Next, the
dependence on the distance between the antenna array and the certificate instance was ex-
amined. The dependence on the size of the lateral two-dimensional area was also studied
by evaluating the difference between the responses of different-sized copper-based certifi-
cates. In the context of this same test, it was important to verify that the entropy produced
by the smaller-sized certificates was more than adequate. Additionally, the effect of the
amount of conductive material density in the three-dimensional structure of the NF-CoA to
the entropy of its frequency response was investigated by comparing copper-based CoAs
belonging to families with different mass per meter. The first most crucial test was the
intra-CoA robustness test, which ensures that the same certificate instance always yields
nearly exact replicate signatures. The results have led to the conclusion that the differences
are located in the neighborhood of the noise floor of the power detector and/or the analog-
to-digital converter of the micro-controller unit and that indeed nearly identical signatures
are finally extracted. Based on this same test, the similarity detection threshold has been
established to be equal to the low power level of 1 dB. This level of accuracy takes on even
higher importance if one considers that the linearity error exhibited by the power detector
used was ±1 dB. In other words, the maximum intra-CoA difference measured is equal to
the physical detection limit of the underlying hardware. The second most crucial test to
conduct was the inter-CoA robustness test, which demonstrates the uniqueness among sig-
natures extracted from different NF-CoA instances. The range of the signature differences
almost reached the dynamic range of the power detector of the reader. Finally, the shielding
capability of the NF-CoA system against interference by nearby conductive and dielectric
material, for instance when NF-CoAs are attached onto computer laptops, aircraft spare
parts, pharmaceutical liquids, etc., has been assessed. Specifically, three different tests
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were conducted that involved the proximity of three different types or sizes of metallic
surfaces brought close enough to the certificate instances. The results clearly indicated no
detrimental effects on the entropy of the produced signatures.
Attempts to empirically quantify the entropy, or uncertainty, of the signatures generated
by the NF-CoA system have been made. The term “empirically” here accentuates the fact
that real measurements, i.e., bit sequences representing the digitized extracted EM signa-
tures from all the available certificate instances, comprised the entirety of the data worked
upon. The certificate verification procedure is a binary classification problem. As such, the
analysis in the first attempt, following the principles of basic detection theory, employed the
concepts of hypothesis testing, probability density functions and receiver operating charac-
teristic curves. The probability that the NF-CoA system predicts a fake CoA as authentic
or predicts an authentic CoA as fake is inconceivably small; on the order of 10−200. The
near deterministic and highly entropical performance of the NF-CoA system is also veri-
fied by the existence of a point on the receiver operating characteristic curve that almost
corresponds to the (0, 1) “perfect classification” point for a certain detection threshold δT .
As an independent corroboration for the above finding, empirical evidence has also been
provided by conducting randomness testing based on one of the most stringent and highly
regarded, by industry and research community alike, test suites, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology Statistical Test Suite (NIST STS). This battery of independent
and computationally intensive statistical tests attempts to algorithmically identify binary
digit sequences that do not behave in a truly random manner and, as expected, are widely
preferred for analyzing cryptographic random number generators. The deduced inherent
unpredictability of the NF-CoA system, scoring “success” for the majority of the tests,
takes on an even higher importance if one considers that no pre- or post-processing of the
bit sequences, no consecutive or interleaved multiple refeeds of the bit sequences and no
Von Neumann or any other corrector has been applied and no optimization departing from
the default NIST STS parameters has been pursued.
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Finally, the security nature of the NF-CoA system and the consequent benefits from
forging an identity or counterfeiting NF-CoA protected objects have rendered it imperative
to identify and formulate the key potential attack problems. An example of a real attack
that was launched and how the NF-CoA system could withstand it is included. Of course,
the investigation of these attacks has been complemented by an analysis of how these are
effectively blocked.
On top of the main functionality of the NF-CoA instances, a localization service has
been provided for location estimation of the NF-CoA instances. This service is presented in
the Appendix and is based on the multi-lateration received signal strength indicator (RSSI)
based localization technique when the certificate instances are coupled with a battery-less
solar-powered wireless connectivity module. Two different real-world WSN-enabled lo-
calization testbeds have been set up and the experiments conducted have yielded very sat-
isfactory results.
In conclusion, the robustness of the NF-CoA system with virtually not a single false
alarm in one’s lifetime, the fast and versatile certificate signature extraction, the small pro-
file of the certificate instances, and the reader’s very low cost, low-power operation and
wireless data relay provisioning are among the characteristics that make it applicable to a
vast array of physical objects that needs protection against counterfeiters.
9.1 Summary of Contributions
Within the context of the inter-disciplinary research work presented in this dissertation,
significant aspects of the near-field certificate of authenticity anti-counterfeiting system
have been brought from paper to reality. A novel standalone wireless robust system with
exceptional hardware-enabled authentication and anticounterfeiting capabilities has been
realized following a bottom-up approach (tag/instance⇒ reader⇒ algorithm⇒ network-
ing⇒ system).
• Designed and realized two different types of novel ultra-low-cost certificate instances
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of enhanced randomness following a design and fabrication strategy that has allowed
for better discrimination/performance control (stacked 2D inkjet-printed paper-based),
as well as higher randomness (random copper-based).
• Designed, fabricated and fully characterized the first three generations of low-power
and low-cost readers of the NF-CoA system utilizing “mix-and-play” antenna array
coupling configurations. The latest generation represents the first standalone micro-
controller-enabled reader.
• Developed a power-efficient algorithm for the fast and accurate NF fingerprint ex-
traction that complies with the timing characteristics of all the components across
the signal path.
• Conducted a wide array of tests to assess the feasibility and performance robustness
of the system.
• Evaluated and determined the similarity detection threshold to be in the vicinity of
the boundaries of the physical limitations of the reader hardware.
• Quantified empirically the entropy, or uncertainty, of the signatures generated by
the NF-CoA system and verified the near deterministic and highly-entropical per-
formance of the NF-CoA system by demonstrating the existence of a point on the
receiver operating characteristic curve that almost corresponds to the (0, 1) “perfect
classification” point for a certain detection threshold δT within the context of the
binary classification problem of the verification procedure.
• Supported the feasibility of the “null hypothesis” of the NF signatures being poten-
tially generated by a true random number generator by conducting and passing the
majority of the tests of one of the most stringent and highly regarded, by industry
and research community alike, test suites, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology Statistical Test Suite (NIST STS).
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• Launched a real super-positioning inverse design attack that the NF-CoA system
successfully withstood.
• Built the first two real-world WSN-enabled multilateration localization testbeds to
evaluate the provision of an accurate location estimate of the certificate instances.
In Fall 2011, this research work was listed among the 25 technologies in all categories
featured in the 20-year anniversary issue of Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA [146].
9.2 Directions for Future Research
While the architecture of the NF-CoA has been realized and the feasibility and robustness
of this research work have been demonstrated, there is a number of research topics that
can originate from this work and complement it. First, a mixed-signal design and devel-
opment effort to integrate all the, currently, discrete components of the reader in a single
die could be invested. This could provide a thrust toward the goal of massively producing
NF-CoA readers.
Moreover, the design of novel curved, but fixed, antenna arrays that could support the
near-field signature extraction of CoA instances attached or embedded onto cylindrical sur-
faces could be sought. This would widen even more the range of the possible applications,
a prominent one being the package sealing of physical objects.
Another promising topic could be the addition of a phase detector and the expansion
of the list of candidate materials for fabrication of the certificate identifiers to include non-
linear materials, such as ferrites and metamaterials. This would effectively render the





ENABLING LOCALIZATION FOR THE NF-COA SYSTEM
The parameter that eventually plays the major role in choosing a particular localization
technique is the ease of deployment in a new or an existing wireless network infrastructure.
This involves the existence of a real-world implementation of a technique with low hard-
ware complexity, low or no packet transmission overhead, low cost, and minor limitations.
As for the hardware complexity, for instance, solutions based on the RSSI multilatera-
tion require only minor software module additions, whereas the lighthouse solution [147]
requires the installation of quite complex anchor nodes with rotating mirrors and laser
diodes.
In the framework of this dissertation, the goal is to provide a very low-cost localiza-
tion service to the NF-CoA system with a satisfactory accuracy. Toward that direction,
a batteryless, solar-powered wireless module is coupled with any of the developed NF-
CoA instances and, by simply broadcasting identical, unique identification packets in regu-
lar intervals, does rely on the multilateration localization technique. This effort is presented
in Section A.2.
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A.1 Wireless Sensor and Ad-Hoc Networking
The capability of gathering, storing, and processing large amounts of data collected from
tiny sensors, including the NF-CoA instances, in a centralized, efficient and low-cost way
without involving the human in the loop is becoming more and more critical as we move
on to the ubiquitous cognition era of the Internet of Things [148]. The ultimate objective
is to be able to extract the sensed information not only over long wireless ranges but even
from the other side of the planet.
The solution to this problem can be the deployment of Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
nodes in-between prototype sensors and the Internet, replacing existing RFID readers which
are not only much larger in size than typical WSN motes but also two orders of magnitude
more expensive. The bridging of the world of the sensing devices and RFIDs with that of
WSNs brings in the spotlight the new area of ubiquitous wireless networks, which can pro-
vide truly cognitive intelligence over extended physical distances on top of very low-cost
and mature wireless infrastructures. The motes comprising a WSN are mesh interconnected
with wireless links and are capable of relaying messages to a sink, as graphically depicted
in Figure 90. Under this approach, the WSN motes are not anymore the lowest-level net-
work devices in the infrastructure hierarchy; their primary task is not as data generators,
which role is almost entirely taken over by the sensors, but as data routers that relay the
sensed information through wireless multihop links to one or more gateways.
For the NF-CoA reader and instances presented in the previous chapters to be able to
connect to a WSN infrastructure that interfaces with the Internet, both sides are required
to “speak” the same protocol language. From the networking Open Systems Interconnec-
tion (OSI) reference layer design [149] perspective, this means that not only should there
be physical layer (PHY) compliance in terms of the RF transmission from the reader or
instance but also the transmitted packet has to implement the proper link layer (medium
access control (MAC)) encapsulation, as described in the following subsections.
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Figure 90: An example of a wireless sensor network (WSN) topology, where the WSN
motes are not anymore the lowest-level network devices in the infrastructure hierarchy.
Although communication between the wireless connectivity module of the NF-CoA in-
stances and the very popular commercial MICA2 WSN mote [150] has been successfully
established as described below using a very simple but power-efficient protocol, the role
of the WSN mote can also be assumed alternatively by 802.15.4/Zigbee nodes, DASH7
nodes, Oracle Sun Spot nodes and others.
Within the multihop context of a WSN, instead of transmitting high-strength signals
over long single-hop wireless links, it is more power efficient to relay packets a number
of times over lower-strength shorter links [151]. This decreased power consumption of
the radio transmission results in increased power efficiency of both the NF-CoA wireless
module the WSN node operation. At the same time, as long as the WSN nodes are located
within direct radio range of others, hopping effectively extends radio communication over
higher ranges overcoming non line-of-sight and path loss effects. Moreover, their multi-
path topology is inherently self-healing allowing the network functionalities to be sustained
without any interruption because of potential WSN node failures.
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A.1.1 NF-CoA Instance Wireless Connectivity
The main functionality of the MCU-enabled NF-CoA wireless connectivity module [152],
shown in Figure 91, is the wireless broadcast transmission of identical, unique identification
packets in regular intervals triggered and powered using energy present in ambient sunlight
without a conventional battery. As expected, the parameters governing the performance of
the module are the effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP), the total transmit time and the






Antenna SoC: MCU + Tx 
Figure 91: The NF-CoA wireless connectivity module.
This module utilizes super capacitors, which are much cleaner to dispose environmen-
tally, have a lower voltage charge threshold and have much higher recharge lifetimes than
batteries. These super capacitors are charged by the unlimited and clean solar energy har-
vested by a parallel configuration of GaAs solar cells interfacing to the tag through a power
management circuit (PMU), which is in turn interfaced to the integrated 8-bit MCU housed
in the same chip as the RF transmitter. The MCU transits from “on” to “sleep” mode and
vice versa with the help of the PMU based on the amount of the solar energy collected
across the charge tank capacitors. The power management unit is comprised of discrete
analog circuitry. The module firmware ensures that the unique identification packet is
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transmitted using the same RF power irrespective of the external light conditions, thereby
ensuring that the EIRP from the tag remains the same within the area, where it is being
tracked. In order to support Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) modulation, passive compo-
nents are introduced to enable pulling of the phase-locked loop (PLL) crystal by a con-
trolled amount by the MCU thereby modulating the RF output going into the antenna with
respect to the frequency.
Since the packet transmissions have been observed to suffer from bit errors, the rate
of which depends on the characteristics of each wireless environment, cyclic redundancy
checks (CRC) are performed. As the name implies, no error correction or recovery is
provided but only error detection. Additionally, the bit errors between the module and the
WSN receiver are noticeably minimized by calibrating the PLL of the module so that its
modulation profile around the center frequency is very closely matched to that required by
the receiver Mica2 motes. This calibration also has the added advantage of requiring fewer
preamble bits for the receiver to bit synchronize with the tag for Manchester bit encoding
[153], which, given the limited amount of power available per energy duty cycle, can be
useful.
The radiated power has to be omni-directional for the purpose of an accurate localiza-
tion computation. Omni- directionality is achieved by ensuring an antenna gain close to
0 dB. The Z-shaped monopole antenna design [154] is fabricated on paper using in-house
inkjet-printed technology and is shown as part of the working prototype in Figure 91. The
antenna design is tweaked to ensure that its impedance is equal to (36.95− j71.77)Ω [155],
which is the conjugate of the optimum load impedance of the amplifier in the wireless trans-
mitter of the module prototype. This matching ensures that almost the whole amount of the
solar power harnessed is radiated out from the amplifier into the antenna as RF power.
The time to transmit one set of data packets was about 9ms, which, given that the total
transmit time available for a charge tank capacitance of 637 µ F is 43.23 ms, allows for
transmission of at least four sets of data packets per energy duty cycle [152].
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A.2 NF-CoA Instance Localization
Localization is the process of determining the physical position of a user or a device with
a particular degree of accuracy in indoor or outdoor environments. The need for truly
cognitive localization intelligence over extended physical distances on top of very low-cost
and mature wireless infrastructures is ever increasing. The physical location information
of a node can be a very useful or even indispensable functionality in a large number of
applications, such as device tracking, involving location and bearing, geographic aware
routing protocols and context- aware ubiquitous applications.
This section demonstrates the implementation of a very low-cost localization and de-
vice tracking system for the NF-CoA system on top of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
topology. Its major components are the NF-CoA wireless connectivity module, the fixed
wireless infrastructure and the central localization server. The first component has been
presented in Section A.1.1. The latter two components of the NF-CoA localization system
are described below and an evaluation of the accuracy of the system is presented.
A.2.1 Lateration as the Localization Technique
The localization technique deployed is the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)-based
lateration. Lateration is the approach according to which distances from three (trilatera-
tion) or more (multilateration) anchor nodes, whose exact absolute location coordinates
are known a priori, are used to estimate the node location. The estimated position is given
either relative to these anchors or to absolute coordinates, provided that the absolute coor-
dinates of the anchor positions are known.
The RSSI returned by a register of an anchor’s transceiver after the successful reception
of a packet from another node can serve as an estimate of the physical distance between
them. In particular, the distance from the emitter can be estimated by plugging this RSSI
value along with the known effective isotropically radiated power (EIRP), which takes into
account the transmission power, the antenna gain and the cables losses of the emitter, into
the Friis equation [50]. For the latter equation a particular path loss coefficient and model,
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which is most suitable to the actual surrounding environment, has to be chosen; in the
NF-CoA localization system for an open area environment that can be the two-ray ground
reflection model [156].
The two main characteristics that render this localization method attractive are that:
• neither additional hardware is required
• nor additional communication overhead has to be carried out.
However, there are a few factors that can degrade the accuracy of the RSSI-based ap-
proach:
• incorrect estimations are introduced when the RSSI is extracted from packets which
have followed an indirect path as a result of multipath fading [157], regardless of
whether or not they have been emitted from an anchor node in line of sight with the
receiver
• the fast-fading effect, as well as the dynamic nature of the environment, can result in
serious variations in the RSSI measurements over time
• since the widely used inexpensive radio transceivers are in most cases uncalibrated
[158], the actual transmission power and returned value of RSSI for the received data
can differ from the configured one and the measured RSSI value might not corre-
spond precisely to the actual received signal strength
Nevertheless, the rather painful, and for some application environments impractical,
process of calibrating every node in the network can entirely eliminate these latter prob-
lems. In the framework of this work, efforts to alleviate the above degrading effects have
largely been made before the trilateration is conducted. First, rigorous mapping of the RSSI
values recorded at fine grained set distances from an anchor node and for known transmit
power are conducted. Additionally, in order to remove the signal noise, the RSSI data is
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passed through Kalman filtering [159] with the use of appropriate procedure language R
functions [160], as discussed in subsection A.2.2.2.
A.2.2 The Overall System/Solution
The three major components that comprise the overall system, namely the NF-CoA wireless
connectivity module, the fixed wireless infrastructure and the central localization server,
have been designed to inter-operate as efficiently as possible.
A.2.2.1 The fixed wireless infrastructure
The key decision that has enabled the cost of the proposed localization solution to be dras-
tically low is the deployment of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) as the backbone infras-
tructure, instead of RFID readers which are not only much larger in size dimensions than
typical WSN motes but also two orders of magnitude more expensive, and the successful
establishment of an asynchronous communication link between a WSN node and the wire-
less connectivity module presented in the previous subsection. The motes that comprise
the WSN topology are the Crossbow Mica2 [150], shown in Figure 92; one of the most












Figure 92: The Crossbow Mica2 serving as the wireless sensor network anchor node for
the NF-CoA localization system.
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For the WSN infrastructure to be able to capture packets transmitted by the connec-
tivity modules and to extract the unique NF-CoA instance identity number and received
signal strength indicator in dBm scale before forwarding them to a central server, both an
anchor and an end node are required to “speak” the same protocol. Regarding the physical
layer, first the transmission has to be carried out over a frequency channel supported by
both sides, which in this case is 904.4 MHz and belongs to the unlicensed ISM (Industrial,
Scientific and Medicine) band, and second the transmitted signal has to be modulated with
FSK meeting specific frequency and modulation requirements. In regards with the link
layer, the WSN mote is expecting the packet to be properly encapsulated before extracting
the payload, which is the actual information carried. This “overhead” is not only used for
communication protocol purposes but can provide topology-related knowledge and error
handling functionality. More specifically, the format of the packet sent from the tag, which
is received by the TI CC1000 transceiver [161] of the WSN node, consists of the follow-
ing fields: Preamble, Sync, Addr, Type, Group, Length, Payload, and cyclic redundancy
check (CRC). The wireless data sequence of a whole 9 ms packet broadcasted by the NF-
CoA wireless module as captured with a real-time spectrum analyzer over time is shown
in Figure 93. The first two fields are used for the synchronization of the receiver’s clock
and the latter field, namely CRC, helps eliminate bit errors occurring within the sent bit
sequence by successfully recognizing a corrupted packet and discarding it. The Payload,
of course, conveys the unique identifier of the NF-CoA instance.
As opposed to the plain Assembly code developed to program the NF-CoA wireless
connectivity module , the Mica2 motes were programmed with NesC [162] code, a variant
of C code that represents in this case the middleware.
From the wireless radio propagation perspective, the WSN setup is carried out to allow
the WSN nodes to better receive the end node transmitted data, which eventually results
into a better localization estimation. The requirement for the clearance of at least the 80%
of the first Fresnel zone [34] is satisfied in most cases for the anchor nodes that are in line of
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Figure 93: The wireless data sequence of a whole 9 ms packet broadcasted by the NF-
CoA wireless module as captured with a real-time spectrum analyzer over time.
sight with the communication module. The Mica2 nodes that form the WSN are mounted
on lamp posts; an example is shown in Figure 94a. The average height of the motes above
the ground is 3.5 m and the height of the end device is around 1.5 m, the value of the
radius of the cross section of the ellipsoidal of the first Fresnel zone at the middle of the
distance, typically 75 m, is approximately 2.8 m and the same value just 0.5 m away from
the mote side is around 0.3 m. The drawing of Figure 94b can help visualize the radius of
the cross-sections of this ellipsoidal volume.
After the successful reception from a number of WSN anchor nodes of the beacon
message broadcasted by the end node, essential information, namely RSSI and unique
anchor identity number, is appended to the packet and forwarded to the localization central
server, presented in the next subsection, through either the XMesh [163], a fully featured
multihop, ad hoc, mesh routing protocol, or over an overlay 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.11 wireless
local area network consisting of three Linksys WRT54GL access points; one connected to
the central server and the other two connected through UTP cable to each of the eight Mica2
motes, the Ethernet interface of which was provided by an additional daughter-board. As is
the case with any wireless network, the purpose of the cost metric is to minimize the total
cost it takes for any mote to transmit to the base station. It is important to note that, instead
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(a) (b)
Figure 94: (a) A wireless sensor network anchor node mounted on a lamp post, (b) Sketch
of the ellipsoidal surface of the first Fresnel area between the transmitting NF-CoA wireless
connectivity module and the wireless sensor network anchor node.
of hop count which is the traditional distance vector routing cost metric, XMesh [163] uses
the minimum transmission cost metric, which minimizes the total number of transmissions
in delivering a packet over multiple hops to a destination.
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Figure 95: The multilateration localization technique as conducted in a real-world large
parking lot environment that is RF covered by a wireless sensor network. Identical unique
identification packets are broadcasted by the NF-CoA wireless connectivity module and
captured by multiple fixed anchor nodes for multilateration purposes.
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A.2.2.2 The Central Localization Server
The RSSI measurements captured by the anchor nodes from the broadcasted packets are
pooled on a central computer where they were selectively parsed for computations that
estimate the location of the NF-CoA instance. All the packets forwarded from the anchor
nodes, as described above, are time-stamped as they arrive at the central server location and
are imported as message entries into a Sqlite database of the lateration application [164].
Data validity checks are the first type of process performed to the message entries, i.e.,
a number of filters are applied to reject invalid entries as a result of, mainly, bit errors
introduced. Then the RSSI data, after it is filtered for bit sequence inconsistencies, is
extracted and passed through Kalman filtering [159] with the use of appropriate procedure
language R functions [160, 164] in order to remove any signal noise present. Moreover, the
transceiver calibration issues revealed previously are dealt with the conductance of separate
test measurements right after the deployment of the anchor nodes. Specifically, RSSI values
recorded at fine grained set distances from an anchor node and for known transmit power
are rigorously mapped for different field wireless propagation profiles; for example, for
different percentages of occupation of the parking lot by vehicles.
Since the localization solution is based on the RSSI-based lateration technique, the
filtered RSSI data is used for the distance estimation between the tag and a particular WSN
node with the use of a two-ray tracing radio propagation loss model. The time-stamp
information availability enables the use of a timer function, which loads data from specific
time periods back in the past relative to the time the location estimate is initiated. Finally,
the multilateration is performed as a database procedure call [164] and in turn functions are




In order to verify the feasibility of this proposed solution for the remote localization and
position tracking solution for the NF-CoA system, actual measurements of the location
estimate errors are taken at different positions of the instance in two different real-world
fields, covered by fixed WSN anchor nodes. This location estimate error is equivalent to
the Euclidean distance between the estimated absolute coordinates returned by the program
and the coordinates of the actual position of the NF-CoA instance. The first one is the
rooftop of the Georgia Tech hotel’s parking deck and the second one is a large car auction
dealer’s parking lot in Southern Atlanta, right next to the Atlanta Hartsfield Airport.
Both WSN topologies are designed to allow the WSN anchor nodes, which are mounted
on lamp posts, to better RF cover and receive the transmitted data by the tag, which results
in better localization estimates. The NF-CoA instance is hung from the rear mirror of a
vehicle that is driven around at different positions of the fields to verify and benchmark the
returned location estimations.
A.2.3.1 The Georgia Tech Hotel’s parking deck rooftop
The satellite image of the 80 m × 80 m area of the rooftop of the empty of the parking
deck of Georgia Tech Hotel is shown in Figure 96. Six WSN anchor nodes are mounted,
as described previously, on existing lamp posts that are denoted with increasing numbers
“3” through “8”. Four of them are placed on the periphery of the topology and two of them
around the center.
Two localization estimate examples returned in Google Earth, namely hhr-estA and hh-
estC, are pinpointed in Figure 96 and can be compared to their respective real position,
denoted with the car icons A and C, respectively.
A.2.3.2 A large parking lot
The WSN topology consists, in this case, of eight anchor nodes that are denoted by the red
pins numbered “3” through “10” in Figure 97 and the placement of which resembles to an
asterisk topology. The diameter of the area covered by the overall topology is around 190
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Figure 96: The WSN topology and measurement positions on Georgia Tech hotel’s parking
deck rooftop.
m, and the radius of the area RF covered by each anchor node is roughly 90 m. Conse-
quently, the percentage of the overlapping areas within the overall field is high, as desired.
The green car icons correspond to 24 different predetermined positions from which an
attempt to estimate their location is made so as to get an initial evaluation of the perfor-
mance of the localization system.
Two examples of the localization estimates returned in Google Earth and compared to
their real placement are shown in Figure 98. The mean, maximum, and minimum estimate
errors are summarized in Table 9. It is worth noting that the average error is reasonable
when the transmitter tag is located in an area around the center of the topology. In contrast,
the location estimate error increases as the transmitter moves more toward the periphery
or even outside of the topology, where optimal coverage by multiple anchor nodes is not
provided. This latter value, nevertheless, needs not been taken into consideration as the NF-
CoA transmitting module will always be considered to move in an area that is optimally
RF covered.
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Figure 97: The WSN topology and measurement positions within a large parking lot.
! 	  (a) (b)
Figure 98: Two examples of localization estimation errors.
Table 9: Summary of the localization estimation error results.
min value 1.62 m
max value 95.9 m
mean value of 24 positions in whole topology 38.56 m
mean value in center of topology 24.52 m
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